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A window onto cooperation, dialogue, leadership, and policymaking at the UN Human Rights Council

THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL IN 2022

LEADERSHIP, RESOLVE AND COOPERATION AT THE UN'S MAIN HUMAN RIGHTS BODY
leadership, and Council elections.

The yourHRC.org portal, together with a number of related reports, are designed to provide country-specific information on cooperation with the Council and its mechanisms, participation in Council debates and dialogues, member State voting patterns, political leadership, and Council elections.
Introduction

A key conclusion of the Universal Rights Group’s analysis of the Human Rights Council in 2021 was that much of the ‘oxygen’ fuelling the Council’s regular work had been consumed by growing Sino-US rivalry, following the US’ re-engagement with the Council under President Joe Biden. Universal Rights Group (URG) predicted that this geopolitical rivalry – and its impacts on the Council – would likely increase in 2022 as the US once again took up a seat on the UN’s apex human rights body.

In the end, that prediction proved only half right. The principal reason for that was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the human rights consequences thereof, which understandably came to dominate the Council’s agenda in 2022, especially in the first half of the year. Notwithstanding, after the summer, the situation in China and Sino-US rivalry came back to the fore, following the High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet’s visit to China and when, just before leaving office, she agreed to release OHCHR’s report on the human rights situation in Xinjiang province. Shortly afterwards, at the Council’s 51st session, the US, UK, and others tabled a resolution following up on the report and calling for a debate on the situation in Xinjiang at the Council’s next session. The resolution was narrowly rejected by Council members – the second time the Council has failed to adopt a draft text in a little over a year (a resolution on Yemen was rejected in late 2021).

In addition to these and other country situations, a second key trend at the Council in 2022 was continued polarization and growing divergence on issues related to societal or cultural norms. This clash has centred on issues around women’s rights (and ‘gender’), including sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), sexual orientation and gender identity, and even – over recent years – children’s rights; and has tended to pit more socially-progressive worldviews against more socially-conservative ones.

Such disagreements and divisions have, of course, been present ever since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and centre on the tension between the universality of human rights ‘regardless of [States’] political, economic and cultural systems,’ and the latitude available to States to promote and protect those rights in light of ‘national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds,’ (paragraph 5 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action).

This inherent tension, reflected in different parts of paragraph 5, has led to varying interpretations of international human rights law by different States (as evidenced by many of the reservations made by States parties to the international human rights treaties). It has also increasingly played out, at the Council, in debates over whether certain practices and laws, particularly those touching on societal issues (e.g., women’s place in society), represent a violation of universal human rights or are acceptable in light of States’ different ‘historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.’

49th session of the Human Rights Council

As noted above, 2022 was expected to be dominated, like 2021, by Sino-US rivalry. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine ensured that the first Council session of the year (HRC49) was instead dominated by efforts to hold Russia to account for the gross and systematic human rights violations, which may amount to war crimes, perpetrated against Ukraine’s civilian population.

At the start of the session, the Council’s response was expected to be characterised by four possible steps – or a combination thereof: an urgent debate on the situation in Ukraine, the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry (COI) to investigate Russian violations of international law, the establishment of a new Special Procedures mandate on Russia itself (e.g., to investigate the suppression of domestic dissent), and/or the suspension of Russia’s Council membership rights. In the end, only the first two of these steps materialised at HRC49, though Russia’s membership was soon after suspended by the General Assembly (7 April), and a new Special Rapporteur mandate on the situation in Russia was established before year-end (see below). Throughout this time, and across all these developments, the delegation of Ukraine displayed remarkable political leadership, courage, and dignity.

After a rapid adjustment of its programme of work, the Council held an urgent debate on Russia’s actions in Ukraine on 3 and 4 March. At the end of the debate, the Council passed a resolution (adopted by vote with 32 in favour, 2 against and 13 abstentions) establishing an Independent International Commission of Inquiry (COI) to investigate all alleged violations of human rights in the context of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine. With the resolution the Council conferred upon the new COI an unprecedentedly strong mandate to pursue accountability for the violations committed by Russia and Russians in Ukraine. In another sign of the Council’s
flexibility in responding quickly to events, OHCHR and the Council President then moved quickly to appoint Commissioners and recruit technical support staff for the COI.

The issue of and fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also spilled over into other Council debates and decisions. For example, Russia tabled numerous amendments to a draft resolution on the rights of persons with disabilities, complaining about the exclusion of its athletes from the Paralympics (all were withdrawn after the sponsors made oral amendments to the text).

In addition to human rights violations resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Council also addressed various other important concerns at HRC49 – both thematic and country-focused.

Regarding the former, one of the great success stories of the Council during the first decade-and-a-half of its existence has been the establishment (2012) of a Trust Fund to support the participation of LDCs and SIDS. HRC49 saw the adoption of a new resolution marking the Trust Fund’s tenth anniversary, recognising its many achievements, and seeking to further strengthen the Fund’s effectiveness by: facilitating Small State participation in Council special sessions; organising briefings for LDC and SIDS delegations at the General Assembly’s Third Committee on the Council’s work; and organising four further regional workshops. Notwithstanding, an important opportunity was missed to reinforce the Fund’s ability to support those LDCs and SIDS choosing to stand for election to the Council – as well as those that successfully secure a seat.

A further important thematic resolution adopted at HRC49 centred on the contribution of human rights defenders, including women human rights defenders, in conflict and post-conflict situations, to the enjoyment and realisation of human rights. Although Norway’s regular resolution on human rights defenders had been adopted by consensus over recent years, on this occasion Russia called a vote on the text – a vote it lost heavily (39 in favour, 0 against, and 8 abstentions).

The 50th session of the Human Rights Council

The landmark fiftieth session began dramatically when the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, announced she would not be seeking a second term and would shortly end her tenure. This came as a surprise to many, as rumours in New York and Geneva had suggested she would continue. It is possible that the heavy criticism she received over her visit to China and in particular her end of visit press statement, as well as the pressure she came under inside and outside her Office to publish OHCHR’s report on Xinjiang, was ultimately responsible for her decision to step down. Whatever the reason, the fact that even a politician of the stature of Bachelet, a former President of Chile, struggled to ‘balance’ the different aspects of her mandate (being required to simultaneously work with States and also publicly criticise them) raises the question of whether the post of High Commissioner for Human Rights is indeed an ‘impossible job.’

Later, in her statement to the high-level event marking the Council’s fiftieth session, the High Commissioner praised the work of the body over its first 16 years. Over that time, she said, ‘it has grown into a forum that addresses virtually every human rights issue through open, honest, and
Conservatism vs. liberalism

There was significant media coverage, in the run up to HRC50, about the US Supreme Court’s blows against women’s rights, especially sexual and reproductive health rights; yet it has long gone largely unnoticed in the press that the exact same ideological struggle, between conservative UN member States (principally members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation – the OIC, and Russia) and more liberal, progressive States (principally the West and countries of Latin America), has been a main undercurrent of Council politics for the past decade.

