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**A window onto cooperation, dialogue,
leadership, and policymaking
at the UN Human Rights Council**

**THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COUNCIL IN
2025**

**LEADERSHIP, RESOLVE AND COOPERATION
AT THE UN'S MAIN HUMAN RIGHTS BODY**



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In October 2015, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Universal Rights Group (URG) launched yourHRC.org, an innovative online tool designed to contribute to international efforts to strengthen the visibility, relevance and impact of the Human Rights Council.

The yourHRC.org portal, together with a number of related reports, are designed to provide country-specific information on: cooperation with the Council and its mechanisms, participation in Council debates and dialogues, member State voting patterns, political leadership, and Council elections.

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Introduction

The United Nations and the multilateral rule of law system that it oversees entered their eightieth year in crisis mode. This is in part financial, with delays to the payment of regular budget dues by some large member States, as well as cuts to extrabudgetary contributions by many others (as of 9 October 2025, member States collectively owed around \$1,87 billion in mandatory contributions). Across the UN as a whole, the Council for Foreign Relations reports the UN secretariat is preparing to trim its \$3.7 billion budget by 20 percent in 2026, which could result in roughly 6,900 job cuts from the UN's 35,000-person workforce.¹ It is also political, with populist leaders openly questioning the UN's value, challenging international rule of law (for example, the US decision to sanction prosecutors and judges of the ICC), pulling out of various international organisations, and pushing back against certain international agendas (e.g., gender, sexual orientation and gender identify, climate change). These trends, together with the UN's inability to halt Russia's invasion of Ukraine, or a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, have in turn led the public – 'the Peoples of the United Nations' – especially in the global North, to question whether the UN, and multilateralism in general, is fit for purpose – capable of protecting human rights, securing sustainable development, stopping wars and genocide, undertaking effective humanitarian action, or responding to today's major challenges, such as those posed by artificial intelligence.

The human rights pillar has not been immune to these trends. According to the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'unprecedented cuts in foreign aid are poised to severely undermine the enjoyment of human rights for millions worldwide.' According to a new report by the Human Rights Funders Network, foreign aid focused on human rights is projected to decline by up to \$1.9 billion annually by 2026, and the hardest hit will be vulnerable groups, including women and girls, LGBTIQ+

people, persons with disabilities, and those living with HIV and AIDS.² While the cuts will be felt most acutely by civil society actors and human rights defenders at national-level, international human rights NGOs are also being severely impacted, with nearly all those active in Geneva, for example, either cutting posts or considering closing their Geneva offices. Politically too, the populist and often nationalist wave sweeping UN member States has had clear and immediate repercussions at the Human Rights Council, with the US' decisions (announced on 4 February) to disengage from the Council (followed by Israel on 6 February, and Nicaragua on 27 February), to not participant in the UPR process in early November, and, in July, to impose sanctions on Francesca Paola Albanese, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories,' as well as on ICC judges and prosecutors, representing only the most egregious examples.

Perhaps not coincidentally, these steep cuts in developed country contributions to the multilateral system in general, and to human rights in particular, and the backlash against international institutions and rule of law, come against a backdrop wherein the West's traditional predominance at the UN is being slowly eroded. In truth, this geopolitical trend has been evident for at least the past three years, with powers of the global South, especially China, enjoying a steep rise in political power and influence. However, the trend has unquestionably accelerated over the course of 2025, especially as a result of the US' decision to vacate the multilateral stage (the US has disengaged from the Council before, of course, first between 2006-2008 under President George W. Bush, and then again during the final years of President Donald Trump's first term), yet this time feels more definitive, and more permanent).

1. <https://www.cfr.org/article/un80-initiative-what-know-about-united-nations-reform-plan>

2. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2025/09/report-foreign-aid-cuts-threaten-global-human-rights-ecosystem>



How should the UN and its Human Rights Council respond?

Against this backdrop, in March this year, UN Secretary-General António Guterres launched a reform initiative known as UN80. The system-wide reforms, which build on earlier reform efforts of the Secretary-General (e.g., his development system reforms), respond to one vital question: ‘How can the UN adapt to become more agile, integrated, and equipped to respond to today’s complex global challenges amid tightening resources?’

Guterres’ answer to this question is that, to survive and prosper, the UN needs to be more responsive and resilient, better equipped to serve the people whose lives depend on it, more accountable to taxpayers who underwrite its work, and more supportive of staff in their critical roles. ‘It’s about doing more, more effectively, and with fewer bureaucratic burdens — ensuring the UN system is better aligned to meet rising global needs with unity, agility, and purpose.’



António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, addresses the General Debate of the 80th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (New York, 23-27 and 29 of September 2025).

Photo via: UNTV

The main pillars of the proposed reforms are three-fold.

First, to make the UN more efficient, by merging UN entities (i.e., agencies, funds, and programmes) with overlapping mandates (e.g., UN Women and UNFPA, UNFCCC and UNEP), moving some UN entities to cheaper duty stations (e.g., from New York to Nairobi), and rationalising mandates (i.e., mechanisms established through intergovernmental decisions – in other words, through UN resolutions).

Second, to make the UN more operational and able to deliver real change at national level, the reforms propose possible structural changes to the architecture of the UN system, and a realignment of programmes across entities. These would aim to improve system-wide coherence, make more efficient use of resources, and strengthen the Organisation's on-the-ground impact.

Third, to underpin these changes, the Secretary-General has undertaken a review and proposed reforms of the UN budget.

In other words, according to the Secretary-General's proposals (which are now being considered by UN member States), to respond to the challenges it is currently facing, as well as the principal challenges facing the international

community in the 21st century, the multilateral system must become more efficient and flexible, and more focused on operational effectiveness at national and local levels in order to 'maximise the concrete on-the-ground impact of activities and services, and improve timely, demand-driven access to expertise for member States.'

It is crucial for the future of the Human Rights Council (and, because the Council is amongst the best functioning major organs of the Organisation, the future of the UN itself) that it is both inspired by, and fully contributes to, this UN80 reform agenda. As with the overall reform proposals, the Council should act at three levels:

1. Rationalisation of resolutions and mandates, thereby increasing efficiency.
2. Reorientation of methods of work away from norm-clarification and norm-setting, towards a far greater focus on operational effectiveness, and impact on-the-ground.
3. Budgetary analysis: how much money is being received by the human rights pillar (regular budgetary and extra-budgetary contributions), and – crucially – how is that money being invested?

Rationalisation and efficiency

In August, the Secretary-General released a report presenting the findings of a review of mandates established by the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and the Human Rights Council, along with their subsidiary bodies. The review found that, since 1946, these bodies have issued mandates to UN entities through more than 40,000 resolutions, decisions, and presidential statements, establishing inter alia peacekeeping missions, and mechanisms to advance the SDGs, respond to humanitarian crises, and protect human rights. What is more, the Secretary-General found that resolutions are becoming longer, more repetitive, and more duplicative (e.g., between the Human Rights Council and the GA Third Committee), while mandates (e.g., Special Procedures) are often overlapping, and continue indefinitely (without sunset clauses, or mandate reviews).

These weaknesses and challenges are clearly in evidence at the Human Rights Council. The number of resolutions adopted each year has risen from less than 80 in 2009 and 2010, to around a hundred in more recent times – though it did drop slightly in 2024 (97 texts) and 2025 (96 texts). 2025 also saw a rare success in terms of (slightly) reducing the number of mandated Council mechanisms, with the merger of two Special Procedures mandates at

the 60th session (resolution 60/25): the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery (led by the UK), and the Special Rapporteur on human trafficking (led by Germany). This is only the second time two Special Procedures mandates have been merged (the previous time was in 2000) – no thematic mandate has ever been discontinued outright since the first Special Procedures mandate was created in 1967. (In another rare occurrence, 2025 also saw the Council reject a resolution - on the ‘Discontinuation of the mandate of Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea,’ presented by Eritrea and rejected with 4 in favour, 25 against, and 18 abstentions. This is only the third time a majority of Council members have voted against a draft Council text).

