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A window onto cooperation, dialogue, leadership, and policymaking at the UN Human Rights Council

THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL IN

LEADERSHIP, RESOLVE AND COOPERATION AT THE UN'S MAIN HUMAN RIGHTS BODY




Table of Contents

Introduction	3	Asia-Pacific Group (APG)	50
A window into the work of the UN's human rights pillar	17	Overview of members	50
PART I - 2024 - THE WORK, OUTPUT, AND PERFORMANC OF THE COUNCIL AND ITS MECHANISMS	CE	Principal sponsorship	51
		Contribution to Council debates, panel discussions, and dialogues in 2024	52
THE COUNCIL'S FOCUS AND OUTPUT: RESOLUTIONS AND MECHANISMS	20	Voting analysis	53
Number of Council texts adopted over time	20	Cooperation with human rights mechanisms	54
The focus of the Council's texts by agenda item	21	Eastern European Group (EEG)	56
Financial implications of Council resolutions	22	Overview of members	56
Evolution of Council Special Sessions since 2006	23	Principal sponsorship	57
Donors of the Voluntary Trust Fund to support the participation of LDCs and SIDS in the Council 2024	24	Contribution to Council debates, panel discussions, and dialogues in 2024	58
Top themes in 2024: focus of thematic resolutions	25	Voting analysis	59
·	23	Cooperation with human rights mechanisms	60
State participation in Interactive Dialogues of the Special Procedures in 2024	26	Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC)	62
Evolution of amendments to Council resolutions	27	Overview of members	62
GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS OF THE COUNCIL	28	Principal sponsorship	63
GLOBAL COVERAGE OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM IN 2024	30	Contribution to Council debates, panel discussions, and dialogues in 2024	64
		Voting analysis	65
PART II - 2024 - COUNCIL MEMBER STATES: ENGAGEME PRINCIPAL SPONSORSHIP, COOPERATION	SNT,	Cooperation with human rights mechanisms	66
MEMBERSHIP OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL IN 2024	34	Western European and Others Group (WEOG)	68
		Overview of members	68
COOPERATION WITH THE UN, ITS REPRESENTATIVES, AND MECHANISMS IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS	36	Principal sponsorship	69
GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF COOPERATION	42	Contribution to Council debates, panel discussions, and dialogues in 2024	70
African Group (AG)	44	Voting analysis	71
Overview of members	44	Cooperation with human rights mechanisms	72
Principal sponsorship	45	Methodology Notes	74
Contribution to Council debates, panel discussions, and dialogues in 2024	46		
Voting analysis	47		
Cooperation with human rights mechanisms	48		

Introduction

The broad story of the Human Rights Council in 2024 is of a UN body that continues to represent a relative bright spot in the United Nations institutional landscape, with States, UN agencies and programmes, and civil society expending increasing amounts of time, resources, and energy on engaging with the Council and its mechanisms; yet, paradoxically, a body that appears to be increasingly losing its way in terms of where it is investing that political and financial capital. In particular, delegations appear to be increasingly intent on ignoring a key dimension of the Council's mandate: to 'enable genuine dialogue, be results- oriented, [and] allow for subsequent follow-up discussions to recommendations and their implementation,' including by 'strengthening the capacity of Member States to comply with their human rights obligations for the benefit of all human beings.'

Put simply, while the programme of work of the Council continues to expand and expand, the focus of that work is predominantly and increasingly centred on the further elaboration of human rights norms – the further widening of the boundaries of what we consider to be universal human rights standards – and even, in 2024, a decision to further codify those norms into a new optional protocol, instead of being centred, as it should, on the implementation and realisation of the norms already set over the past half century. What is more, the way in which States are seeking to further elaborate and expand the universal normative framework is not through 'genuine dialogue' aimed at 'enhanc[ing] dialogue and broaden[ing] understanding among civilizations, cultures, and religions,' but is rather based, usually, on one group of States working to impose its views on other States, with little or no space for generating understanding and empathy, or a genuine search for common ground.





Greater efficiency and rationalisation - more honoured in the breach than the observance

In 2024, across its three regular sessions, the Council met for a total of just under 15 weeks.