At HRC50, this struggle played out in divisions over three draft Council resolutions: on the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, on the elimination of all forms discrimination against women and girls, and especially on the renewal of the mandate of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI).

Regarding the latter, OIC States tabled 13 ‘hostile’ amendments at HRC50. The voting on each amendment was extremely close, suggesting the 2022 Council membership was finely balanced between more conservative more progressive States, though in the end only one (relatively unimportant) amendment was adopted. Amendment 1, which would have changed the name and focus of the mandate, and thus destroyed its purpose, was rejected with 19 in favour, 23 against, and 3 abstentions.

The final draft resolution, with that single amendment, presented by Uruguay, was adopted with 23 in favour, 17 against (including China) and 7 abstentions (including Poland).

The draft resolution on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and girls, presented by Mexico, similarly faced a large number of written amendments (by Nigeria, Egypt, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia) aiming to remove terms such as ‘gender’ (and instead proposed ‘sex’), ‘bodily integrity,’ ‘safe abortion,’ ‘sex education,’ ‘comprehensive sex education,’ and ‘reproductive rights.’

In the end all amendments were rejected by relatively healthy margins, and the final resolution was adopted by consensus.

The draft resolution on violence against women was likewise eventually adopted by consensus after a Russian amendment was easily rejected (with just nine votes in favour).

Afghanistan

There was concern, throughout 2022, that the conflict in Afghanistan would pull attention away from other situations of serious human rights violations around the world, including the situation in Afghanistan following the Taliban’s takeover of government. It was therefore welcome that HRC50 saw the adoption of a resolution (following an urgent debate on the subject held on 1 July) focused on the human rights of women and girls in Afghanistan – rights that have been under systematic attack since the Taliban’s coup d’état.

The resolution, eventually adopted by consensus, called upon the Taliban to reverse policies and practices that restrict the rights of women and girls, including their right to education. As well as being substantively important, the resolution is also symbolically significant because it is a rare yet positive example of a ‘hybrid’ resolution – i.e., one that looks at certain rights or the rights of certain groups in a defined geographical context. Such hybrid texts, which benefit from specificity and relevance, should be used more often at the Council.

Other country specific resolutions adopted at HRC50 covered situations in Belarus, Eritrea, Myanmar, and Sudan.

The 51st session of the Human Rights Council

HRC51 saw the return of Sino-Western rivalry to the foreground of the Council’s work, and – ultimately – an important political victory for China as it successfully fended off efforts by the US and its allies to secure the adoption of a resolution on Xinjiang province. This disappointment – for Western States and civil society, but especially for the victims of abuses in Xinjiang – was however partially offset by the adoption of a further resolution on alleged human rights violations committed by another permanent member of the Security Council (Russia), this time on the situation inside Russia.
Although the Council had repeatedly addressed alleged violations perpetrated by Russia during the course of the year, this had hitherto been limited to abuses committed in the context of the country’s invasion of Ukraine (see above). The EU’s decision to bring forward a draft resolution (under agenda item 4) on the human rights situation in Russia itself was therefore momentous – the first time an attempt had been made to bring this powerful State onto the international stage.

The draft decision (under item 2) on the ‘situation of human rights in the Russian Federation,’ including growing repression aimed at stifling domestic criticism of the war in Ukraine, and establish a new Special Rapporteur mandate on the human rights situation in Russia.

The draft decision (under Item 4) on the human rights situation in Russia. The text was rejected by a vote of 17 in favour, 6 against, and 24 abstentions. On this occasion nearly all OIC and African States abstained – effectively allowing the resolution to pass.

In addition to the text on the situation in Russia, HRC51 also saw resolutions adopted on the situations in Afghanistan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Sri Lanka, Yemen, and Venezuela. With the first of these, the Council extended and strengthened the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan, providing it, in effect, with some of the characteristics of a COI. After HRC50, in November, the Council also held an important special session on the situation in Iran, especially in light of the authorities’ crackdown against women human rights defenders.

The US and its allies may have had a greater chance of success (because China would have had less time to mobilise against such a move) if they had sent a letter to the Council President at the start of the session requesting an urgent debate on the situation in Xinjiang. However, the core group believed an urgent debate would not be appropriate as Xinjiang did not represent a ‘rapidly deteriorating situation.’ In any case, such a letter was not sent, leaving the UK, US, and wider core group to take the brave step of trying to secure enough votes to adopt a Council decision to hold a debate on the situation in Xinjiang at the Council’s next session (March 2023).

Notwithstanding the limited ‘ask’ of such a decision, it was clear from the start that this would be a tall order considering China’s growing influence at the Council (mirroring its growing geopolitical power). Indeed, China mobilised huge resources against the draft, both in Geneva and in capitals.

The following day did, however, see Council members take a step towards reasserting the principle that no State is above the international rule of law, when they adopted resolution L.13 on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation with 17 in favour, 6 against, and 24 abstentions. On this occasion nearly all OIC and African States abstained – effectively allowing the resolution to pass.

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The core group and Western NGOs claimed after the vote that these events represented a moral victory – demonstrating a willingness on the part of 17 Council members to hold all States, no matter how powerful, accountable for serious human rights violations. However, while there is undoubtedly some truth to this, it is difficult to escape the conclusion, on balance, that the vote result represented a blow to the credibility of the Council. It also represented a cruel blow for the victims of abuses in Xinjiang and their search for justice.

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The nuclear legacy in the Marshall Islands

The thematic (or hybrid) text that received the most attention during HRC51 was a draft resolution on ‘Technical assistance and capacity building to address the human rights implications of the nuclear legacy in the Marshall Islands,’ presented by Fiji, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Samoa, and Vanuatu. This was the first Council text to refer to the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment since the UN recently recognised this right.

The draft resolution, presented by a representative of the Marshall Islands in a personal and deeply moving statement, asked OHCHR to prepare a report on addressing the challenges and barriers to the full realisation and enjoyment of the human rights of the people of the Marshall Islands, stemming from the State’s nuclear legacy.

Sadly, rather than engaging with the serious (and ongoing) human rights impacts of nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands (including impacts on the right to a healthy environment, the right to health, and the right to life), the world’s nuclear powers joined together to criticise the initiative on technical/procedural grounds. For example, India argued that OHCHR does not have the expertise to address cross-cutting nuclear, environmental, and health matters; Pakistan argued that that the Council is not the appropriate forum to discuss such cross-cutting issues; and the UK said there is not yet international consensus on the legal basis of the human right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment. The US, in addition to reiterating some of the above arguments, made clear that it has no legal responsibility for the possible human rights consequences of nuclear testing, and challenged the factual, causal, and legal bases of the resolution.

The resolution was nonetheless adopted by consensus (though the UK and US disassociated from key paragraphs).

