The adoption of the UPR outcome of Gambia, initially scheduled for 18th March, was postponed to 26th due to the fact that the country had not indicated a clear position on all recommendations during the review. Following a series of consultations between OHCHR and Gambia, the latter eventually provided a response to the recommendations – though no delegation from Gambia participated in the adoption of the report. Another country, Bosnia and Herzegovina, announced that it would only take note of the 167 recommendations received during their review (October 2014) at this session, even though it had also been expected to provide its final responses on recommendations. The delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina committed to come back to the Council to provide its ‘detailed answers to all recommendations’ by the 29th session in June 2015. Many observers felt that the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina may set an unwelcome precedent.

During the debate under item 6, several states and NGOs took the floor to underline the current challenges of the UPR while recognizing its added value to share best practices and improve the human rights situation on the ground.

Among the interventions was one by the UK on behalf of a group of 50 countries. These states committed themselves to ensuring that all their recommendations will be precise, practical, constructive, forward looking and implementable, and that they would show restraint on the number of recommendations given, with a maximum of 2 per state (given to each reporting state). It is also to be observed that the issue of limiting recommendations is opposed by a coalition of NGOs led by UPR Info, on the grounds that such an approach would narrow the scope of the review of a country and leave important issues uncovered.

It is to be recalled that a similar statement was made during the 22nd session of the Council in 2013 by a group of states led by the UK, Morocco and Brazil. URG carried out an analysis on whether these states have honoured the commitment made (i.e. limiting their recommendations to 2). The URG’s analysis, conducted from the 15th to the 19th session of the UPR Working Group, shows that only the Netherlands, UK and Brazil have consistently respected their voluntary commitment. Even then, there were exceptions – for example Brazil made 4 recommendations to Israel and the UK made 3 recommendations to Canada.

Resolutions, Decisions and President’s Statements

The 28th session of the Council concluded with the adoption of 37 texts: 34 resolutions and 3 President’s statements (PRSTs). This represents a decrease of 12% from the number of texts adopted at the 24th session in March 2014, and the lowest number since 2010. The drop – together with a related deeper focus on the implementation of existing resolutions – may be due to a renewed focus on the relevant (i.e. methods of work) provisions of the Council’s institution-building package (IBP) and 5-year review outcome. This renewed focus has been driven by Turkey and Norway through a cross regional statement, with 73 countries in total, on ‘improving methods of work in the Council’ (delivered under item 3), by engagement on this matter by the new President of the Council, and by the URG’s recent report on the Council’s work and output.

Around 38% of the texts were adopted by a recorded vote.

24 (65%) of the texts adopted by the Council were thematic in nature, while only 13 (35%) dealt with country-specific situations. Of these, 9 addressed human rights violations (under agenda items 4, 7 and 10) and 4 sought to protect human rights through technical assistance and capacity building (under item 10).

21 of the adopted texts (57%) had Programme Budget Implications (PBI), requiring appropriations of $11,928,350 not previously covered by the UN regular budget.

During item 3, a group of 49 states again drew attention to the growing gap between the ambition of the Council (as reflected in the large number of resolutions and mandated activities) and the resources made available to the human rights pillar. The statement argued that establishing ‘sustainable resourcing over the coming years should be a top priority for both UN member states and the Office.’

Conclusion and analysis

One of the more contentious issues faced by states at the 28th Session was the consideration of the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) report (see URG’s blog on this issue here) and the subsequent resolution, tabled by Cuba, on the composition of the staff of the Office. This was eventually adopted by vote, with developing countries (with the exception of Morocco) voting in favour and developed countries voted against. By adopting this resolution, the Council invites the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies to give consideration to the relevant sections of the report of the JIU and to the implementation of the resolution. The requests for vote (on both the specific paragraph dealing with the JIU report and on the resolution as a whole) was made on the ground that such an issue should be dealt with by the GA’s Fifth Committee, and the reference to the JIU report undermines the independence of the High Commissioner by introducing the idea of Council oversight of the OHCHR. At the end of the 28th session, a statement by a group of 52 states again drew attention to the dangers inherent in such oversight.

