FX 17 – Prospects, opportunities, and challenges for the Human Rights Council to contribute to the General Assembly’s 2021-2026 review of the Council’s status

At the 2005 World Summit, UN member States decided to strengthen the human rights pillar by creating the Human Rights Council in replacement of the Commission on Human Rights. This decision was taken based on proposals contained in the-then UN Secretary-General’s report ‘In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all.’According to the report, the establishment of a smaller standing Human Rights Council ‘would accord human rights a more authoritative position, corresponding to the primacy of human rights in the Charter of the United Nations.’ The report left it to States to decide whether the Council should ‘be a principal organ of the UN or a subsidiary body of the General Assembly [GA].’

In March 2006, States adopted GA resolution 60/251 formally establishing the Council as a subsidiary organ of the GA. With this resolution, they decided that ‘the General Assembly shall review the status of the Council within five years.’At the same time, the GA called upon the Council to ‘review its work and functioning five years after its establishment and report to the General Assembly.’

In March 2011, after completing the review of its work and functioning as requested in GA resolution 60/251, the Council adopted resolution 16/21.’The GA recognised this outcome in resolution 65/281 and decided to maintain the status of the Council as a subsidiary body. It further decided ‘to consider again the question of whether to maintain this status […] at a time no sooner than ten years [i.e., 2021] and no later than fifteen years’ [i.e., 2026]. On this occasion however, the GA did not request the Council to conduct a further review of its work and functioning.

The last serious discussion between States on the 2021-2026 review, and especially ‘Geneva’s’ contribution thereto, took place in the context of the fifth Glion Human Rights Dialogue (Glion VI) in 2020. Thereafter, various Council Presidents tried (yet often failed) to take the debate forward (partly due to geopolitics, partly to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic).

The strong view of participants at Glion VI (and at Glion V the year before) was that ‘Geneva’ should indeed provide a contribution to help inform the GA’s deliberations. However, there was no consensus over the nature or timing of that contribution.

In February 2019, these issues were raised again in a 2019 Council Bureau ‘Roadmap for 2019.’ The paper noted that the absence in GA resolution 65/281 of an explicit request for the Council to conduct a review of its work and functioning had led to discussions over: ‘(1) whether and how the Council should contribute to the 2021-2026 review as it did in 2011; and (2) whether a review of the Council’s work and functioning should be undertaken?’

On 28 March 2019, President of the Council H.E. Coly Seck (Senegal) convened a first open informal consultation seeking the initial views of States on how, if at all, the Council might usefully contribute to the 2021-2026 review. As during Glion V, there was a clear sense that ‘Geneva’ should contribute. It was repeatedly noted that because experience and expertise about the Council largely reside in Geneva, it would be necessary for delegations to the Council and other Geneva-based stakeholders to feed into the New York-based review. Moreover, although some participants argued that it is too soon to begin talks in Geneva, others already made concrete suggestions regarding the possible form of an eventual contribution.

Notwithstanding these initial ideas, there was also a strong view that the Council should ultimately take its lead from the GA (even though, of course, it is the same States represented in both bodies). This might come, for example, in the form of an informal signal from the President of the GA (e.g., in a letter to the President of the Council) or in a more formal GA decision (i.e., a resolution providing the Council with a specific mandate to act).

Against this background, the dialogue will consider the following questions:

1. Does the broad sense, evident at Glion V and VI, that the Council and ‘Geneva’ should contribute to the GA’s 2021-2026 status review still hold?
2. When should the Council begin these deliberations (and how can it encourage the President of the GA to request input)?
3. How (i.e., process) should such a contribution be elaborated and made available to the GA, and when should this happen?
4. Is there still agreement that a ‘Geneva contribution’ should come in the form a ‘self-reflection’ exercise, covering the Council’s success and failures, and where changes are necessary so that it can better fulfil its mandate?
5. Should ‘Geneva’s’ more substantive contribution to the GA’s status review also include an independent assessment of the Council’s work and delivery by, for example, the High Commissioner?