HRC51 also saw three new resolutions focused on technology and human rights: one by Austria and Panama on new and emerging technologies in the military domain (eventually adopted by consensus); one by Greece on neurotechnology and human rights (consensus); and one by Israel, Argentina, Germany, and Greece on cyberbullying (consensus). While each of these resolutions addressed important issues, the growing number of Council initiatives on new technologies (and the growing number of resolutions more generally – HRC51 saw the joint highest number of texts ever considered – 42 – at a single Council session (42 were also considered at HRC37)), suggests that delegations should consider a more holistic approach to new technologies and human rights – an approach based on an understanding that irrespective of the type of technology in question, the relevant human rights principles remain the same.

The fight against racism should be something that unites Council members and observers, yet HRC51 again saw divisions between African and Western States over the UN’s approach to addressing racial discrimination and related intolerance. After heated discussions in the open informal consultations on a draft African Group resolution on ‘From rhetoric to reality: a global call for concrete action against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerances,’ the text was eventually called to a vote by the US and adopted with 32 in favour, 9 against, and 6 abstentions. It will be important, if delegations truly wish to reverse growing polarisation at the Council, for African Group and Western Group members to meet and find common ground on this crucial issue.

Implementation and impact

There were important positive signs at HRC51 that delegations are taking steps to strengthen the implementation, by States, of their international human rights obligations and commitments, and improve the level of capacity-building support provided to States to assist them in that regard.

For example, the session saw the adoption of a resolution, presented by Paraguay and Brazil, that will see the convening of two inter-sessional seminars to allow States to share good practices in the establishment and strengthening of national mechanisms for implementation, reporting, and follow-up (NMIRFs). Where they exist around the world (principally in small developing countries), NMIRFs have been seen to have a significant positive impact on levels of implementation of UN human rights recommendations, and on regularity of periodic reporting.

HRC51 also saw the adoption of an ambitious resolution presented by Thailand and a wider core group that initiates consultations on how to strengthen the delivery, by the Council and wider UN system, of technical assistance and capacity-building support under item 10 of the Council’s agenda. The aim of any reform of the Council’s work under item 10 should be to improve access to such support for all States, and to focus on helping them implement relevant Special Procedures, Treaty Body, and UPR recommendations.
Members of the Human Rights Council (Council) hold the main responsibility for pursuing and fulfilling the body’s important mandate and thereby “promoting universal respect for the protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all” (GA resolution 60/251).

When establishing the Council, the UN General Assembly (GA) decided that it would consist of 47 member States, elected by a majority of its members. In making their choice, members of the GA would take into account the contribution of the candidates to the promotion and protection of human rights, as well as their voluntary pledges and commitments.

The GA, furthermore, decided that elected members should uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights and fully cooperate with the Council and its mechanisms. Moreover, it was agreed that the Council’s methods of work would be transparent, fair, and impartial, enable genuine dialogue, be results-oriented, allow for subsequent follow-up discussions to recommendations and their implementation, and allow for substantive interaction with Special Procedures and other mechanisms.

yourHRC.org aims to promote transparency around the degree to which the Council and its members are delivering on this crucial mandate, passed to them by the GA and, ultimately, entrusted to them by ‘the Peoples of the United Nations’ described in the UN Charter.
PART I

2022

THE WORK, OUTPUT, AND PERFORMANCE OF THE COUNCIL AND ITS MECHANISMS
THE COUNCIL’S FOCUS AND OUTPUT: RESOLUTIONS AND MECHANISMS

Number of Council texts adopted over time

- 98 texts were adopted in 2022, representing a 16% increase compared to 2021. While this undoubtedly represents a blow to efforts to improve the Council’s efficiency (efforts that have been yielding positive results since 2015), the number of adopted texts still did not reach the 2017 record for the number of adopted resolution – 113.

- In 2022, the total number (33) and proportion (34%) of voted texts returned closer to the mean, following 2021 where the total number (36) and proportion (43%) were the highest in the history of the Council. While the number and percentage of voted texts were reduced in 2022, important differences between States on key human rights issues and situations persisted – for just the second time in Council history, a voted text was rejected (a draft decision to hold a debate on the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China).

- 55% of all texts generated by the Council in 2022 were thematic initiatives adopted under agenda item 3 (the ‘Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, including the right to development’).

- While the number of Item 4 resolutions has remained relatively steady since 2016, with around 10 resolutions per year, there was a slight increase in 2022, with 12 adopted texts. Country-specific texts under this agenda item have focused on the human rights situations in Belarus, Burundi, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Eritrea (discontinued in 2018), Islamic Republic of Iran, Myanmar, South Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic (usually more than one text per year), and Venezuela (since 2019). In 2022, there was also a new country-specific resolution regarding the human rights situation in the Russian Federation.

- The number of resolutions adopted under agenda item 7 (‘Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories’) in 2022 – three – was the joint lowest (with 2021) in the Council’s history. One text on the Occupied Palestinian Territories was, for the fourth consecutive year, adopted under item 2. This suggests that there is room for a ‘deal’ between Palestine, the West and the OIC on item 7 – which would benefit Palestinians.

Data Source: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (‘OHCHR’) website / URG Resolutions Portal.
### Financial implications of Council resolutions (2011-2022)

#### Number of texts adopted

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#### Total

- Total texts adopted: 3,203
- Texts with PBI (with no extra-budgetary appropriations): 350
- Texts with PBI (requiring extra-budgetary appropriations): 247
- Texts without PBI: 2,506

#### Data Source:
- Programme Budget Implications (PBIs) arising from each resolution (2013-2022) available on the OHCHR extranet and via the URG Resolutions Portal.

### Evolution of Council Special Sessions since 2006

#### Data Source:
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (‘OHCHR’) website.

#### Total Special Sessions
- 2006: 3
- 2007: 4
- 2008: 2
- 2009: 1
- 2010: 0
- 2011: 5
- 2012: 4
- 2013: 2
- 2014: 4
- 2015: 3
- 2016: 3
- 2017: 3
- 2018: 3
- 2019: 5
- 2020: 5
- 2021: 3
- 2022: 2

#### Number of Special Sessions
- Total: 35

#### Breakdown
- Country specific
- Thematic
Donors of the Voluntary Trust Fund to support the participation of LDCs and SIDS in the Council 2022

Donors to the LDCs/SIDS Trust Fund

Number of donors

- New donors
- Recurrent donors
- Total donors

DONORS

(2013-2022)

Top themes in 2022: focus of thematic resolutions

Economic, social and cultural rights
- Adequate housing
- COVID-19
- Cultural Rights
- Food
- Foreign Debt
- Health
- International Cooperation
- International Solidarity
- Social Forum
- Water and Sanitation
- Work

Civil and political rights
- Accountability
- Arbitrary Detention
- Conscientious Objection
- Discrimination
- Disinformation
- Freedom of Opinion and Expression
- Freedom of Religion and Belief
- Internet
- Journalists
- Justice
- Mercenaries
- Peaceful Assembly and Association
- Peaceful Protest
- Racism
- Slavery
- SOGI - Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
- Transitional justice

Cross-cutting/other
- Casually recording
- Climate Change
- Democratic and Equitable International Order
- Development
- Firearms
- Genocide
- Good governance
- Human Rights Education
- Local Government
- New and Emerging Technologies
- Technical Cooperation and Capacity Building
- Terrorism
- Unilateral Coercive Measures

Groups in focus
- Human Rights Defenders
- Indigenous Peoples
- Internally Displaced Persons
- Minorities
- Older Persons
- Persons with Disabilities
- Rights of the Child
- Women’s rights (incl. Female Genital Mutilation)
- Youth

Total: 14

Groups in focus
- Human Rights
- Defenders
- Rights of the Child
- Persons with Disabilities
- Internally Displaced Persons
- Minorities
- Older Persons
- Indigenous Peoples
- Women’s rights
- (incl. Female Genital Mutilation)
- Youth

Total: 11

Total: 16

Note: The size of each bubble and word/phrase within the bubble relates to the number of resolutions adopted with that focus/theme in 2022.

