Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States seemed less interested in upholding human rights worldwide – in 2018 President Donald Trump’s decided to withdraw from the UN Human Rights Council. Chinese diplomacy used the opportunity to promote its competitive vision of the concept of human rights to the fullest. Under President Joe Biden, the U.S. returned as the sitting member of the HRC, but one of Trump’s first decisions after taking office in 2025 was to withdraw again. Does this mean that the United States will surrender this field of competition, which is crucial to maintaining a key position on the international stage?
The issue of respecting human rights in U.S.-China relations got its momentum during the COVID-19 pandemic. Rising geopolitical tensions between powers extended beyond traditional geopolitics into the realm of normative security. Normative security is ensured when a state can shape widespread recognition and applications of the norms and values that the state considers vital for national and global security and realize its goals in the international arena. It is delivered by diffusing strategic narratives in international organizations – defining the state’s identity and constructing a threat coming from a rival power. This allows them to safeguard their ideological foundations and build coalitions around the norms – “an alignment of belief”.
The rivalry between the U.S. and China at the HRC was to promote different concepts of human rights. In this regard, China recognizes the importance of second and third-generation human rights: economic, social, cultural, and collective and solidarity rights, at the expense of their first generation: civil and political rights, the primacy of which is emphasized by the United States. China’s framing of the “right to development” as a fundamental human right seeks to challenge the Western emphasis on civil and political rights. Similarly, the United States frames issues of the rule of law and personal freedom as cornerstones of democratic societies, critiquing authoritarian practices.
The COVID-19 pandemic acted as a catalyst, intensifying this normative battle. The tit-for-tat game begun. Both the U.S. and China employed framing tactics to undermine each other’s position in international affairs while also highlighting their positive attributes. The U.S. narrative focused on portraying China as authoritarian and oppressive, citing allegations such as the treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Besides, the Trump administration accused China of transmitting the virus. The U.S. presents itself as a champion of democracy, counteracting authoritarian regimes that disregard civil and political rights, particularly the right to life, promotes digital freedoms and combating disinformation.
China, in response, refutes these allegations and accused the U.S. of hypocrisy, pointing out American human rights abuses domestically and internationally. Moreover, China leveraged themes such as health as a global public good to appeal to developing nations, promoting a vision of human rights rooted in collective well-being. China acted to enhance its global influence by presenting its model of pandemic management as effective and people-centered, also addressing inequalities exacerbated by the pandemic, and framing HRC resolutions in attractive ways to developing countries. Prioritizing material well-being allowed China to portray itself as a leader defending and defining human rights, challenging their liberal version.
The empirical analysis of resolutions and voting patterns underscores how strategic narratives translate into coalition-building. The HRC is a “multilateral bubble” where establishing alliances is crucial. The effectiveness of strategic framing by the United States and China can be evaluated through their ability to forge international coalitions and influence the adoption of resolutions within the HRC. China builds coalitions of like-minded countries around specific resolutions about development or happiness that both promote a new understanding of human rights and are critical of the United States and its allies. While several countries almost always support China’s position, it is difficult to speak of a permanent bloc. However, China can convince developing countries that are critical of the West, religiously conservative and authoritarian, to support its cause. In the American coalition in the HRC, more countries continuously stay in line with the U.S and country specific resolutions, but the U.S. cannot block Chinese ones. This is mainly due to the general and positive message of many Chinese proposals, which sometimes align with U.S. allies’ policies. It is worth noting that many countries abstained from voting on resolutions to maintain an “equidistance” between the United States and China, thus avoiding an overt alignment with either side.
The Chinese also lobbied for countries not to join anti-China resolutions. They referred to the need to preserve good relations but threatened, unofficially but firmly, to worsen them if deemed necessary. Apart from promoting the first generation of human rights, American administrations have looked to counterbalance China’s active presence in the HRC. They mainly approach this in the form of joint statements, which have resulted in counterstatements initiated by the Chinese side. As the U.S. is an easy target for a counterattack on human rights, the initiators of the joint statements or resolutions are usually U.S. allied countries, which have an excellent record for respecting human rights. This creates a situation where like-minded countries act as proxies for the United States. The Americans’ way of lobbying is less overt than the Chinese. As China organizes South-South cooperation on human rights, the United States does so with the European Union which is much more active in lobbying. Representatives of its member states are even assigned tasks in convincing individual countries and are coordinated by the European Union delegation.
The COVID-19 pandemic created space for normative competition. Beyond the HRC, this rivalry carries profound implications for the future of multilateral institutions and the global human rights regime. The politicization of the HRC and the increasing division into ideological blocs threaten its effectiveness as a platform for universal human rights. Currently, China continues to gain influence among developing nations, and the United States is giving up not only its leadership, but also its membership in many international organizations. As Trump creates significant tensions with his allies as well, the likelihood of them acting as U.S. proxies is diminishing. However, it should be anticipated that democratic states will continue to defend their version of human rights. It is also likely that they will put some of the human rights belonging to the third generation higher on their agenda. This may encourage more states to support meaningful resolutions from the Global North at the HRC.
For further reading please check: Mierzejewski, D., & Matera, P. (2025). The Sino-American Struggle for Normative Security: The Strategic Framing and Shaping of Alignment of Belief in the Human Rights Council During the COVID-19 Pandemic. Journal of Contemporary China, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2025.2463380
Image: Creative Commons, FreeMalaysiaToday.com
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