Notwithstanding, these gains have been offset somewhat by the decision of some States to table (five) completely new resolutions (two during HRC58, one during HRC59, and two during HRC60). While these resolutions do address important issues (e.g., sea-level rise), it should normally be possible to address them through existing Council initiatives (providing relevant core groups are open to new ideas and/or members) such as those on climate change, or the right to a healthy environment. In mitigation, the main sponsors of some of these new texts (e.g., women in diplomacy) have been careful to minimise financial implications and duplication.

Moreover, during this year's September-October session (HRC60), States of the European Union tabled a draft resolution establishing – in addition to extending the mandate of the existing Special Procedures mandate on Afghanistan - an 'ongoing independent investigative mechanism to collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of international crimes and the most serious violations of international law, including those that may also amount to violations and abuses of international human rights law, committed in Afghanistan, including against women and girls, and to prepare files in order to facilitate and expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings, in accordance with international law standards, in national, regional or international courts or tribunals that have or may in the future have jurisdiction over these crimes, in accordance with international law.' The resolution was adopted without a vote. While there is an obvious need for the Council to address the serious and systematic human rights violations committed by the Taliban, it is not clear – again, especially considering the UN's perilous financial situation – what the value added

of the new independent investigative mechanism (which is expected to cost around \$9.4 million to establish and scale-up between 2026-2028, and \$9.3 million annually thereafter), over and above the role played by the existing mechanism (the Special Rapporteur – who has been able to secure some level of cooperation with the Taliban). It is even less clear why the EU thought it necessary to both establish a new investigative mechanism, and retain the existing one.

Whatever the logic of these and other moves to expand the work of the Council, they do suggest that URG was right to question, in its report on 'The Human Rights Council in 2024' (against a backdrop of decisions last year to establish more new mechanisms and begin negotiations on new instruments such as the new optional protocol to the Convention of the Rights of the Child on free pre-primary and secondary education), whether the increasingly loud calls for rationalisation and efficiency heard from UN member States are 'more honoured in the breach than the observance.'



Mr. Richard Bennett, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan.

Credits: X @UNGeneva

Budgetary analysis

On 15 September, as part of the UN80 reform process, the UN secretariat published revised programme budget estimates for 2026, including initial proposals to merge the mandates of different UN entities (agencies, funds, and programmes), and move some entities from places like New York and Geneva to less expensive workstations, in order to drive efficiencies.

It would be useful, in addition to this UN-wide budget readjustment, for the human rights pillar to undertake its own assessment: what is the total 'income' of the UN human rights system – both budgetary and extra-budgetary; how are those resources being invested and deployed; and are those budgetary decisions consistent with securing the greatest possible human rights impact on the ground, i.e., impact that is both cost-efficient, and cost-effective?

It is commonly noted that the human rights pillar receives only around 3-5% of the UN's regular budget. That is indeed scandalous, and makes a mockery of the idea of three equal and mutually reinforcing pillars of the UN. However, it is equally true that this extremely low ceiling is unlikely to move upwards any time soon, especially in

the current economic and political climate, and that this percentage does not take into account voluntary contributions (i.e., extra-budgetary expenditure). In 2022, for example, the PBI (financial implications) of adopted Council texts was almost \$70 million, in 2023 it was close to \$98 million, and in 2024, just over \$76 million. The large majority of these PBIs required extra-budgetary appropriations. While the level of total PBIs dropped in 2025 (to \$31 million), it remains the case that the human rights pillar is responsible for considerable financial outlay. If the Council is to contribute to the goals of the vital UN80 reform agenda, including reorientating its work towards supporting implementation and impact on the ground, then it will be important for UN member States to have a clear overview of where and how this money is being spent. Is it mainly being invested in secretariat support, in COIs and other investigative mechanisms, in Special Procedures, in conference services, or – as it should – also on supporting national and local actors to help bring about real and measurable improvements in the enjoyment of human rights (e.g., through capacity-building and technical assistance), and to help ensure that the right of victims to remedy, redress, and reparation is effectively upheld?



UN Geneva. Official visit of Secretary-General of the United Nations in Geneva. Volker Türk, High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations at a 58th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in headquarters in United Nations in Geneva. 24 february

UN Photo / Jean Marc Ferré

Operational effectiveness

In September, the Secretary-General shared with member States a further UN80 report, ‘Shifting Paradigms: United to Deliver,’ setting out principles that should guide the UN’s operational reforms. In particular, the report states that those reforms should aim to: strengthen the system’s capacity to support countries in delivering on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and respond effectively to emerging issues [e.g., climate change, digital technology], including those identified in the Pact for the Future; maximise the concrete on-the-ground impact of activities and services, and improve timely, demand-driven access to expertise for member States; and optimise efficiencies and effectiveness by reducing duplication and streamlining operations.

On this basis, the report then sets out proposals to strengthen the UN’s delivery across all three pillars of its work – peace and security, sustainable development, and human rights – while also advancing more effective collaboration across the pillars. It proposes, for example, ‘a New Humanitarian Compact to cut bureaucracy and integrate billions of dollars in global supply chains,’ and the establishment of ‘a system-wide Human Rights Group to coordinate human rights systematically across all UN activities.’

While the report’s one proposal to strengthen the operational effectiveness of the human rights pillar is somewhat underwhelming, that does at least leave space for the Council and the wider human rights system to undertake their own consultations and reflections on how to fulfil former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s call for the Council to ‘lead the international community from the era of declaration to the era of implementation.’

As noted earlier in this introduction, the Council would undertake those reflections from a relative position of strength, especially compared to other principal organs of the UN system. First, the three main human rights mechanisms, the UPR, the Special Procedures, and the Treaty Bodies, especially acting in concert, represent a remarkably powerful compliance system, ensuring that States (governments, civil society, NHRIs, etc.) can regularly feed information into the UN system on progress and challenges, and regularly receive detailed and tailored recommendations on how to strengthen compliance in the future. Where the Council and the wider human rights machinery (including OHCHR) have traditionally fallen short is in supporting States (again, all national actors) in translating those recommendations into better laws, policies, and practices on the ground.

While the Council has taken some important steps in this regard over recent years, including its important work to encourage and guide States in the establishment of national mechanisms for implementation, reporting, and follow-up (NMIRFs), and its discussions on reforming agenda item 10 to provide more accessible and more effective technical assistance and capacity-building support, and while implementation is being increasingly supported by UN development agencies including UNICEF, UNFPA, and UN Women, all of which now routinely integrate human rights recommendations into country programming documents, much more remains to be done. It is also true that there is significant room for improvement in terms of measuring the impact of implementation measures on the enjoyment of human rights, and of bringing examples of impact, challenges and how they were overcome, and good practice and lessons learnt, to the Council, in order to be shared and to encourage progress elsewhere.

In 2026, an important opportunity exists for States, OHCHR, and civil society to consider what the three pillars of the UN80 reform proposals mean for the human rights system, how the Council should respond, and how the Council might shift its investment model, and its

methods of work, to align with the commendable goals of the Secretary-General's system-wide reforms. To help guide such a process, supportive States could perhaps consider establishing a 'group of friends of the Council,' or 'group of friends of the President.'



A meeting of the Human Rights Council 60th session in the Salle des Assemblées.

Photo via: UNTV.

Increased polarisation?

While there is some evidence that geopolitical tensions and currents outside of Geneva are being reflected in increased division inside the Council chamber, talk of heightened polarisation at the Council in 2025 is perhaps overstated (a situation no doubt helped by the absence of the US, at least under the current administration).

An illustrative example of where broader tensions, especially between more socially conservative countries (now including the US, and supported by increasingly influential so-called ‘anti-rights’ NGOs) and more socially liberal ones, are playing out in Geneva, is the New Zealand-led (with Colombia and Estonia) resolution on ‘Preventable maternal mortality and morbidity and human rights.’ This initiative is also illustrative as an example of the UN Secretary-General’s contention, in his UN80 reports, that many UN resolutions have become too long, and too focused on normative debate and expansion rather than on bringing practical improvements to people’s lives.