Data source: Council resolutions available on the OHCHR extranet and via the URG Resolutions Portal.

In 2022, the human rights issues related to technology stood out as a particular concern. Three resolutions were passed in 2022 (all during HRC51). Two resolutions involved new and emerging technologies and human rights (new and emerging technologies in the military domain, and neurotechnology and human rights), while another involved cyberbullying. The proliferation of texts on technology suggests that States may need to consider a more holistic approach recognising that relevant human rights principles remain the same regardless of the technology involved.

Regarding groups in focus, women’s and girls’ rights were once again a key focus of Council resolutions. Three resolutions were passed in 2022, including one on female genital mutilation.
State participation in Interactive Dialogues of the Special Procedures in 2022

Evolution of amendments to Council resolutions

Voted amendments
- Passed
- Defeated
- Withdrawn
- Total

Data source: OHCHR extranet.

Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.
GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS OF THE COUNCIL

Geographic focus of Council texts, special sessions, and panels (2006-2022)

TEXTS ADOPTED:
- CSP
- SPS
- Item 1
- Item 2
- Item 4
- Item 5
- Item 7
- Item 10
- Decision
- Other

Data source: Council texts (resolutions, decisions, or presidential statements) 2006-2022, available on the OHCHR extranet and via the URG Resolutions Portal.

Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.
GLOBAL COVERAGE OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM IN 2021

For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.
PART II

2022

COUNCIL MEMBER STATES:
ENGAGEMENT, PRINCIPAL SPONSORSHIP, COOPERATION
MEMBERSHIP OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL IN 2022

Data source: OHCHR website.

Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.
COOPERATION WITH THE UN, ITS REPRESENTATIVES, AND MECHANISMS IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Secretary-General’s report

On 29 September 2022, the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, Ms. Ilze Brands Kehris, presented the thirteenth annual report pursuant to Council resolution 12/2 on: “Cooperation with the UN, its representatives, and mechanisms in the field of human rights.” The report contains information on allegations of intimidation and reprisals during the reporting period of 1 May 2021 to 30 April 2022, including follow-up to cases included in previous reports.

With resolution 12/2, the Council “expressed concern over continued reports of intimidation and reprisals against individuals and groups seeking to cooperate, or having cooperated, with the United Nations (UN), its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights.” The Council further “condemned all acts of intimidation and reprisal committed by Governments and non-State actors.”

The 2022 report explains that “forms of reprisal and retaliation for ongoing or past cooperation and intimidation designed to discourage future participation or cooperation with a wide range of United Nations entities at headquarters and in the filed have continued throughout the reporting period. Incidents or trends were addressed within the United Nations system by the Secretariat, United Nations field offices and peace operations and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), by intergovernmental organs such as the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Human Rights Council, and by the special procedures mandate holders of the Council, human rights treaty bodies and other entities such as the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture and the high-level political forum on sustainable development.”

The Secretary-General’s report underscores that the number of reported acts of intimidation and reprisal by State and non-State actors against individuals or groups seeking to cooperate or having cooperated with the UN remains high. Noted global trends include online surveillance and cyberattacks, which augmented the potential vulnerability of individuals and organisations to intimidation and reprisals. In the digital sphere, defenders, activists and journalists have been attacked on social media during or after travel to UN meetings, and there are cases of defenders whose phones have reportedly been infected with spyware marketed by companies to governments.

The Secretary-General’s report further highlights that while the most commonly reported incidents pertain to human rights defenders, activists and journalists, other individuals and groups are also affected, including victims and witnesses of human rights violations, relatives, lawyers, public officials, as well as members of opposition parties and national human rights institutions. Particularly vulnerable groups mentioned in the report include women (approximately 60% of the nearly 350 individual cases involved women), youth, those that face barriers linked to gender or sexual orientation, those representing indigenous peoples or minorities, and those who work on environmental issues.

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Oral presentation by Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Ilze Brands Kehris of the report of the Secretary-General on cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights, 29 September 2022.
Additionally, as with each annual report on reprisals, the report summarises and provides information on reported allegations of intimidation and reprisals in different UN member States. In 2022 the Secretary-General presents information on cases in the following countries:

- Afghanistan
- Andorra
- Bahrain
- Bangladesh
- Belarus
- Brazil
- Burundi
- Cameroon
- Central African Republic
- China
- Cuba
- Cyprus
- Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Djibouti
- Egypt
- Guatemala
- India
- Indonesia
- Iran (Islamic Republic of)
- Israel
- Kazakhstan
- Lao People’s Democratic Republic
- Libya
- Maldives
- Mali
- Mexico
- Morocco
- Myanmar
- Nicaragua
- Philippines
- Russian Federation
- Rwanda
- Saudi Arabia
- South Sudan
- Sri Lanka
- Sudan
- Thailand
- Turkmenistan
- United Arab Emirates
- Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
- Viet Nam
- Yemen
- State of Palestine

Finally, and again in line with previous annual reports the document summarises responses it has received from States to the allegations made in previous reports. In 2022, the Secretary-General reported having received responses from the following countries:

- Andorra
- Bahrain
- Bangladesh
- Brazil
- China
- Cuba
- Cyprus
- Guatemala
- Indonesia
- Maldives
- Mexico
- Morocco
- Philippines
- Saudi Arabia
- Thailand
- Viet Nam
- Yemen
African Group (AG)

Overview of members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Voluntary contribution to OHCHR (2021)</th>
<th>Voluntary contribution to OHCHR 2022 (11 November 2022)</th>
<th>NHRI accreditation status (13 July 2022)</th>
<th>Membership terms to date</th>
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Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Principal sponsorship

During 2022, African members of the Council led (as main sponsors/part of a core group) on a number of important resolutions, covering both thematic and country-specific issues.

At a thematic level, in 2022, members of the African Group (AG) led, inter alia, on the following issues:

- Cote d’Ivoire: youth and human rights.
- Namibia: freedom of opinion and expression; freedom of peaceful assembly and association; and adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living.
- Senegal: access to medicines and vaccines; LDCs/SIDS Trust Fund.