For many observers, the outcome of this session was a glass both half empty and half full.

There were, according to observers, some positive developments such as the creation of a new mandate on the right to privacy, including mass surveillance; the consensual adoption of two important and potential divisive resolutions on religion – one following up on resolution 16/18 on religious intolerance (OIC), and its sister resolution on freedom of religion (EU); and the adoption of resolutions on DPRK, Iran, Myanmar and Syria. The latter resolutions are important considering the Council’s key mandate to respond to human rights violations in specific situations.

Other positive developments include the proactive engagement of China on a number of issues. For example, it led an initiative, through securing a PRST, drawing attention to the 20th anniversary of the Fourth World Conference on Women and the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. China also delivered a statement on behalf of the Like Minded Group (LMG) on the UPR Trust Fund on implementation of recommendations, drawing particular attention to the needs of Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States.

On the downside, the Council failed to effectively address human rights violations in South Sudan and in Iraq, violations that may amount to crimes against humanity. There was no resolution at all on South Sudan, while on Iraq, a weak and one-sided resolution, drafted and tabled by the country itself, was adopted under item 10 (capacity-building and technical cooperation). Such developments call into question the credibility of the Council and suggest that delegations are not serious about implementing the mandate handed down to them by heads of states and governments in GA resolution 60/1 and by the GA in resolution 60/251.

Again, general thematic debates tended to take up the majority of the Council’s time during its 28th session. This is contrary to the Council’s intergovernmental mandate.

As underscored by the President of the Council in his closing remarks, another negative development has been the growing number of acts of intimidation and attacks against civil society representatives and human rights defenders. This is despite the fact that states, through resolution 16/21, collectively rejected any act of intimidation or reprisal against individuals or groups that have cooperated, or are seeking to cooperate, with the UN and its mechanisms in the field of human rights.

As noted above, initiatives such as the Turkey-Norway cross-regional statement on the Council’s methods of work appear to have contributed to a decrease in the number of resolutions considered by the Council at this session, as compared to the 2014 March session. One reason for this is that states have been reminded of, and have taken steps in line with, the relevant provisions of resolution 16/21 containing the outcome of the Council’s 5-year review. For example, at the 28th session New Zealand and Mexico decided to biennalize their initiatives on disabilities. As well as keeping the Council’s agenda and programme of work manageable, such initiatives also provide more time for states to focus on the implementation of existing resolutions and their impact on the ground.

With this in mind, the surprising position adopted by Brazil on the issue of biennalisation is disappointing. In its statement prior to the adoption of the resolution on the right of persons with disabilities (L5), Brazil claimed that biennalisation undermines the prerogatives and sovereign rights of states to introduce new resolutions. This, however, represents an incorrect reading of paragraph 48 of resolution 16/21. Indeed, it is ironic that Brazil should take such a stance, when it was the former Permanent Representative of Brazil, while facilitating negotiations on methods of work during the 5-year review, who proposed that states should consider submitting regular thematic initiatives on a triennial basis. It is also worth noting that part of the rationale for biennialisation or triennialisation, in addition to freeing up time to discuss implementation, is to ensure sufficient time to address violations of human rights, in accordance with GA resolution 60/251. As noted in URG’s recent report on the Council’s work and output since 2006, only the US and the EU (or leading EU member states) regularly take steps to fulfil this GA mandate by tabling resolutions under item 4 on the violation of human rights in specific situations. As shown in Human Rights Watch’s ‘2014 Votes Count’ report, Brazil rarely contributed to country specific debates in 2014 only taking the floor during the Commission of Inquiry on Syria. At this session, the abstention of Brazil on the Council’s resolution on the continuing grave deterioration in the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic has been labelled as disappointing in several quarters. It reveals a lack of leadership in the Council and, moreover, may lead  an informed observer to question Brazil’s claim to a permanent seat on the Security Council.