Early iterations of this resolution, during the first decade after the Council’s establishment, were jointly led by New Zealand and Burkina Faso (supported by Colombia). At this time, the resolutions were short (e.g., the 2009 text was two-and-a-half pages long, with ten preambular paragraphs (PPs), and seven operative paragraphs (OPs); the 2010 text was also two-and-a-half pages long with eight PPs, and eleven OPs; and the 2011 text was one-and-a-half pages long, with four PPs, and seven OPs). The resolutions were also focused on encouraging States, NHRIs, and other national stakeholders, supported by

UN agencies and programmes, to take concrete steps at national level to reduce preventable maternal mortality, especially by engaging with the UN human rights mechanisms on the subject, implementing the resulting recommendations, and measuring impact through the gathering of disaggregated data. In other words, the resolutions were practical and operational. Finally, at this time, the negotiations on the texts were relatively straightforward, and the resolutions were usually amongst the first to be adopted (without amendments being tabled, and by consensus) at each relevant session.

Today, the situation is very different. Burkina Faso left the core group after 2018, replaced by Estonia. The 2025 text (resolution 60/18) is eight pages long, has 32 often long PPs and 24 OPs, and has shifted from being an operational text, to a normative one. As a consequence, the open informal consultations in 2025 were long and difficult – continuing over eight rounds of negotiations, and characterised by angry exchanges between more socially conservative countries (e.g., countries of the Arab Group, the Holy See), and more socially liberal ones. Even after eight informals, six amendments were tabled to the draft ahead of voting, three by the Arab Group, Eritrea, and Pakistan, one by Eritrea, and two by Russia. These were mainly focused on deleting or changing some of the many references in the text to SRHR, including comprehensive sexuality education. Three amendments were subsequently withdrawn, and the others were rejected by the Council. The resolution was eventually adopted by consensus.



While the maternal mortality text is an example of wider political tensions playing out at the Council in the form of increased polarisation, there are other examples which point in the opposite direction. One regards China's traditional resolutions on 'The contribution of development to the enjoyment of human rights,' (voted in 2017, 2019, 2021, 2023), 'Mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of human rights,' (voted in 2018, 2020, 2021), and 'Promoting economic, social, and cultural rights within the context of addressing inequalities,' (voted in 2022). In the past, these China-led resolutions were consistently the focus of division and votes at the Council - often simply because the main sponsor was China. However, in recent years, these China-led texts have moved to consensus (e.g., 'The contribution of development' in 2025, and 'Promoting economic, social, and cultural rights in the context of inequality' in 2023 and 2025). China also achieved consensus on its 2024 resolution on 'Promoting accessibility.'

This trend regarding China-led resolutions appears to be playing out more broadly across other Council texts. Compared to the record high number (38) and proportion (45%) of voted texts in 2021, a steady decrease has taken place over recent years. In 2022 the number (33) and proportion (34%) of voted texts returned towards the mean (30%), in 2023 the number (30) and proportion (28%) were situated slightly below it, and in 2024, the total number (22) and proportion (23%) of voted texts dropped to significantly below the mean. Despite a slight increase again in 2025 - 26 resolutions were called to a vote (27%) - this broadly downward trend suggests that, overall, the Council is becoming less - not more - divided and polarised.

Special sessions

The Council held two important special sessions in 2025.

On 7th February, the Council convened a 37th special session on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in response to the deteriorating situation in North and South Kivu. The session concluded with the adoption of resolution S-37 (adopted without a vote) establishing an international Fact-Finding Mission to investigate and document violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the eastern DRC. During the session, Rwanda rejected allegations of involvement in the conflict, instead calling for restraint and diplomatic dialogue to de-escalate tensions.

On 14th November, the Council convened a further special session (its 38th) on the human rights situation in and around El Fasher, Sudan, and adopted – again without a vote – a resolution in which it requested the Independent

International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan (the mandate of which was extended for two years at HRC60 through resolution 60/3 – adopted by vote, with 24 in favour, 11 against, and 12 abstentions) to conduct an urgent inquiry into the recent alleged violations of international law committed in and around El Fasher.

More surprisingly, there was again no special session in 2025 on human rights violations in Gaza (and in Israel at the start of the conflict) – and nor has there been such a session since the crisis began, despite the fact that the Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, when presenting its latest report to the Council during HRC60, concluded that Israel has committed genocide against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.



H.E. Mr. Patrick Muyaya Katembwe, Minister of Communication and Media of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, addressing the Council at the 37th special session of the Human Rights Council on the situation of human rights in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo - 7 February 2025.

Photo via: UNTV.





A window into the work of the UN's human rights pillar...

Members of the Human Rights Council (Council) hold the main responsibility for pursuing and fulfilling the body's important mandate and thereby 'promoting universal respect for the protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all' (GA resolution 60/251).

When establishing the Council, the UN General Assembly (GA) decided that it would consist of 47 member States, elected by a majority of its members. In making their choice, members of the GA would take into account the contribution of the candidates to the promotion and protection of human rights, as well as their voluntary pledges and commitments.

The GA, furthermore, decided that elected members should uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights and fully cooperate with the Council and its mechanisms. Moreover, it was agreed that the Council's methods of work would be transparent, fair, and impartial, enable genuine dialogue, be results-oriented, allow for subsequent follow-up discussions to recommendations and their implementation, and allow for substantive interaction with Special Procedures and other mechanisms.

[yourHRC.org](https://www.yourhrc.org) aims to promote transparency around the degree to which the Council and its members are delivering on this crucial mandate, passed to them by the GA and, ultimately, entrusted to them by 'the Peoples of the United Nations' described in the UN Charter.






PART I

2025

**THE WORK, OUTPUT, AND
PERFORMANCE OF THE COUNCIL
AND ITS MECHANISMS**

THE COUNCIL'S FOCUS AND OUTPUT: RESOLUTIONS AND MECHANISMS

Number of Council texts adopted over time



Number of
Resolutions voted
in 2025


26

- Voted resolutions (during the year)
- March session
- June session
- September session
- Presidential statements
- Substantive Decisions*
- Resolutions

Data source: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ('OHCHR') website / URG Resolutions Portal.

- 96 texts were adopted in 2025, representing a 1% decrease compared to 2024. This decrease brings the number of adopted texts closer to the overall average (92).
- In 2025, the total number (26) and proportion (27%) of voted texts remain below the average (30%). Compared to the record high number (38) and proportion (45%) of voted texts in 2021, a steady decrease has continued over the past four years. While in 2022 the number (33) and proportion (34%) of voted texts had moved back toward the average, in 2023 the number (30) and proportion (28%) again fell slightly below it. This downward trend of voted texts in 2024 (22 voted texts, 23%) and the still-low figures in 2025 (26 voted texts, 27%) suggest that States have continued to improve their efforts to achieve consensus in recent sessions.


The focus of the Council's texts by agenda item (2008-2025)



Data Source: Council texts (resolutions, decisions and presidential statements) adopted between 2008-2025, available on the OHCHR extranet and via the URG Resolutions Portal.

- 54% of all texts generated by the Council in 2025 were thematic initiatives adopted under agenda item 3 (the 'promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, including the right to development').
- The number (10) of item 4 resolutions in 2025 is in line with the trend observed since 2016, with around 10 resolutions per year. Country-specific texts under this agenda item have focused on the human rights situations in Belarus, Burundi, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Islamic Republic of Iran, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Syrian Arab Republic, the Russian Federation (since 2022), and Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression.
- Since 2021, only three resolutions per year have been adopted under agenda item 7 ('human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories'). Additionally, for the fifth consecutive year, one resolution concerning the Occupied Palestinian Territories was adopted under agenda item 2 ('annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights'), rather than item 7. This shift may indicate a trend toward addressing issues in the Occupied Palestinian Territories under alternative agenda items.

Financial implications of Council resolutions (2011-2025)




- Texts without PBI
- Texts with PBI (with no extra-budgetary appropriations)
- Texts with PBI (requiring extra-budgetary appropriations)

*Three resolutions reduced the budget requirements at the HRC60: the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery and trafficking in persons; the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation; technical assistance and capacity building in the field of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.


Data Source: Programme Budget Implications (PBIs) arising from each resolution (2013-2025) available on the OHCHR extranet and via the URG Resolutions Portal.

Evolution of Council Special Sessions since 2006



Data Source: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ('OHCHR') website.