The 55th session (HRC55) alone (26 February to 5 April) ran for six weeks - the longest session in the Council's history.

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Council had always managed to conduct its annual work over three sessions totalling ten weeks (a four-week session around March, and two three-week sessions around June and September). At the time of the pandemic, the decision to extend Council sessions was justified – due to the added time pressures placed on UN bodies. However, since the end of the pandemic, instead of reverting to the previous situation, Council members, led by successive Presidencies (especially the 2022 Presidency of H.E. Ambassador Federico Villegas of Argentina), have 'normalised' the expansion of regular sessions. In the view of the Universal Rights Group, this was and remains a grave mistake, as it has taken away a de facto check and balance on the steady expansion of the Council's work.

Some argue that the increase in Council meeting time is a necessary response to a worsening global human rights situation. Yet beyond newspaper headlines about the admittedly dire situations in places such as Ukraine and Gaza, there is little hard evidence that the global situation today is demonstrably worse than it was five, ten, or fifteen years ago. The reality is more prosaic – as the space for more debates, reports, panels, etc., grows, States and civil society will simply fill up that space. Like nature, UN member States, it seems, abhor a vacuum. Most of this added work is unlikely to have a significant impact on the on-the-ground enjoyment of human rights.

Paradoxically, the longest session in the Council's history came against the backdrop of an acute **liquidity crisis** facing the UN and – because it already receives such a low proportion of the UN's regular budget (around 4%) – especially its human rights pillar. In short, the Council and the wider UN human rights system, are being asked to do a lot more with a lot less.

In consequence, at HRC55, Council members were obliged to adopt a decision on 'the postponement of the implementation of certain activities mandated by the Human Rights Council, that cannot be implemented in 2024 due to the liquidity crisis.' With the decision, the Council decided to postpone or merge various intersessional seminars, interactive dialogues, reports, and other actions on a range of thematic (e.g., the rights of indigenous peoples, NMIRFs, social protection, democracy, international cooperation, capacity-building) and country (e.g., the situation of the Rohingya) issues.

OHCHR faced an unenviable task in advising the Council President on these cuts, and overall proposed a wise course: the postponed activities will not make a huge difference to the Council's effectiveness and impact.

In addition to the above cuts (as covered by the Council's decision), thematic Special Procedures mandate-holders have also been asked to reduce the number of country missions each year from two to one. Of all the painful – yet necessary – efficiency decisions taken during 2024, this one raises the most questions, as Special Procedures country missions are one of the few tools at the Council's disposal through which it can project real and tangible influence on-the-ground in UN member States.

All of this underlines the importance, at the Council, of making urgent progress with rationalising the body's work and strengthening its efficiency. Although the number of texts adopted at HRC55 (34) and HRC56 (25) were significantly less than the number adopted at the equivalent sessions one year previous (a 21% and 17% decrease respectively), (HRC57 saw a slight increase of 2,7%), it nevertheless remains the case that the Council's agenda and programme of work are stretched too thin, and that this is having a detrimental effect on its output and impact. Linked with this point, too much of the Council's time and resources are taken up with general thematic debate, and not enough with promoting and recognising implementation and impact at national level, and identifying and sharing good practices and lessons learnt in that regard.

Council President appointed two co-facilitators (the Ambassadors of Indonesia and Switzerland) to look at 'the rationalisation of initiatives and activities created through Council decisions.' Unfortunately, similar initiatives in the past have failed to garner much reward, mainly because of the approach taken – open informal consultations designed to identify and agree on Council-wide efficiency

and rationalisation measures. While States have regularly agreed on the need for rationalisation, when it has come to agreeing the details, they have been loath to 'lose' their own initiatives. It is unclear whether the current cofacilitators have learnt this lesson. It is important that future efforts do so, and instead focus on convincing the main sponsors of initiatives (covering resolutions, panels, intersessional meetings, and thematic Special Procedures mandates) to explore merging those that are duplicative or heavily overlapping.