At country-specific level, in 2022, African members led, inter alia, on the following situations:

- Notwithstanding such individual leadership, it is important to note that African States often work through their regional group. In 2022, the African Group led on, inter alia, the following resolutions: racism, and female genital mutilation.
- The African Group also led on Council initiatives aimed at the delivery of technical assistance and capacity-building in the field of human rights in certain States, including the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, South Sudan, and Libya.
Contribution to Council debates, panel discussions, and dialogues in 2022

Voting analysis

In 2022, when a vote was called on country-specific resolutions tabled under agenda item 2 (report of the High Commissioner), AG members of the Council tended to abstain or vote against. The exception was the resolution on the human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which most AG members supported (except for Malawi, which voted against, while Cameroon abstained). Other notable exceptions include: the Gambia’s and Malawi’s vote in favour of the resolution on Nicaragua; and Somalia’s vote in favour of the rejected resolution on the situation of human rights in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Turning to resolutions tabled under item 4 (human rights situations that require the Council’s attention), in the absence of consensus, members of the AG tended to abstain or vote against. Nonetheless, there were some exceptions including, inter alia:

- Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Malawi voted in favour of the two resolutions on the situation in Syria; and the Gambia supported one of these texts.
- Eritrea and Sudan voted against the resolution on recognising the contribution of human rights defenders, including women human rights defenders, in conflict and post-conflict situations, to the enjoyment and realisation of human rights.
- Benin, the Gambia, and Malawi voted in favour of the resolution on the situation of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election and its aftermath and the situation of human rights in Belarus.
- Malawi voted in favour of the resolution of the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

During voting on item 7 resolutions (Occupied Palestinian Territories), African States tended to support all texts. The exceptions were Cameroon, which tended to vote abstain, and Malawi, which tended to vote against.

Most AG members voted against or abstained during voting on the one item 10 (technical assistance and capacity-building) text for which a vote was requested in 2022, namely the resolution on cooperation with Georgia.

However, the Gambia, Libya, Malawi, and Somalia supported the text.

For thematic resolutions, when a vote was called in 2022, AG members voted in favour of nearly all adopted texts. Notable exceptions include:

- AG States all voted against or abstained from voting on the resolution on the mandate of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
- Eritrea and Sudan voted against the resolution on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights.
- Cameroon and the Gambia voted against the resolution on the mandate of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries.

Note: This bar chart shows the number of joint statements each State has joined during Council general debates, panel discussions, and interactive dialogues with the Special Procedures. The empty chair symbol indicates whether, overall, the country, as a Council member, participated (individual statements) in more than 10% of panel discussions, general debates, and interactive dialogues. For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.
### Cooperation with human rights mechanisms

#### TREATY BODIES

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<th>Country</th>
<th>CEDAW (4 years)</th>
<th>CERD (28 years)</th>
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#### OPCAT

- Ratified?
- NPM established?
- Sub-Committee visit?

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#### Universal Periodic Review

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#### Communications response rate

- Responded to 3 received
- Responded to 5 received
- Responded to 8 received
- Responded to 12 received
- Responded to 16 received
- Responded to 20 received

#### Special Procedures

- Visits status and longest outstanding visit
- Communications procedures accepted
- Conventions ratified in 2022

#### Standing Committee

- / Ratified
- / Invited
- / Requested
- / Postponed / Cancelled

Note: For more comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.
Asia-Pacific Group (APG)

Overview of members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Voluntary contribution to OHCHR (2021)</th>
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Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Principal sponsorship

During 2022, Asia-Pacific Group (APG) members of the Council led (as main sponsors/part of a core group) on a number of important resolutions, covering both thematic and country-specific issues.

At a thematic level, in 2022, APG members led, inter alia, on the following resolutions:

- **China**: access to medicines and vaccines; promoting ECOSOC rights within the context of addressing inequalities in COVID recovery.
- **India**: access to medicines and vaccines.
- **Indonesia**: human rights technical cooperation and capacity building; access to medicines and vaccines; and the right to work.
- **Japan**: disinformation.
- **Marshall Islands**: technical assistance and capacity building to address the human rights implications of the nuclear legacy in the Marshall Islands.
- **Qatar**: situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic (x3).

Notwithstanding such individual leadership, it is important to note that some APG States regularly work through political groups, especially the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Arab Group. During 2022, the OIC, at thematic level, led on a resolution on combating intolerance and violence based on religion or belief.

At country-specific level, in 2022 APG members led, inter alia, on the following resolutions:

- **Marshall Islands**: LDCs/SIDS Voluntary Trust Fund.
- **Pakistan**: Universal Periodic Review; promoting ECOSOC rights within the context of addressing inequalities in COVID recovery.
- **Qatar**: safety of journalists; human rights technical cooperation and capacity building.
- **Uzbekistan**: youth and human rights.

At a thematic level, in 2022, APG members led, inter alia, on the following resolutions:

- **Marshall Islands**: technical assistance and capacity building to address the human rights implications of the nuclear legacy in the Marshall Islands.
- **Qatar**: situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic (x3).

Notwithstanding such individual leadership, it is important to note that some APG States regularly work through political groups, especially the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Arab Group. During 2022, the OIC, at thematic level, led on a resolution on combating intolerance and violence based on religion or belief.

At country-specific level, in 2022 the OIC lead on the following resolutions:

- **Marshall Islands**: LDCs/SIDS Voluntary Trust Fund.
- **Pakistan**: Universal Periodic Review; promoting ECOSOC rights within the context of addressing inequalities in COVID recovery.
- **Qatar**: safety of journalists; human rights technical cooperation and capacity building.
- **Uzbekistan**: youth and human rights.
Voting analysis

Regarding country-specific resolutions tabled under agenda item 2 (annual report of the High Commissioner) and item 4 (human rights situations that require the Council’s attention), when a vote was called in 2022, APG members tended to abstain or vote against; except for Japan, Marshall Islands and Republic of Korea, which tended to vote in favour of most items 2 and 4 texts.

One notable exception under item 2 was the resolution on the human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the obligation to ensure accountability and justice – China, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan voted in favour of the resolution, with no APG States voting against; only India, the Marshall Islands, and Nepal abstained. Regarding item 4, Qatar also voted in favour of the two resolutions on the human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic.

During voting on item 7 resolutions (Occupied Palestinian Territories), Asia-Pacific members of the Council nearly always voted in favour. The exceptions were Marshall Islands (voted against all texts); and Japan, and Republic of Korea each voted against one item 7 resolution.

Most APG members either abstained or voted against the one item 10 (technical assistance and capacity building) text for which a vote was requested in 2022, namely a resolution on cooperation with Georgia. Japan, however, voted in favour of the resolution.

For thematic resolutions dealing with civil and political rights, APG members:

- Voted in favour of the texts on mercenaries and a global call for concrete action against racism; except Japan, Marshall Islands, and Republic of Korea which voted against the former and abstained during voting on the latter.

Turning to resolutions dealing with economic, social, and cultural rights and cross-cutting matters, APG members tended to vote in favour of all three resolutions that came up for a vote; Japan, the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Korea, however, voted against all three resolutions.