Donors of the Voluntary Trust Fund to support the participation of LDCs and SIDS in the Council 2025



*as of 4 August 2025


DONORS

Donors (2013-2025)



In 2025, Benin became a new voluntary donor to the Trust Fund. That same year, Benin also benefited from the Voluntary Trust Fund through the participation of delegates in the 58th and 60th sessions of the Council.

Top themes in 2025: focus of thematic resolutions




Note: The size of each bubble and word/phrase within the bubble relates to the number of resolutions adopted with that focus/theme in 2025.

Data source: Council resolutions available on the OHCHR extranet and via the URG Resolutions Portal.

- In 2025, the human rights issues related to women and girls stood out as a particular area of concern, reflecting the global priorities related to the group in focus and its intersectionality with different human rights dimensions. Six resolutions were passed in 2025 (one during HRC58, four during HRC59 and one during HRC60). One resolution focused on the relationship between diplomacy and human rights, another on discrimination against women, one on empowerment of women in and through sport, one on the elimination of gender-based violence, one on the achievement of economic empowerment, and the last on promotion and protection of the human rights of women and children in conflict and post-conflict situations.
- Regarding economic, social and cultural rights, health rights were a focus point of Council resolutions. Three resolutions were passed in 2025: one on preventable maternal mortality and morbidity, one on the elimination of female genital mutilation, and the last one on access to medicine, vaccines and other health products. The resolutions adopted reflected particular attention to issues related to women and girls, reinforcing their prevalence as an area of concern for 2025. The particular emphasis on women and girls aligns with the increasing Council's focus on gender-related matters over the past five years and is particularly timely, coinciding this year with the 30th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.

Evolution of amendments to Council resolutions



Voted amendments

■ Passed
 ■ Defeated
 ■ Withdrawn
 ■ Not Consider
 # Total


Data source: OHCHR extranet.

Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.



GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS OF THE COUNCIL


Geographic focus of Council texts, special sessions, and panels (2006-2025).



Geographic focus of the Council texts, sp

*Russian Federation's resolutions include item 1 (1) & 4 (3) resolutions and the SPE (

Data source: Council texts (resolutions, decisions, or presidential statements) 2006-2025, available on the OHCHR extranet and via the URG Resolutions Portal.




Special sessions and panels (last 10 years).

(1) on the situation of human rights in Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression


Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

GLOBAL COVERAGE OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM IN 2025



GLOBAL COVERAGE OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM IN 2025						
THEMATIC SPECIAL PROCEDURES	COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SPECIAL PROCEDURES			INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIONS		
1	1	1	1	✓	✓	✓
Number of visits	Number of visits	Special Rapporteur	Independent Expert	Commissions of Inquiry	Fact-Finding Mission	Other

Data source: Council texts (resolutions, decisions, or presidential statements) 2006-2025, available on the OHCHR extranet and via the URG Resolutions Portal.



UPR		OHCHR PRESENCE	
UPR review completed 2025	UPR Review completed (reported not yet adopted)	OHCHR field presence during 2025	OHCHR Presence in a third country to monitor the situation

Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.







PART II

2025

**COUNCIL MEMBER STATES:
ENGAGEMENT, PRINCIPAL
SPONSORSHIP, COOPERATION**

MEMBERSHIP OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL IN 2025





Data source: OHCHR website.

Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

COOPERATION WITH THE UN, ITS REPRESENTATIVES, AND MECHANISMS IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Secretary-General's report

On 24 September 2025, the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, Ms. Ilze Brands Kehris, presented the sixteenth annual report pursuant to Council resolution 12/2 on: 'Cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights'. The report contains observations and recommendations for addressing and preventing intimidation and reprisals, as well as information on allegations of intimidation and reprisals received during the reporting period of 1 May 2024 to 30 April 2025. The report also includes follow-up information on cases included in previous reports.

In resolution 12/2, the Council expressed its concern over the reports of intimidation and reprisals against individuals and groups wishing to cooperate or having cooperated with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights. The Council also condemned acts of intimidation and reprisal committed by Governments and non-State actors against such individuals and groups and invited the Secretary-General to report annually on alleged reprisals, including recommendations to address the issue.

The 2025 report noted that forms of reprisal and retaliation were addressed within the UN System by the Secretariat, including the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations field offices and peace operations, intergovernmental organs, including the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Human Rights Council, its special procedure mandate holders, human rights treaty bodies and other mechanisms. The report underlined that these incidents aimed at discouraging future participation or cooperation with a wide range of United Nations entities at Headquarters and in the field continued throughout the reporting period.


The Secretary-General's report highlighted that acts of intimidation and reprisals by both State and non-State actors remain prevalent, with incidents reported across all regions involving 32 Member States. Civic space and the protection of human rights defenders continue to be undermined, who face online and offline threats and attacks, leading to self-censorship. Restriction in activities, and lack of access to funding and sustainable resources are further threatening the work of civil society.

Specifically, the report noted new concerns, including the increased allegations of transnational repression and the impact on the protection of human rights defenders and other individuals in exile. Six Member States were allegedly responsible for 11 such incidents. Another concerning trend regards the targeting of individuals from the LGBT+ community, youth, women human rights defenders, Indigenous peoples, journalists, lawyers, victims of human rights violations, and their relatives.

The report also highlighted trends, consistent with those documented in previous years, including self-censorship and non-cooperation with the UN due to fears of reprisals, repressive policies or criminal liability. Non-cooperation poses a challenge for the documentation of allegations: the OHCHR and other UN entities documented cases of individuals who refused to engage due to fear of reprisals, including 62 individuals in one State. Online and offline surveillance of those who cooperate or attempt to cooperate remains a concern, documented in one third of the States included in the report.

The Secretary-General's report mentioned that more than half of the States included in the report continue to apply laws and regulations concerning civil society, counter-terrorism and national security that deter or hinder cooperation with the UN. In addition to the patterns and severity of reprisals in certain States, the Secretary-General expressed concern about the gender-specific nature and severity of reprisals targeting women, eroding inclusivity and silencing critical voices.

The safe and meaningful engagement of interlocutors, partners, civil society actors and human rights defenders with the United Nations is necessary to ensure the discharge of its mandate. Documentation and reporting, sustained political will, increased accountability and close collaboration with Member States and individuals affected by reprisals and intimidation are necessary to meaningfully contribute to all the pillars of the UN system. The Secretary-General urged States to prevent and address acts of intimidation and reprisals, and intensify effective coordinated efforts by Member States, the UN and civil society to redress the worrying trends.



Additionally, as with each annual report on reprisals, the report summarises and provides information on reported allegations of intimidation and reprisals in different UN member States. In 2025 the Secretary-General presents information on cases in the following countries:

Afghanistan

Algeria

Bahrain

Bangladesh

Belarus

Cameroon

China

Cuba

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Egypt

Guatemala

India

Indonesia

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Iraq

Israel

Mexico

Myanmar

Nicaragua

Pakistan

Peru

Russian Federation

Saudi Arabia

Sri Lanka

Sudan

Thailand

Turkmenistan

United Arab Emirates

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

Viet Nam

Yemen

State of Palestine

Finally, and again in line with previous annual reports the document summarises responses it has received from States to the allegations made in previous reports. In 2025, the Secretary-General reports having received responses from the following countries:

Algeria

Bahrain

Belarus

China

Cuba

Egypt

Guatemala

India

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Mexico

Pakistan

Peru

Russian Federation


Saudi Arabia

Thailand



Viet Nam

GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF COOPERATION

Latin America and Caribbean Group



African Group




Standing invitation issued

Western Europe and Others Group


Standing invitations issued by



Total visits completed



Average communications response rate




SPECIAL PROCEDURES

Average number of treaties ratified

8/9

Average/overall reporting status



TREATY BODIES

Average lateness of most overdue report

1 year

Most overdue report

1 year

Midterm reports submitted by:

7/7 Member States

Average number of reviews participated in:

112/193 (1st cycle)
 154/193 (2nd cycle)
 170/193 (3rd cycle)


UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW

Eastern European Group


Standing invitations issued by



Total visits completed



Average communications response rate




SPECIAL PROCEDURES

Average number of treaties ratified

8/9

Average/overall reporting status



TREATY BODIES

Average lateness of most overdue report

6 years

Most overdue report

10 years


Midterm reports submitted by:

6/6 Member States

Average number of reviews participated in:

24/193 (1st cycle)
 62/193 (2nd cycle)
 97/193 (3rd cycle)

UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW




Asia Pacific Group


Standing invitations issued by



Total visits completed



Average communications response rate




SPECIAL PROCEDURES

Average number of treaties ratified

8/9

Average/overall reporting status



TREATY BODIES

Average lateness of most overdue report

10 years

Most overdue report

23 years

Midterm reports submitted by:

5/13 Member States

Average number of reviews participated in:

44/193 (1st cycle)
 97/193 (2nd cycle)
 107/193 (3rd cycle)

UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW

UPR midterm report submitted

Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.