A final point is that the Council's activism is increasingly engendering a reaction on the part of the General Assembly's Third Committee (which inter alia deals with human rights), particularly when mandates created by the Council lead to more work for Committee members (e.g., when the Council decides that Special Procedures mandate-holders should also report to, and hold interactive dialogues with, States at the General Assembly). During the current session of the Committee, the **African Group** (led by Cameroon) shared a very draft proposal on the 'Methods of Work of the Third Committee,' which includes proposals that would require the Council to secure the approval of the Third Committee before taking decisions that impact on the latter's programme of work.



Religion: a pyrrhic victory for the EU?

There was much focus (and a good deal of rumour) in advance of HRC55 on the Council's 'twin' resolutions on freedom of religion or belief (led by the EU) and combatting religious intolerance (led by the OIC). In particular, there was considerable chatter around whether, and how, the OIC would follow-up on the group's success in securing the adoption of a resolution, following an urgent debate, during HRC53 on 'countering religious hatred constituting incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence,' by 're-opening' its annual resolution and adding stronger wording or new actions on incitement to religious hatred – an issue of high political sensitivity in Western capitals.

For years, the EU's and OIC's respective resolutions have existing in a kind of **uneasy balance** – with both 'sides' tacitly agreeing not to make significant changes to the texts and thereby risking 'consensus' (even if it makes little logical sense to adopt the same texts year-on-year without reflecting changes or developments in the 'real world.')

In the end, disagreements in the OIC over whether and to what extent to bring changes to their draft, together with a frustration that the EU was not willing to meaningfully engage on the substance of the matter (and thus avoid a vote should changes be brought), meant that, for the first time since 2011 (when the original 'resolution 16/18 was adopted), the group did not table a text for adoption.

As a result, only the EU's resolution on freedom of religion or belief was adopted at HRC55 – by consensus (the EU did not bring any significant changes to their draft).

Presenting its text on behalf of the EU, Belgium's Ambassador conceded that 'bearing in mind the close relationship between this resolution and the resolution on combating religious intolerance, traditionally presented by the OIC, we had hoped that the OIC would present its resolution in this session. Both resolutions have been running in parallel for many years. The consensus found in 2011 has allowed the Council to speak with one voice on the need to promote and protect the right to freedom of religion or belief, as well as on the need to combat religious intolerance.'

The hollowness of these words was shown at the very next session of the Council (HRC56) when the EU refused to engage with, and then tabled amendments on, the OIC's follow-up resolution on 'Countering religious hatred constituting incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.' The response of the OIC, which would like to secure a common UN approach to countering religious hatred, was to withdraw the draft resolution (even though they would have comfortably won any votes on the text).

The context of the OIC's decisions not to table its regular resolution on combatting religious intolerance, and to withdraw its draft text on countering religious hatred, is ongoing disagreement, especially between the OIC and the EU, about how States should respond to acts of religious hatred such as the public burning of holy texts. Specifically, do such acts constitute incitement to religious hatred, discrimination, or violence, and, therefore, should States prohibit such acts in line with their obligations under the ICCPR? Some EU member States hold that they do not, and therefore such acts should not be prohibited/ criminalised in law. OIC States, unsurprisingly, disagree; hence their decision one year ago, during HRC53, to call for an urgent debate to 'discuss the alarming rise in premeditated and public acts of religious hatred as manifested by recurrent desecration of the Holy Quran in some European and other countries,' and to secure the adoption of resolution 53/1 on the subject.

At the time of the negotiation of resolution 53/1, Western – especially EU – States complained that it would have

been possible for them to join consensus, if the OIC had agreed to prolong consultations. EU actions since then show such claims to be disingenuous.

It will be important in the future that the EU reverses this stance, and engage on the substance of the issue. After decades of discussion, the question of where the threshold lies between legitimate free expression and incitement to religious (or racial/other) hatred **remains unresolved**, and thus a reasonable (and important) matter for debate. Indeed, different Western States themselves take different approaches to the matter. Just because States disagree on a given subject (whether that be incitement to hatred or, say, sexual and reproductive health and rights) does not mean that it should not be discussed – on the contrary, it makes it vitally important that it is (as per the Council's aforementioned mandate to 'enhance dialogue and broaden understanding among civilizations, cultures, and religions, through 'genuine dialogue').