Note: This bar chart shows the number of joint statements each State has joined during Council general debates, panel discussions, and interactive dialogues with the Special Procedures. The empty chair symbol indicates whether, overall, the country, as a Council member, participated (individual statements) in more than 10% of panel discussions, general debates, and interactive dialogues. For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.
During 2022, Eastern European Group (EEG) members of the Council led (as main sponsors/part of a core group) on a number of important resolutions, covering both thematic and country-specific issues.

At a thematic level, in 2022, EEG States led, inter alia, on the following issues:

**Armenia:** Universal Periodic Review; prevention of genocide.

**Lithuania:** disinformation.

**Poland:** role of good governance in the promotion and protection of human rights; conscientious objection to military service; role of prevention in the promotion and protection of human rights – rule of law and accountability; cultural rights and cultural heritage; disinformation.

**Ukraine:** role of prevention in the promotion and protection of human rights – rule of law and accountability; disinformation.

At the country-specific level, in 2022, EEG members of the Council led, inter alia, on the following resolutions:

**Czechia:** situation of human rights in the Russian Federation.

**Lithuania:** situation of human rights in the Russian Federation.

**Montenegro:** promoting reconciliation, accountability, and human rights in Sri Lanka.

**Poland:** situation of human rights in the Russian Federation.

**Ukraine:** situation of human rights in Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression.

**Note:** For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.
Voting analysis

Regarding country-specific resolutions tabled under agenda items 2 (report of the High Commissioner) and 4 (human rights situations that require the Council’s attention), when a vote was called in 2022, EEG members of the Council tended to vote in favour of most texts. Notable exceptions include:

- **Russia** voted against all country-specific resolutions, except for the item 2 text on the human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, for which Russia voted in favour.
- **Armenia** abstained from the item 2 resolutions on Nicaragua and the Xinjiang Region; and voted against or abstained from all item 4 resolutions which came up for a vote.
- **Ukraine** abstained from the item 2 resolutions on human rights situations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the Xinjiang Region.
- **Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland and Ukraine** voted against the resolution on the situation of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election and in its aftermath.

Turning to resolutions tabled under agenda item 7 (Occupied Palestinian Territories), EEG members of the Council mostly voted in favour. However, Lithuania abstained from the resolution on the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, and abstained during voting on the resolution on Israeli settlements (Ukraine also abstained from the resolution on the Israeli settlements).

Most EEG members voted in favour of the item 10 (technical assistance and capacity building) text for which a vote was requested in 2022, namely a resolution on cooperation with Georgia. The only exceptions were Russia and Armenia - the former voted against the resolution, and the latter didn’t vote.

For thematic resolutions dealing with civil and political rights, all EEG voting was mixed: on the resolution on the mandate of the Working Group on mercenaries, only Armenia voted in favour, while the rest of the EEG members voted against; for the resolution calling for concrete action against racism, Armenia and Latvia voted in favour, while Czechia, Poland and Ukraine voted against (Lithuania abstained).

Regarding economic, social, and cultural rights, voting was again mixed among EEG members: on the resolution regarding the promotion and protection of ECOSOC rights in the context of COVID-19, Armenia and the Russian Federation voted in favour, Montenegro, Lithuania and Poland voted against, while Ukraine abstained; only Armenia voted in favour of the resolution on human rights and international solidarity, while the rest of the EEG members voted against; all six EEG members voted against the resolution on the enhancement of international cooperation in the field of human rights, however.

* Ratification and Reporting is recorded for eight ‘core UN human rights conventions’ which include: the ICCPR, the ICESCR, CAT, the CPED, the CEDAW, the CRC, the CERD, and the CRPD.

**Note:** For more comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.
During 2022, Latin America and the Caribbean Group (GRULAC) members of the Council led (as main sponsors/part of a core group) on a number of important resolutions, covering both thematic and country-specific issues.

At a thematic level, in 2022, GRULAC members of the Council led, inter alia, on the following issues:

**Argentina:** older persons; cyberbullying; Universal Periodic Review; Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity; discrimination against women and girls; cultural rights and cultural heritage.

**Bolivia:** promoting ECOSOC rights within the context of addressing inequalities in COVID recovery.

**Brazil:** the negative impact of corruption, older persons; digital technologies, privacy in the digital age, mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy; human rights in the context of HIV and AIDS; enhancement of technical cooperation and capacity-building; human rights on the Internet; safety of journalists; physical and mental health; national mechanisms for implementation, reporting and follow-up; human rights technical cooperation and capacity-building; Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity; access to medicines and vaccines; freedom of opinion and expression; adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to non-discrimination.

**Cuba:** international solidarity; Social Forum; foreign debt; cultural rights and cultural diversity; mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food; mercenaries; and democratic and equitable international order.

**Mexico:** human rights and Indigenous Peoples; mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous Peoples; terrorism and human rights; independence and impartiality of the judicial system – participation of women in the administration of justice; mandate of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity; discrimination against women and girls; mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while combatting terrorism; right to work; participation of persons with disabilities in sport; rights of minorities.

**Paraguay:** national mechanisms for implementation, reporting and follow-up.

At country-specific level, in 2021, GRULAC members of the Council led, inter alia, on the following resolutions:

**Brazil:** promotion and protection of human rights in Nicaragua; situation of human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

**Paraguay:** promotion and protection of human rights in Nicaragua; situation of human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; promotion and protection of human rights in Nicaragua.
Contribution to Council debates, panel discussions, and dialogues in 2022

- Argentina
- Bolivia
- Brazil
- Cuba
- Honduras
- Mexico
- Paraguay
- Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

Note: This bar chart shows the number of joint statements each State has joined during Council general debates, panel discussions, and interactive dialogues with the Special Procedures. The empty chair symbol indicates whether, overall, the country, as a Council member, participated (individual statements) in more than 10% of panel discussions, general debates, and interactive dialogues. For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Voting analysis

Regarding country-specific resolutions tabled under agenda items 2 (report of the High Commissioner) and 4 (human rights situations that require the Council’s attention), when a vote was called during 2022, GRULAC members were divided:

- Argentina, Mexico, and Paraguay consistently voted in favor of all item 2 and item 4 texts; Honduras joined these three members on all item 4 resolutions, but voted against the item 2 text on Nicaragua, and abstained from voting on the item 2 resolution on the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
- Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela tended to vote against all item 2 and 4 texts, although they all supported the item 2 text on the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
- Brazil voted in favour of all texts except the item 2 texts on the Occupied Palestinian Territories and South Sudan, and the item 4 resolutions on Syria and Iran.
- On the rejected item 2 resolution on the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China, Honduras and Paraguay voted in favor, while Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela voted against; Argentina, Mexico and Brazil abstained.