African Group (AG)

Overview of members

		Voluntary contribution to OHCHR in 2024	Voluntary contribution to OHCHR in 2025 (as of 31 October 2025)	NHRI accreditation status (4 June 2025)	Number of years the State has been a member of the HRC
Algeria					
Benin					
Burundi					
Côte d'Ivoire					
Democratic Republic of the Congo					
Ethiopia					
The Gambia					
Ghana					
Kenya					
Malawi					
Morocco					
South Africa					
Sudan					


Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Contribution to Council debates, panel discussions, and dialogues in 2025




Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Resolution main sponsorship in 2025



Note: This bar chart shows the number of resolutions' main sponsorship and core group sponsorship each State has joined during the Council in 2025. For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Resolution group sponsorship in 2025



Note: This bar chart shows the number of resolutions' group sponsorship each State has joined during the Council in 2025. For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Principal sponsorship

During 2025, African members of the Council led (as main sponsors/part of a core group) on a number of important resolutions, covering both thematic and country-specific issues.

In 2025, members of the African Group (AG) led, *inter alia*, on the following issues:

Algeria: the impact of anti-personnel mines on the full enjoyment of all human rights; Enhancing international cooperation, technical assistance and capacity-building to strengthen national frameworks for the protection and empowerment of children in the digital space.

Benin: Question of the death penalty.

Democratic Republic of the Congo: Technical assistance and capacity-building in the field of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Situation of human rights in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Ethiopia: Cultural rights and the protection of cultural heritage; The negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights.

The Gambia: Open-ended intergovernmental working group for the elaboration of a legally binding instrument on the promotion and protection of the human rights of older persons; The human rights of older persons.

Ghana: Cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights.

Malawi: Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka.


Morocco: The human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment; Women, diplomacy and human rights; Human rights, democracy and the rule of law; Empowering women and girls in and through sport; The safety of journalists; New and emerging technologies and human rights; The negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights; Enhancement of technical cooperation and capacity-building in the field of human rights; The role of prevention in the promotion and protection of human rights.

South Africa: The impact of anti-personnel mines on the full enjoyment of all human rights; Access to medicines, vaccines and other health products in the context of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; Promoting and protecting economic, social and cultural rights within the context of addressing inequalities.

Notwithstanding such individual leadership, it is important to note that African States often work through their regional group. In 2025, the **African Group** led on, *inter alia*, the following thematic resolutions: Elimination of female genital mutilation; From rhetoric to reality: global call for concrete action against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.

The **African Group** also led on Council initiatives aimed at the delivery of technical assistance and capacity-building in the field of human rights in certain States, including South Sudan, Mali, Central African Republic, and Libya.

Voting analysis



Note: This chart shows States' voting decisions in 2025. For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Cooperation with human rights mechanisms

	Algeria	Benin	Burundi	
SPECIAL PROCEDURES	Standing invitation			
	Visits Status and Longest Outstanding Visit			
		Total: 17 Inactive: 6	Total: 5 Inactive: 3	Total: 18 Inactive: 4
	Communications response rate	61 responded to 76 received 80%	1 responded to 3 received 33%	10 responded to 38 received 26%
TREATY BODIES	Core treaties ratified	8	9	7
	Communications procedures accepted	3	2	2
	Conventions ratified in 2025			
	Reporting status			
	Most overdue report (years)	CAT (13 years)	CESCR (0,5 years)	CESCR (5 years)
OPCAT				
	Ratified?			
	NPM established?			
	Sub-Committee visit?	—	2008, 2016 (2)	2025 (1)
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW	Mid-term report	 4 th cycle	 1 st cycle	—
	Reviewed in 2025?	—	—	—
	Level of delegation	Ministry	Ministry	Ministry
	Participation in other reviews (1 st cycle)	179	10	5
	Participation in other reviews (2 nd cycle)	186	45	44
	Participation in other reviews (3 rd cycle)	160	47	51

* Ratification and reporting are recorded for the nine 'core human rights conventions,' meaning: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW); and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

Note: for more comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Côte d'Ivoire	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Ethiopia	The Gambia	Ghana	Kenya	Malawi	Morocco	South Africa	Sudan
Total: 20 Inactive: 9	Total: 25 Inactive: 8	Total: 13 Inactive: 11	Total: 8 Inactive: 4	Total: 14 Inactive: 9	Total: 30 Inactive: 12	Total: 9 Inactive: 5	Total: 18 Inactive: 11	Total: 35 Inactive: 11	Total: 42 Inactive: 7
6 responded to 12 received 50%	2 responded to 62 received 3%	13 responded to 50 received 26%	2 responded to 18 received 11%	2 responded to 8 received 25%	7 responded to 81 received 9%	5 responded to 33 received 15%	58 responded to 75 received 77%	11 responded to 37 received 30%	20 responded to 86 received 23%
9 2	7 2	7 0	9 2	8 4	7 0	9 1	9 5	8 5	7 1
CERD (19 years)	CERD (14 years)	CERD (12 years)	CERD (45 years)	CESCR (22 years)	CRPD (1 year)	CCPR (3 years)	CAT (10 years)	CESCR (2 years)	CERD (6 years)
—	2024 (1)	—	—	2019 (1)	—	—	2017 (1)	2023 (1)	—
3 rd cycle	1 st & 3 rd cycles	—	—	—	1 st , 2 nd , 3 rd cycles	—	2 nd , 3 rd , 4 th cycles	—	1 st cycle
—	—	—	—	—			—	—	—
Ministry	Ministry	Ministry	Ministry	Ministry	Attorney General Office and Dept. of Justice	Permanent Representation in Geneva	Ministry	Ministry	Ministry
17	26	7	0	65	0	0	117	71	45
63	40	71	0	101	52	0	145	100	91
111	56	91	0	139	61	23	121	82	96


Asia-Pacific Group (APG)

Overview of members

		Voluntary contribution to OHCHR in 2024	Voluntary contribution to OHCHR in 2025 (as of 31 October 2025)	NHRI accreditation status (4 June 2025)	Number of years the State has been a member of the HRC
Bangladesh					
China					
Cyprus					
Indonesia					
Japan					
Kuwait					
Kyrgyzstan					
Maldives					
Marshall Islands					
Qatar					
Republic of Korea					
Thailand					
Viet Nam					


Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Contribution to Council debates, panel discussions, and dialogues in 2025




Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Resolution main sponsorship in 2025



Note: This bar chart shows the number of resolutions' main sponsorship and core group sponsorship each State has joined during the Council in 2025. For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Resolution group sponsorship in 2025



Note: This bar chart shows the number of resolutions' group sponsorship each State has joined during the Council in 2025. For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Principal sponsorship

During 2025, Asia-Pacific Group (APG) members of the Council led (as main sponsors/part of a core group) on a number of important resolutions, covering both thematic and country-specific issues.

In 2025, APG members led, *inter alia*, on the following issues:

Bangladesh: Human rights and climate change; Access to medicines, vaccines and other health products in the context of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.

China: The contribution of development to the enjoyment of all human rights; Access to medicines, vaccines and other health products in the context of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; Promoting and protecting economic, social and cultural rights within the context of addressing inequalities.

Cyprus: Cultural rights and the protection of cultural heritage; Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation; Sea-level rise and its effects on the full and effective enjoyment of human rights.

Indonesia: Empowering women and girls in and through sport; Access to medicines, vaccines and other health products in the context of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; The negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights; The rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; Enhancement of technical cooperation and capacity-building in the field of human rights.