A related point is also important: the EU (and the West more broadly) does not only have 'defensive interests' in this area. Global religious hatred constituting incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence is not limited to a few cases of Quran burnings in European cities. Rather, there are many other examples of religious hatred happening elsewhere, including in OIC member States. As Belgium's Ambassador rightly pointed out during HRC55, 'around the world, individuals continue to be discriminated and, in some cases even prosecuted and killed, because of their religion or belief or the lack thereof.'



Addressing social issues through meaningful dialogue

Another area where more talk - not less - is needed at the Council is societal concerns such as women's rights, gender, and children's rights. For years, the divide between States with more liberal social positions, and those with more socially conservative ones, has been widening. This has in-turn fed increasing polarisation, as one group of States continuously pushes the boundaries of what might be considered universal human rights norms, introducing new concepts and language, while other States have increasingly resisted that push on the grounds that it is often insensitive to their national cultural or religious contexts. The answer to this situation is, again, dialogue and mutual understanding. Yet for much of the past decade there has been little of this, as States have talked past one another, labelling those they disagree with as 'anti-rights.'

This division was evident at the June session of the Council (HRC56) on the matter of women's rights. A draft text presented by Mexico and Chile on the 'Elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and girls' attracted seven amendments (mostly focused on sexual and reproductive health and rights, and gender issues), while

a draft Belgian-led resolution on 'Technology-facilitated gender-based violence' attracted two. Notwithstanding, in the end none of these amendments were adopted, and the two resolutions, together with two more on 'Accelerating progress towards preventing adolescent girls' pregnancy' (Mauritius, Panama), and 'Menstrual hygiene management, human rights, and gender equality' (Gambia, on behalf of the African Group), were all adopted by consensus.

Also at HRC56, differences between delegations on social, cultural, and religious questions, led to a large number of amendments being tabled against a draft resolution on the human rights implications of HIV and AIDS (led by Brazil, Colombia, Portugal, and Thailand). The aim of the resolution was simply to call for a panel discussion on the subject at HRC58, and to ask OHCHR to prepare two reports. Notwithstanding these simple objectives, because the text necessarily dealt with sexual and reproductive health and rights issues such as comprehensive sexuality education, as well as gender issues, it attracted eight amendments. Of these, six were rejected by vote, one was withdrawn, and one saw no action.

On 24 June, H.E. Omar Zniber, President of the Human Rights Council, UN Women and the Permanent Mission of Bolivia organised an event at the UN to mark International Women in Diplomacy Day.

Credit: X @ONUGeneve.

One disappointing trend over recent years is that **children's** rights, something about which all States should agree, have not been immune to these growing clashes between more liberal and more conservative States. HRC55, for example, saw significant disagreements over the content of the GRULAC-EU resolution on the rights of the child, especially over the relative weight that should be placed on the role of parents and the family (and, in that regard, the provisions of article 5 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child). The fact that each year there are now amendments proposed on a matter – the rights of children - that all States should normally agree on, is indicative of the extent of polarisation in the Council, and also of the broad inability of States to engage in meaningful dialogue - meaning not only hearing what others say, but listening, and trying to understand each other's positions (especially from a cultural or religious perspective)

In total, seven amendments (out of eight amendments tabled in total at the session) were tabled to the draft resolution, by Bahrain, Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Russia. Of these, one was not considered, two were withdrawn, and four were rejected by vote.

In the end, the unamended resolution was adopted by consensus.

Further disagreements on children's rights – and further evidence of some Council delegations' repeated failure to engage in meaningful dialogue – arose during HRC56, when Luxembourg (penholder), Armenia, Bulgaria, Colombia, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Gambia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nauru, Panama, Romania, and Sierra Leone tabled a draft resolution establishing an open-ended intergovernmental working group [to draft] an optional

protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the rights to early childhood education, free pre-primary education, and free secondary education.

The idea of a **fourth optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child** was pushed heavily by some civil society actors, most notably Human Rights Watch. The new optional protocol would inter alia:

- Recognise that the right to education includes early childhood care and education.
- Call on States to make public pre-primary education (beginning with at least one year) and public secondary education available free to all.
- Ensure participation of children/that children's views are considered in the discussions on the optional protocol.