Turning to thematic resolutions, where a vote was called in 2022, GRULAC members tended to support most texts dealing with civil and political rights. Exceptions include Brazil and Mexico’s abstention on the text on the mandate of the Working Group on mercenaries. Turning to economic, social, and cultural rights and cross-cutting texts, most GRULAC members tended to vote in favour of most resolutions on which a vote was called in 2022. However, Mexico abstained from all three such texts that came up for a vote, while Brazil abstained from one (enhancement of international cooperation in the field of human rights).
## Cooperation with human rights mechanisms

### Core conventions

- **ICCPR**
- **ICESCR**
- **CAT**
- **CPED**
- **CEDAW**
- **CRC**
- **CERD**
- **CRPD**

### Reporting status

- **CEDAW**
  - (2 years) submitted on time
  - (3rd cycle) 2012, 2020, 2022
  - (2nd cycle) 2010, 2017

- **CRPD**
  - (1 year) submitted on time

- **CERD**
  - (4 years) submitted on time
  - (2nd cycle) 2009, 2012

- **CEDAW**
  - (4 years) submitted on time
  - (3rd cycle) 2011, 2015, 2022

### OPCAT

- Ratified?

- NPM established?

- Sub-Committee visit

### Level of delegation

- **Deputy Minister**
- **Attorney General**
- **Special Rapporteur on Human Rights (to be determined)**
- **Minister**

### Mid-term reporting

- **1st, 2nd, 3rd cycle**
- **3rd cycle**

### Participation in other reviews

- **1st cycle**
- **2nd cycle**
- **3rd cycle**

### Communications

- **Response rate**
- **Reported completed**
- **Irritated**
- **Accepted**
- **Requested**
- **Postponed/Cancelled**

### Note:

- Ratification and Reporting is recorded for eight ‘core UN human rights conventions’ which include: the ICCPR, the ICESCR, CAT, the CPED, the CEDAW, the CRC, the CERD, and the CRPD.

- For more comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.
Western European and Others Group (WEOG)

Overview of members

- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- United States of America

Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Principal sponsorship

During 2022, the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) members of the Council led (as main sponsors/part of a core group) on a number of important resolutions, covering both thematic and country-specific issues. At thematic level, in 2022, WEOG members of the Council led, inter alia, on the following issues:

- **Finland**: adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to non-discrimination.
- **France**: arbitrary detention; safety of journalists; youth and human rights.
- **Germany**: cyberbullying; safe drinking water and sanitation; adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to non-discrimination.

**United Kingdom**: Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery; disinformation.

**United States**: disinformation.

At country-specific level, in 2022, WEOG members of the Council led, inter alia, on the following resolutions:

- **Finland**: situation of human rights in the Russian Federation; debate on the situation of human rights in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China (rejected by vote).
- **France**: situation of human rights in the Russian Federation; situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic (x3).
- **Germany**: promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka; situation of human rights in the Russian Federation; situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic (x3); reporting by the High Commissioner on situation in Sudan.
- **Luxembourg**: situation of human rights in the Russian Federation.
- **United Kingdom**: promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka; situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic (x3); assistance to Somalia in the field of human rights; advancing human rights in South Sudan; situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran; debate on the situation of human rights in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China (rejected by vote).
- **United States**: promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka; situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic (x3); reporting by the High Commissioner on situation in Sudan; advancing human rights in South Sudan; debate on the situation of human rights in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China (rejected by vote).

Notwithstanding such individual leadership, it is important to note that some WEOG Council members regularly work through the European Union (EU). In 2022, at thematic level, the EU led resolutions on: freedom of religion or belief; and the rights of the child – child and family reunification.

At country-specific level, the EU led on the following resolutions: situation of human rights in Afghanistan; situation of human rights of women and girls in Afghanistan; situation of human rights in Belarus; situation of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election and in its aftermath; situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; situation of human rights in Ethiopia; situation of human rights in Myanmar; situation of human rights in Eritrea; and situation of human rights in Burundi.

**Contribution to Council debates, panel discussions, and dialogues in 2022**

**United Kingdom**: 88
**France**: 25
**Germany**: 57
**Luxembourg**: 28
**Netherlands**: 27
**United Kingdom**: 40
**USA**: 25

**Note**: This bar chart shows the number of joint statements each State has joined during Council general debates, panel discussions, and interactive dialogues with the Special Procedures. The empty chair symbol indicates whether, overall, the country, as a Council member, participated (individual statements) in more than 10% of panel discussions, general debates, and interactive dialogues. For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.
## Voting analysis

In 2022, when a vote was called on agenda item 2 (reports of the High Commissioner) and item 4 (human rights situations that require the Council’s attention) country-specific resolutions, WEOG members consistently voted in favour. The exception to this trend was the item 2 text on the human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, on which the United States voted against, and the United Kingdom abstained.

Concerning votes on item 7 (Occupied Palestinian Territories) resolutions, the United States and the UK voted against all resolutions which came to a vote. The other WEOG members voted in favour of the texts on Israeli settlements and the Palestinian right to self-determination, but all WEOG members voted against the resolution for concrete action against racism (Finland and Luxembourg abstained).

Turning to economic, social and cultural rights and cross-cutting matters, in the absence of consensus, WEOG members consistently voted against all resolutions which came up for a vote. All WEOG members abstained from the resolution on commemorating the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Declaration on the Right to Development, however.

All WEOG members voted in favour of the one text under item 10 (technical assistance and capacity building) for which a vote was requested in 2022, namely a resolution on cooperation with Georgia.

For thematic resolutions dealing with civil and political rights, in the absence of consensus, all WEOG members voted against the resolution on the mandate of the Working Group on mercenaries, while France, Germany, the Netherlands, the US, and the UK voted against the resolution for concrete action against racism (Finland and Luxembourg abstained).

### Cooperation with human rights mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Luxembourg</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standing invitation</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visits Status and Longest Outstanding Visit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications response rate</td>
<td>responded to 38 received 15 received</td>
<td>responded to 87% received 47%</td>
<td>responded to 1 received 15 received 0%</td>
<td>responded to 469 received 469</td>
<td>responded to 37 received 31%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Core conventions**
- ICCPR
- ICESCR
- CAT
- CPED
- CEDAW
- CRC
- CERD
- CRPD

* Ratification and Reporting is recorded for eight ‘core UN human rights conventions’ which include: the ICCPR, the ICESCR, CAT, the CPED, the CEDAW, the CRC, the CERD, and the CRPD.

**Note:** For more comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.
yourHRC.org uses independent and objective data as the basis of its summaries and analyses. The origin of that data is primarily official UN documents and information produced by other international organisations. To ensure transparency, information on the sources of all data used, together with the methodology applied and the timeframe, is presented below.

Section I.