Japan: Civil society space; Advisory services and technical assistance for Cambodia.

Kuwait: Enhancing international cooperation, technical assistance and capacity-building to strengthen national frameworks for the protection and empowerment of children in the digital space.

Kyrgyzstan: Accelerating efforts to achieve women's economic empowerment.

Maldives: The human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment; Women, diplomacy and human rights; The rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; Sea-level rise and its effects on the full and effective enjoyment of human rights; The role of prevention in the promotion and protection of human rights: the rule of law and accountability.


Qatar: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic; Empowering women and girls in and through sport; The safety of journalists; Enhancement of technical cooperation and capacity-building in the field of human rights; Promotion and protection of the human rights of women and children in conflict and post-conflict situations: ensuring justice, remedies and reparation for victims.

Republic of Korea: Human rights, democracy and the rule of law; New and emerging digital technologies and human rights.

Thailand: Access to medicines, vaccines and other health products in the context of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; Enhancement of technical cooperation and capacity-building in the field of human rights.
























Viet Nam: Human rights and climate change; Enhancing international cooperation, technical assistance and capacity-building to strengthen national frameworks for the protection and empowerment of children in the digital space.

Voting analysis



Note: This chart shows States' voting decisions in 2025. For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Cooperation with human rights mechanisms

	Bangladesh 	China 	Cyprus 	
SPECIAL PROCEDURES	Standing invitation			
	Visits Status and Longest Outstanding Visit	 Total: 31 Inactive: 11	 Total: 30 Inactive: 13	 Total: 5 Inactive: 1
	Communications response rate	 45 responded to 105 received 43%	 188 responded to 347 received 54%	 13 responded to 17 received 76%
TREATY BODIES	Core treaties ratified	9	6	7
	Communications procedures accepted	1	0	5
	Conventions ratified in 2025	CAT-OP		
	Reporting status			
	Most overdue report (years)	CERD (23 years)	CERD (2 years)	—
OPCAT				
Ratified?				
NPM established?				
Sub-Committee visit?	—	—	2016 (1)	
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW	Mid-term report	—	—	—
	Reviewed in 2025?	—	—	—
	Level of delegation	Ministry	Permanent Representation in Geneva	Ministry
	Participation in other reviews (1 st cycle)	84	57	5
	Participation in other reviews (2 nd cycle)	84	173	60
Participation in other reviews (3 rd cycle)	88	176	90	

















* Ratification and Reporting is recorded for nine 'core UN human rights conventions' which include: the ICCPR, the ICESCR, CAT, the CPED, the CEDAW, the CRC, the CERD, CMW, and the CRPD.

Note: for more comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Indonesia	Japan	Kuwait	Kyrgyzstan	Maldives	Marshall Islands	Qatar	Republic of Korea	Thailand	Viet Nam
Total: 33 Inactive: 11	Total: 26 Inactive: 7	Total: 8 Inactive: 4	Total: 16 Inactive: 7	Total: 15 Inactive: 5	Total: 6 Inactive: 0	Total: 17 Inactive: 3	Total: 34 Inactive: 9	Total: 22 Inactive: 16	Total: 17 Inactive: 11
Completed Requested Accepted Reminder Declined	Completed Requested Accepted Reminder Declined	Completed Requested Accepted Reminder Declined	Completed Requested Accepted Reminder Declined	Completed Requested Accepted Reminder Declined	Completed Requested Accepted Reminder Declined	Completed Requested Accepted Reminder Declined	Completed Requested Accepted Reminder Declined	Completed Requested Accepted Reminder Declined	Completed Requested Accepted Reminder Declined
58 responded to 120 received 48%	62 responded to 66 received 94%	20 responded to 29 received 69%	30 responded to 52 received 58%	10 responded to 29 received 34%	0 responded to 0 received 0%	18 responded to 22 received 82%	56 responded to 84 received 67%	114 responded to 145 received 79%	87 responded to 105 received 83%
8	8	7	8	8	7	7	8	8	7
0	0	0	2	3	2	1	6	2	0
submitted on time on schedule submitted late overdue(outstanding) not party n/a	submitted on time on schedule submitted late overdue(outstanding) not party n/a	submitted on time on schedule submitted late overdue(outstanding) not party n/a	submitted on time on schedule submitted late overdue(outstanding) not party n/a	submitted on time on schedule submitted late overdue(outstanding) not party n/a	submitted on time on schedule submitted late overdue(outstanding) not party n/a	submitted on time on schedule submitted late overdue(outstanding) not party n/a	submitted on time on schedule submitted late overdue(outstanding) not party n/a	submitted on time on schedule submitted late overdue(outstanding) not party n/a	submitted on time on schedule submitted late overdue(outstanding) not party n/a
CERD (15 years)	CESCR (7 years)	—	—	CESCR (17 years)	CAT, CESCR (6 years)	—	—	CESCR (5 years)	CESCR (6 years)
—	—	—	2012, 2018 (2)	2007, 2014 (2)	—	—	—	—	—
—		—	—		—	—			
—	1 st , 2 nd , 3 rd cycles	—	—	1 st cycle	—	—	2 nd & 3 rd cycles	1 st , 2 nd , 3 rd cycles	3 rd cycle
—	—					—	—	—	—
Ministry	Ministry	Ministry	Ministry	Attorney General	Ministry	Permanent Representation in Geneva	Ministry	Ministry	Ministry
78	75	27	20	35	0	39	69	47	38
192	90	73	48	105	0	57	110	175	96
186	116	53	53	174	34	95	132	96	95


Eastern European Group (EEG)

Overview of members

		Voluntary contribution to OHCHR in 2024	Voluntary contribution to OHCHR in 2025 (as of 31 October 2025)	NHRI accreditation status (4 June 2025)	Number of years the State has been a member of the HRC
Albania					
Bulgaria					
Czechia					
Georgia					
North Macedonia					
Romania					


Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Contribution to Council debates, panel discussions, and dialogues in 2025




Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Resolution main sponsorship in 2025



Note: This bar chart shows the number of resolutions' main sponsorship and core group sponsorship each State has joined during the Council in 2025. For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Resolution group sponsorship in 2025



Note: This bar chart shows the number of resolutions' group sponsorship each State has joined during the Council in 2025. For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Principal sponsorship

During 2025, Eastern European Group (EEG) members of the Council led (as main sponsors/part of a core group) on a number of important resolutions, covering both thematic and country-specific issues.

At a thematic level, in 2025, EEG States led, *inter alia*, on the following issues:

Albania: The situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic; Advancing human rights in South Sudan; The human rights implications of drug policy.

Bulgaria: Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation.

Czechia: The right to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation.

Georgia: Cooperation with Georgia.

North Macedonia: Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran; Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka.

Romania: Human rights, diplomacy and the rule of law; Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation.

Voting analysis

Agenda Item	Text number	Text Title	Albania	Bulgaria	Czechia	Georgia	North Macedonia	Romania
2	58/1	Advancing human rights in South Sudan	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour
	58/2	Human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the obligation to ensure accountability and justice	Abstention	Abstention	Against	Abstention	Against	Abstention
	59/L.1/Rev1	Discontinuation of the mandate of Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea	Against	Against	Against	Against	Against	Against
	59/1	Situation of human rights in Eritrea	In favour	In favour	In favour	Abstention	In favour	In favour
	60/3	Responding to the human rights and humanitarian crisis caused by the ongoing armed conflict in the Sudan	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour
	58/3	The negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights	Against	Against	Against	Against	Against	Against
3	58/7	The negative impact of the non-repatriation of funds of illicit origin to the countries of origin on the enjoyment of human rights, and the importance of improving international	Against	Against	Against	Against	Against	Against
	58/12	Effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights	Against	Against	Against	Abstention	Against	Against
	59/3	Enhancement of international cooperation in the field of human rights	Against	Against	Against	Against	Against	Against
	59/5	Mandate of Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour
	59/7	Access to medicines, vaccines and other health products in the context of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health	Abstention	Abstention	Abstention	Abstention	Abstention	Abstention
	59/8	Human rights and international solidarity	Against	Against	Against	Against	Against	Against
	60/5	Mandate of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination	Against	Against	Against	Against	Against	Against
	60/6	Promotion of a democratic and equitable international order	Against	Against	Against	Against	Against	Against
	60/7	The right to development	Against	Against	Against	Against	Against	Against
	60/17	Question of the death penalty	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour
4	58/18	Promotion and protection of human rights in Nicaragua	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour
	58/19	Situation of human rights in Belarus	In favour	In favour	In favour	Abstention	In favour	In favour
	58/21	Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran	In favour	In favour	In favour	Abstention	In favour	In favour
	58/24	Situation of human rights in Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour
	60/15	Situation of human rights in Burundi	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour
	60/21	Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour
7	58/26	Human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan	Abstention	Against	Against	Against	Against	Abstention
	58/27	Right of the Palestinian people to self-determination	In favour	In favour	Against	In favour	Against	In favour
	58/28	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan	Abstention	Abstention	Against	Abstention	Against	Abstention
10	59/22	Cooperation with and assistance to Ukraine in the field of human rights	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour


■ Thematic
■ Country
■ Institutional /Procedural

● Against
● Abstention
● In favour
● No vote

* Ratification and Reporting is recorded for nine 'core UN human rights conventions' which include: the ICCPR, the ICESCR, CAT, the CPED, the CEDAW, the CRC, the CERD, CMW, and the CRPD.

Note: for more comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Cooperation with human rights mechanisms




Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC)

Overview of members

		Voluntary contribution to OHCHR in 2024	Voluntary contribution to OHCHR in 2025 (as of 31 October 2025)	NHRI accreditation status (4 June 2025)	Number of years the State has been a member of the HRC
Bolivia					
Brazil					
Chile					
Colombia					
Costa Rica					
Cuba					
Dominican Republic					
Mexico					


Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Contribution to Council debates, panel discussions, and dialogues in 2025




Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Resolution main sponsorship in 2025



Note: This bar chart shows the number of resolutions' main sponsorship and core group sponsorship each State has joined during the Council in 2025. For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Resolution group sponsorship in 2025



Note: This bar chart shows the number of resolutions' group sponsorship each State has joined during the Council in 2025. For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Principal sponsorship

During 2025, Latin America and the Caribbean Group (GRULAC) members of the Council led (as main sponsors/part of a core group) on a number of important resolutions, covering both thematic and country-specific issues.

In 2025, GRULAC members of the Council led, *inter alia*, on the following issues:

Bolivia: Promoting and protecting economic, social and cultural rights within the context of addressing inequalities.

Brazil: Promotion and protection of human rights in Nicaragua; Open-ended intergovernmental working group on the elaboration of a legally binding instrument on the promotion and protection of human rights of older persons; The safety of journalists; New and emerging digital technologies and human rights; Access to medicines, vaccines and other health products in the context of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; The negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights; Mandate of Independent Expert on protection against violence and

discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity; Enhancement of technical cooperation and capacity-building in the field of human rights; Promoting international cooperation to support national mechanisms for implementation, reporting and follow-up; The human rights implications of drug policy; A world of sport free from racisms, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; The human rights of older persons; The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.

Chile: Promotion and protection of human rights in Nicaragua; Women, diplomacy and human rights; Neurotechnology and human rights; Mandate of the Working Group on discrimination against women and girls; Civil society space; Mandate of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity; The rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association.

Colombia: Promotion and protection of human rights in Nicaragua; Enhancement of technical cooperation and capacity-building in the field of human rights in Colombia; Mandate of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity; The human rights implications of drug policy; Preventable maternal mortality and morbidity and human rights.

Costa Rica: Promotion and protection of human rights in Nicaragua; The human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment; Mandate of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimina-


tion based on sexual orientation and gender identity; Promotion and protection of human rights of women and children in conflict and post-conflict situations; ensuring justice, remedies and reparations for victims; Question of the death penalty.

Cuba: Effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights; Promotion of the enjoyment of cultural rights of everyone and respect for cultural diversity; Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food; The Social Forum; Human rights and international solidarity; Promotion of a democratic and equitable international order; Mandate of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination.

Dominican Republic: Accelerating efforts to achieve women's economic empowerment; Sea-level rise and its effects on the full and effective enjoyment of human rights.

Mexico: Women, diplomacy and human rights; Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism; Mandate of the Working Group on discrimination against women and girls; Mandate of the Independent Expert on violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity; The human rights implications of drug policy; Question of the death penalty; Human rights and indigenous peoples; Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Voting analysis




* Ratification and Reporting is recorded for nine 'core UN human rights conventions' which include: the ICCPR, the ICESCR, CAT, the CPED, the CEDAW, the CRC, the CERD, CMW, and the CRPD.

Note: for more comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.




































Note: This chart shows States' voting decisions in 2025. For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Cooperation with human rights mechanisms




Western European and Others Group (WEOG)

Overview of members

		Voluntary contribution to OHCHR in 2024	Voluntary contribution to OHCHR in 2025 (as of 31 October 2025)	NHRI accreditation status (4 June 2025)	Number of years the State has been a member of the HRC
Belgium					
France					
Germany					
Iceland					
Netherlands					
Spain					
Switzerland					


Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Contribution to Council debates, panel discussions, and dialogues in 2025




Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Resolution main sponsorship in 2025



Note: This bar chart shows the number of resolutions' main sponsorship and core group sponsorship each State has joined during the Council in 2025. For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Resolution group sponsorship in 2025



Note: This bar chart shows the number of resolutions' group sponsorship each State has joined during the Council in 2025. For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Principal sponsorship

During 2025, the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) members of the Council led (as main sponsors/part of a core group) on a number of important resolutions, covering both thematic and country-specific issues.

In 2025, WEOG members of the Council led, *inter alia*, on the following issues:

Belgium: Question of the death penalty; and Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation.

France: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic; The safety of journalists; Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation; Question of the death penalty; and Arbitrary Detention.

Germany: Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic; Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran; Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery and trafficking in persons; Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation; The human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation; and Responding to the human rights and humanitarian crisis caused by the ongoing armed conflict in Sudan.


Iceland: Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran; and The rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association.

Netherlands (Kingdom of the): Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic; Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation; and Responding to the human rights and humanitarian crisis caused by the ongoing armed conflict in Sudan.

Spain: Women, diplomacy and human rights; Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation; and the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation,

Switzerland: Neurotechnology and human rights; The human rights implications of drug policy; and Question of the death penalty.

Voting analysis




■ Thematic
■ Country
■ Institutional /Procedural

● Against
● Abstention
● In favour
● No vote

* Ratification and Reporting is recorded for nine 'core UN human rights conventions' which include: the ICCPR, the ICESCR, CAT, the CPED, the CEDAW, the CRC, the CERD, CMW, and the CRPD.

Note: for more comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Cooperation with human rights mechanisms



Methodology Notes

yourHRC.org uses independent and objective data as the basis of its summaries and analyses. The origin of that data is primarily official UN documents and information produced by other international organisations. To ensure transparency, information on the sources of all data used, together with the methodology applied and the timeframe, is presented below.

Section I.

The Council's focus and output: Resolution and mechanisms

Source: OHCHR website. OHCHR extranet.

Timeframe: 2006-2025.

Data as of: 31 October 2025

The focus of Council texts by agenda item (2008-2025)

Source: Individual resolutions, decisions, and presidential statements. OHCHR extranet.

Timeframe: 2008-2025

Data as of: 31 October 2025

Financial Implications of Council resolutions (2012-2025)

Source: Individual PBIs. OHCHR extranet.

Timeframe: 2012-2025

Data as of: 31 October 2025

Special Sessions

Source: OHCHR website.

Timeframe: 2006-2025.

Data as of: 31 October 2025

Donors of Voluntary Trust Fund for LDCs and SIDS (2013-2025)

Source: OHCHR.

Timeframe: 2013-2025.

Data as of: 31 October 2025

Top themes in 2025: focus of thematic resolutions

Source: Individual resolutions, decisions, and presidential statements. OHCHR extranet.

Timeframe: 2025

Data as of: 31 October 2025

Amendments

Source: Council texts: amendments. OHCHR extranet.

Timeframe: 2006-2025.