Opposition to the proposals, including from some child rights experts, centred on two concerns: first, that the right to free primary and secondary education is already included in and protected by the Convention on the Rights of the Child (either explicitly in the text, and/or through interpretative general comments), and thus to open this issue to intergovernmental negotiation may actually lead to a rolling back of children's right to education; and second, regarding pre-primary childcare, that making such pre-school care free to all, even (to begin with) for just one year, would be well beyond the reach of many developing countries, especially LDCs and SIDS.

Notwithstanding these concerns, and two amendments tabled by Russia, the resolution was eventually adopted by consensus.

Beyond discussions over substance, events around this resolution illustrate two important contemporary deficiencies of the Council. First, there was insufficient consultation in advance of tabling a resolution to establish something as important as an intergovernmental working group to draft a new treaty, meaning there was no space for dialogue to consider important questions such as whether free pre-school care is remotely practicable or affordable for poorer countries, or whether free second-

ary education is not already covered under existing interpretations of the Convention on the Rights of the Child – and thus whether the proposed new optional protocol is necessary at all. Second, and as noted earlier in this analysis, the resolution illustrates the Council's continued obsession with establishing new norms, and negotiating new instruments, when it should be devoting attention and resources to the implementation of existing obligations and commitments.



Gaza – the tragedy the Council forgot?

The Council did not hold any special session or urgent debate on the human rights situation in Gaza over the course of 2024, despite clear evidence of gross and systematic human rights violations, and an unfolding humanitarian disaster. Indeed, since the start of the conflict in October 2023, the Council has failed to hold any emergency discussions on the human rights consequences of either the Hamas' attacks against Israeli civilians, or Israel's operations against Hamas in Gaza, during which tens of thousands of civilians have been killed, including women and children.

This neglect is particularly egregious considering that in March of this year, the Special Rapporteur on human rights in the **Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)** presented a hard-hitting report which found reasonable grounds to believe that the threshold of genocide has been met by Israel, detailing, in particular, the presence of genocidal intent in statements and remarks made by Israeli officials.

It is not immediately clear why this is the case. According to some diplomats, it is because events in Gaza are being 'dealt with' in New York. Another (depressing) possibility is that the Palestinian delegation and the OIC do not see any point in bringing the crisis to the Council's attention in the absence of a clear indication on the part of Israel's Western allies that they will engage seriously and objectively on the substance of the human rights situation, in finding solutions, and in holding Israel to account.

siders that, despite decades of serious and persistent human rights violations against Palestinians in the OPT, key Western powers still refuse to join consensus on resolutions condemning the illegal occupation and its human rights consequences. At HRC55, for example, Western nations called votes on all four resolutions presented on the situation in the OPT. That included one resolution tabled under agenda item 2 instead of item 7 (the Palestinian delegation moved this resolution to item 2 several years ago in the hope that the US and European States would be able to meaningfully engage), on accountability and justice. The text called upon Israel to fully abide by the International Court of Justice provisional measures issued in January, called upon all States to cease arms transfers to Israel (recalling the ICJ's determination of plausible genocide), and requested the COI on the OPT to report on the direct and indirect transfer and sales of arms to Israel. Six States voted against the resolution (Argentina, Bulgaria, Germany, Malawi, Paraguay, US), leaving some States (e.g., Germany and US) open to accusations of hypocrisy and double standards. Importantly (and positively), however, other Western States (Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg) voted in favour of the text. The US, along with Malawi and Paraguay, also voted against the annual resolution condemning ongoing Israeli settlement activity (Germany abstained). This represents, again, an unconscionable failure on the part of these States to condemn a clear violation of international law on the part of Israel, and to uphold the human rights of the Palestinian people.

This stance is perhaps understandable when one con-

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Other country situations

Notwithstanding its inadequate engagement on the crisis in Gaza, in 2024 the Council did continue to address a range of **country-specific human rights situations**, including in Afghanistan, Belarus, Burundi, DPRK, Eritrea, Iran, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Sudan, South Sudan, Russia, Syria, and Venezuela. The Council also continued to innovate and expand its work to secure accountability. For example, at HRC55, the Council established a new mechanism (made up of three independent experts) on the situation in Belarus, and adopted a resolution renewing the mandate of the Commission of Inquiry on Russia's aggression against Ukraine.