The Council’s focus and output: Resolution and mechanisms
Source: OHCHR website. OHCHR extranet.
Data as of: 31 October 2022

Special Sessions
Source: OHCHR website.
Data as of: 4 December 2022

The focus of Council texts by agenda item (2006-2020)
Source: Individual resolutions, decisions, and presidential statements. OHCHR extranet.
Timeframe: 2006-2022
Data as of: 31 October 2022

Financial Implications of Council resolutions (2011-2020)
Source: Individual PBI, OHCHR extranet.
Timeframe: 2011-2022
Data as of: 31 October 2022

Top themes in 2022: focus of thematic resolutions
Source: Individual resolutions, decisions, and presidential statements. OHCHR extranet.
Timeframe: 2022
Data as of: 31 October 2022

Geographic focus of the Council texts, special sessions, and panels (2006-2022)
Source: Council texts: Individual resolutions, decisions, and presidential statements. OHCHR extranet; Special Sessions: OHCHR website; Panels: OHCHR website.
Timeframe: 2006 - 2022
Data as of: 31 October 2022

Global coverage of the UN human rights system in 2022
Source: OHCHR website. UN Human Rights Appeal 2022.
Timeframe: 2022.
Data as of: 31 October 2022

State participation on Interactive Dialogues of Special Procedures in 2022
Source: HRC Extranet
Data as of: 31 October 2022
Note: The level of participation in Interactive Dialogues with Special Procedures was calculated based on the individual statements listed on the OHCHR Extranet during the 2022 sessions (i.e. during the Council’s sessions 31-39). Joint statements on behalf of a group of States that were not individually listed were not counted. Nevertheless, of course, States do also participate in this broader manner.

Section II.

Overview of membership, members of the Bureau, of the Consultative Group, and the Working Group on Situations
Data as of: 31 October 2022

Voluntary contribution to OHCHR (2021 and 2022)
Source: OHCHR website.
Most recent information published by the OHCHR, data as of 15 November 2022.

NHRI Accreditation Status
Source: Chart of the Status of National Institutions, accredited by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI); http://sites.unhchr.org/En/Documents/Status%20Accreditation%20Chart.pdf
Most recent information published by the OHCHR, data as of 31 October 2022

Previous membership terms
Source: OHCHR website.
Data as of: 31 October 2022

Contribution to Council debates, panels, and dialogues
Source: HRC Extranet.
Data as of: 31 October 2022.

Note: The participation of the members of the Council in group statements was calculated based on all joint statements listed on the HRC Extranet from March 2016 until September 2022 (i.e., during HRC sessions 31-39). Figures include statements not delivered due to lack of time.

The Empty Chair indicator was calculated based on the individual statements and joint statements other than political, regional or otherwise “fixed” groups. A ‘YES’ shows that, during its current and last most recent membership terms (where applicable), the corresponding State participated in less than 10% of the total number of debates, interactive dialogues, and panel discussions.

Cooperation with human rights mechanisms
Special Procedures
Standing invitation
Source: OHCHR website.
Data as of: 31 October 2022.

Visits Completed & longest outstanding visit
Source: OHCHR website.
Data as of: 31 October 2022.
Note: The number of visits undertaken includes only visits that have actually taken place, as listed on the OHCHR website (i.e., visits reported as completed or with report forthcoming). The dates for the most overdue visit are calculated according to the initial request date of the corresponding visit (regardless of subsequent reminders) or with the earliest request date published, when the initial request date is not available. Visits with incomplete information (i.e., dates and status), inviations, and visits postponed/cancelled have been excluded from the analysis. Visits by Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, or visits to regional institutions/organisations are not included in this analysis.

Communications response rate
Source: OHCHR – Communication report and search database.
Data as of: 31 October 2022.

Treaty Bodies

Status of Ratification and Reporting
Source: OHCHR website.
Data as of: 31 October 2022.
Note: Ratification and Reporting is recorded for eight “core UN human rights conventions,” which include: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

Treaty Body reporting dates relate to the State’s current reporting cycle, as listed on the OHCHR website.

Explanation of Options:
• SUBMITTED ON TIME: The State Party Report submitted the report before or on the due date;
• ON SCHEDULE: The current cycle due date is in the future;
• SUBMITTED LATE: The State Party Report has been submitted for the current cycle but was submitted late, i.e. after the due date;
• **OVERDUE (OUTSTANDING):** The current cycle report has not yet been submitted, and it is overdue;
• **NOT PARTY:** The State has not ratified the corresponding Treaty;
• **N/A:** No deadline has been set, or data is not available.

The ‘most overdue’ report time is for the outstanding report with the earliest due date.

Reporting and ratification scores were calculated with the information published on the OHCHR website on the 31 October 2022.

### Communications procedures accepted

**Source:** OHCHR website.

**Data as of:** 31 October 2022.

**Note:** This figure relates to the acceptance of individual complaints procedures under each of the abovementioned core conventions.

### OP-CAT

**Source:** OHCHR website.

**Data as of:** 31 October 2022.

**Note:** An “NPM” is a ‘National Preventative Mechanism’.

### Universal Periodic Review

#### Level of delegation

**Source:** The Head of a State’s delegation (for its last UPR) was determined using the report submitted by the corresponding State during its last UPR. Where the rank of the representative was not clear, the URG followed up with the relevant missions as far as possible.

**Data as of:** 31 October 2022.

#### Mid-term reporting

**Source:** OHCHR website. [http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRImplementation.aspx](http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRImplementation.aspx)

**Data as of:** 31 October 2022.

**Note:** The ‘mid-term reporting’ score relates to whether the State has submitted a mid-term report for the first and/or the second cycles of UPR.

#### Participation in other reviews

**Source:** UPR Info – ‘Statistics of UPR Recommendations.’

**Data as of:** 31 October 2022.

**Note:** Participation in other reviews relates to the number of other States’ reviews (out of 193) during which the corresponding State made (1 or more) recommendations.

**Note:** For updated information on all current and former Council members, visit yourHRC.org.

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The yourHRC.org project has four parts:

1. **A universally accessible and free-to-use web portal - yourHRC.org - providing information on the performance of all States that have stood for and won election to the Council.** An interactive world map provides information on the Council’s membership in any given year, and the number of membership terms held by each country. Country-specific pages then provide up-to-date information on: the voting record of the State; its principal sponsorship on important Council initiatives; its level of participation in Council debates, interactive dialogues, and panels; its engagement and cooperation with the Council’s mechanisms (UPR and Special Procedures) and with the Treaty Bodies; and the degree to which it fulfilled the voluntary pledges and commitments made before its previous membership term.

2. **An annual ‘yourHRC.org election guide,’ providing at-a-glance information (including comparative information) on candidatures for upcoming Council elections.**

3. **An annual ‘yourHRC.org end-of-year report’ (to be published each December), providing information (including comparative information) on levels of member State engagement and cooperation over that year.**

4. **A periodic ‘yourHRC.org candidate alert’ sent to stakeholders informing them of candidature announcements for future Council elections, and providing information on that State’s performance during previous membership terms (where applicable).**

The present document is the third annual ‘yourHRC.org end-of-year report,’ offering an assessment of the Council’s work, output, achievements and shortfalls in 2022, and analysing the contributions of member States to the work of the Council and the enjoyment of human rights around the world.

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yourHRC.org

A window onto cooperation, dialogue, leadership and policymaking at the UN Human Rights Council