Data as of: 31 October 2025

Geographic focus of the Council texts and special sessions (2006-2025)

Source: Council texts: Individual resolutions, decisions, and presidential statements. OHCHR extranet; Special Sessions: OHCHR website.

Timeframe: 2006 - 2025

Data as of: 31 October 2025

Global coverage of the UN human rights system in 2025

Source: OHCHR website. UN Human Rights Appeal 2025.

Timeframe: 2025

Data as of: 31 October 2025

Section II.

Overview of membership, members of the Bureau, of the Consultative Group, and the Working Group on Situations

Source: OHCHR website – Human Rights Council.

Data as of: 31 October 2025.

Voluntary contribution to OHCHR (2024 and 2025)

Source: OHCHR website.

Most recent information published by the OHCHR, data as of 31 October 2025.

NHRI Accreditation Status

Source: Chart of the Status of National Institutions, accredited by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI); <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/nhri/ganhri/ganhri-status-accreditation-chart.pdf>

Most recent information published by the OHCHR, data as of 4 June 2025.

Previous membership terms

Source: OHCHR website.

Data as of: 31 October 2025.

Resolution Sponsorship

Source: HRC Extranet.

Data as of: 31 October 2025.

Note: The sponsorship of the members of the Council was calculated based on all resolutions listed on the HRC Extranet from March 2025 until September 2025 (i.e., during HRC sessions 58-60). The options for State's sponsorship include:

- **Main sponsorship:** States sponsored a resolution by themselves.
- **Core Group Sponsorship:** States sponsored a resolution as part of a core group.
- **Group Sponsorship:** States sponsored a resolution as part of a regional (e.g. African Group) or political (e.g. OIC, EU, etc.) group.

State contribution to Interactive Dialogues in 2025

Source: HRC Extranet

Data as of: 31 October 2025

Note: The level of participation in Interactive Dialogues was calculated based on the individual statements listed on the OHCHR Extranet during the 2025 sessions (i.e. during the Council's sessions 58-60) and joint statements on behalf of a group of States.

Explanation of groups:

- **Regional groups:** African Group.
- **Sub-regional groups:** Benelux; Caribbean Community (CARICOM); Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC); Lublin Triangle; Nordic and Baltic States (NB8); core groups that include countries from the same regional group (e.g. the Core group on the right to privacy); groups of like-minded countries from the same regional group.
- **Political groups:** Arab Group; Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN); Group of Friends in Defense of the United Nations Charter; European Union (EU); Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NAM); Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
- **Cross-regional groups:** Groupe des États Membres de la Francophonie (OIF); MED9; Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP); core groups that include countries from different regional groups (e.g. the Core group on the right to privacy); groups of like-minded countries from different regional groups; cross-regional groups.

Voting analysis

Source: OHCHR Extranet.

Timeframe: 2025

Data as of: 31 October 2025.

Cooperation with human rights mechanisms

Special Procedures

Standing invitation

Source: OHCHR website.

Data as of: 31 October 2025.

Visits Completed & longest outstanding visit

Source: OHCHR website.

Data as of: 31 October 2025.

Note: The number of visits undertaken includes only visits that have actually taken place, as listed on the OHCHR website. The dates for the most overdue visit are calculated according to the initial request date of the corresponding visit (regardless of subsequent reminders) or with the earliest request date published, when the initial request date is not available. Visits are classified as following in the analysis:

- **Completed visits:** visits reported as completed or with report forthcoming in the [OHCHR completed visits tab](#).
- **Requested visits:** visits whose last status was classified as "requested" or "invited" in the [OHCHR website pending visits tab](#).
- **Accepted visits:** visits whose last status was classified as "accepted by the State", "proposal of dates", "postponed by the mandate holder" or "postponed by the State" in the [OHCHR website pending visits tab](#).
- **Reminder of visits:** visits whose last status was classified as "reminder" in the [OHCHR website pending visits tab](#).
- **Declined visits:** visits classified as declined in the [OHCHR website other status tab](#).
- **Inactive visits:** visits classified as inactive in the [OHCHR website other status tab](#). Inactive visits were not considered towards the final count of the total visits in the region and did not influence the percentage of the average visits completed for the region.

Communications response rate

Source: OHCHR – Communication report and search database.

Data as of: 31 October 2025.

Treaty Bodies

Status of Ratification and Reporting

Source: OHCHR website.

Data as of: 31 October 2025.

Note: Ratification and Reporting is recorded for eight ‘core UN human rights conventions,’ which include: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

Treaty Body reporting dates relate to the State’s current reporting cycle, as listed on the OHCHR website.

Explanation of Options:

- **SUBMITTED ON TIME:** The State Party Report submitted the report before or on the due date;
- **ON SCHEDULE:** The current cycle due date is in the future;
- **SUBMITTED LATE:** The State Party Report has been submitted for the current cycle but was submitted late, i.e. after the due date;
- **OVERDUE (OUTSTANDING):** The current cycle report has not yet been submitted, and it is overdue;
- **NOT PARTY:** The State has not ratified the corresponding Treaty;
- **N/A:** No deadline has been set, or data is not available.

The ‘most overdue’ report time is for the outstanding report with the earliest due date.

Reporting and ratification scores were calculated with the information published on the OHCHR website on the 31st October 2025.

Communications procedures accepted

Source: OHCHR website.

Data as of: 31 October 2025.

Note: This figure relates to the acceptance of individual complaints procedures under each of the abovementioned core conventions.

OP-CAT

Source: OHCHR website.

Data as of: 31 October 2025.

Note: An ‘NPM’ is a ‘National Preventative Mechanism’.

Universal Periodic Review

Level of delegation

Source: The Head of a State’s delegation (for its last UPR) was determined using the report of the working group during the State’s last UPR. Where the rank of the representative was not clear, the URG followed up with the relevant missions as far as possible.

Data as of: 31 October 2025.

Mid-term reporting

Source: OHCHR website. <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRImplementation.aspx>

Data as of: 31 October 2025.

Note: The ‘mid-term reporting’ score relates to whether the State has submitted a mid-term report for the first, second and/or the third cycles of UPR.

Participation in other reviews

Source: UPR Info - ‘Statistics of UPR Recommendations.’

Data as of: 31 October 2025.

Note: Participation in other reviews relates to the number of other States’ reviews (out of 193) during which the corresponding State made (1 or more) recommendations.

Note: For updated information on all current and former Council members, visit yourHRC.org.

Photo credits:

- UN Geneva. Official visit of Secretary-General of the United Nations in Geneva. Volker Türk, High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations at a 58th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in headquarters in United Nations in Geneva. 24 february UN Photo / Jean Marc Ferré
- UN Geneva. Official visit of Secretary-General of the United Nations in Geneva. A general view of participants at a 58th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in headquarters in United Nations in Geneva. 24 february 2025. UN Photo / Jean Marc Ferré
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About yourHRC.org

The yourHRC.org project has four parts:

1

A universally accessible and free-to-use web portal - **yourHRC.org** - providing information on the performance of all States that have stood for and won election to the Council. An interactive world map provides information on the Council's membership in any given year, and the number of membership terms held by each country. Country-specific pages then provide up-to-date information on: the voting record of the State; its principal sponsorship on important Council initiatives; its level of participation in Council debates, interactive dialogues, and panels; its engagement and cooperation with the Council's mechanisms (UPR and Special Procedures) and with the Treaty Bodies; and the degree to which it fulfilled the voluntary pledges and commitments made before its previous membership term.

2

An annual '**yourHRC.org election guide**,' providing at-a-glance information (including comparative information) on candidatures for upcoming Council elections.

3

An annual '**yourHRC.org end-of-year report**' (to be published each December), providing information (including comparative information) on levels of member State engagement and cooperation over that year.

4

A periodic '**yourHRC.org candidate alert**' sent to stakeholders informing them of candidature announcements for future Council elections, and providing information on that State's performance during previous membership terms (where applicable).

The present document is the third annual '**yourHRC.org end-of-year report**,' offering an assessment of the Council's work, output, achievements and shortfalls in 2025, and analysing the contributions of member States to the work of the Council and the enjoyment of human rights around the world.

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yourHRC.org

THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COUNCIL IN

2025



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A window onto cooperation, dialogue, leadership
and policymaking at the UN Human Rights Council



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