António Guterres, United Nations Secretary-General, speaking at the Human Rights Council 55th Session, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland - 26 Feb 2024.

Emerging human rights challenges

While the Council continued, in 2024, to devote excessive attention and resources to norm-setting, and insufficient attention and resources to the translation of existing norms into improved laws, policies, and practices at national level (though strengthened implementation), that is not to say that the Council's normative work lacks any value. Indeed, there is an important need for the clarification and elaboration of norms in various areas, most notably in areas of emerging human rights concern such as digital technology/AI, and climate change/environment.


Regarding the former, HRC57 saw disagreement and confusion when two of the Council President's co-facilitators on digital technology/AI and human rights, the Ambassadors of The Gambia and Luxembourg, presented a draft resolution on the subject, without the agreement of the existing core group on the new and emerging digital technologies, led by the Republic of Korea. Early drafts of that resolution had called for the establishment of a new Council 'task force,' though this was then changed to the establishment of a Working Group (i.e., a Special Procedures mandate). Following intense opposition during the open informal consultations on the draft text, the main sponsors withdrew it. Notwithstanding, it is hoped that the core group on new and emerging digital technologies will take up the idea of establishing a Working Group in 2025, as the independent norm-clarifying and norm-setting work at which Special Procedures excel, would be of great value (for States and technology companies) in the area of digital technology/AI - helping ensure that, in their design, development, and operation, new technologies serve to promote rather than harm human rights.

Two other resolutions related to digital technology were adopted at HRC57: one, tabled by

Sweden, Brazil, Tunisia, and the United States, on 'The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet,' (adopted by consensus), and one, tabled by Argentina, Germany, Greece, and Israel on 'Countering cyberbullying,' (also consensus).

Regarding the latter, the Council has regularly adopted resolutions on human rights and the **environment**, more broadly, as well as on specific aspects of the triple environmental crisis (e.g., regular resolutions on human rights and climate change). However, it has not before adopted resolutions on the other dimensions of that crisis: name-

ly, pollution and biodiversity loss. That changed in 2024. First, at HRC56, Panama, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru tabled a draft resolution on 'Plastic pollution implications on the full enjoyment of human rights,' (adopted by consensus). Then, at HRC57, Colombia and Costa Rica tabled a resolution on 'Biodiversity and human rights,' (also adopted by consensus). While this broadening of the scope of the Council's work on environmental issues is welcome, it is hoped that these new initiatives will be of limited duration, considering the efficiency challenges facing the Council, as well as the fact that the same human rights norms apply to all environmental challenges, whether that be climate change, pollution, or biodiversity loss (hence there is no need for regular initiatives and resolutions covering each of them in isolation).



The implementation gap between universal norms and local reality

As noted above, despite Council sessions getting longer, and more thematic issues being regularly added to its agenda, there has been little or no related up-tick in the time or resources devoted to translating the growing body of universal human rights norms and standards into tangible improvements in the enjoyment of human rights at national level, including through the improved delivery of technical assistance and capacity-building support.

First, there remains no dedicated space at the Council wherein States, UN agencies, civil society and others can report on, and share good practices regarding, progress with the implementation of UN human rights recommendations. Establishing such a **'impact platform'** should be a priority for Council members and for the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Second, the Council's work under **item 10** of its agenda (technical assistance and capacity-building) remains broadly ineffective. Notwithstanding some important innovations (e.g., item 10 resolutions led by the Caribbean Community, Honduras, and Colombia), it remains the case that it is very difficult for developing countries to access international support to help them implement their human rights obligations and commitments. This point

was raised at HRC56 in a joint statement delivered by Gambia on behalf of a group of States. The statement further called for significant reform of the manner in which the Council delivers capacity-building support to those countries that so need and request it.

And third, the wider UN system, especially UN Country Teams, remains poorly equipped to help States implement the recommendations they receive from the UPR, Treaty Bodies, and Special Procedures, and thereby fulfil their international human rights obligations and commitments. While UN agencies, funds, and programmes have significantly upgraded their capacity to integrate human rights recommendations into country programming, a vital piece of the jigsaw - the **Human Rights Advisers** Programme - appears to be going backwards. Indeed, HRC56 saw the adoption of a new resolution entitled 'Informing the Human Rights Council on the Human Rights Advisers Programme,' tabled by Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Paraguay, Sierra Leone, Sweden, and the UK, which expressed acute concern at funding shortages to the Human Rights Advisers Programme, and noted that such shortages would directly impact OHCHR's ability to provide technical assistance and capacity-building support to countries around the world.





A window into the work of the UN's human rights pillar...

Members of the Human Rights Council (Council) hold the main responsibility for pursuing and fulfilling the body's important mandate and thereby 'promoting universal respect for the protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all' (GA resolution 60/251).

When establishing the Council, the UN General Assembly (GA) decided that it would consist of 47 member States, elected by a majority of its members. In making their choice, members of the GA would take into account the contribution of the candidates to the promotion and protection of human rights, as well as their voluntary pledges and commitments.

The GA, furthermore, decided that elected members should uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights and fully cooperate with the Council and its mechanisms. Moreover, it was agreed that the Council's methods of work would be transparent, fair, and impartial, enable genuine dialogue, be results-oriented, allow for subsequent follow-up discussions to recommendations and their implementation, and allow for substantive interaction with Special Procedures and other mechanisms.


yourHRC.org aims to promote transparency around the degree to which the Council and its members are delivering on this crucial mandate, passed to them by the GA and, ultimately, entrusted to them by 'the Peoples of the United Nations' described in the UN Charter.





THE COUNCIL'S FOCUS AND OUTPUT: RESOLUTIONS AND MECHANISMS

Number of Council texts adopted over time






Data source: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ('OHCHR') website / URG Resolutions Portal.

- 97 texts were adopted in 2024, representing a 8% decrease compared to 2023. This decrease brings the number of adopted texts closer to the mean. Moreover, the adopted texts did not reach 2017 or 2020 levels (113 and 103 adopted texts, respectively), which could indicate that States are continuing their efforts to improve efficiency.
- In 2024, the total number (22) and proportion (23%) of voted texts is situated significantly below the mean. Compared to the record high number (38) and proportion (45%) of voted texts in 2021, a steady decrease has taken place in the past three years. While in 2022 the number (33) and proportion (34%) of voted texts had returned towards the mean, in 2023 the number (30) and proportion (28%) were situated slightly below it. This indicates that States have been improving their efforts to achieve consensus in recent years.

The focus of the Council's texts by agenda item (2008-2024)




Data Source: Council texts (resolutions, decisions and presidential statements) adopted between 2008-2024, available on the OHCHR extranet and via the URG Resolutions Portal.

- 56% of all texts generated by the Council in 2024 were thematic initiatives adopted under agenda item 3 (the 'promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, including the right to development').
- The number (10) of item 4 resolutions in 2024 is in line with the trend observed since 2016, with around 10 resolutions per year. Country-specific texts under this agenda item have focused on the human rights situations in Belarus, Burundi, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Eritrea (discontinued in 2018), Islamic Republic of Iran, Myanmar, South Sudan (discontinued under item 4 in 2020), Syrian Arab Republic (usually more than one text per year), Venezuela (since 2019), and the Russian Federation (since 2022).
- Since 2021, only three resolutions per year have been adopted under agenda item 7 ('human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories'). Additionally, for the fourth consecutive year, one resolution concerning the Occupied Palestinian Territories was adopted under agenda item 2 ('annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights'), rather than item 7. This shift may indicate a trend toward addressing issues in the Occupied Palestinian Territories under alternative agenda items.

Financial implications of Council resolutions (2011-2024)

42.3% US\$ 13,091,600 56.1% US\$ 9,561,900 US\$ 10,945,900 US\$ 21,451,600 US\$ 15,969,250 US\$ 20,001,300 US\$ 32,990,296 US\$ 37,794,699 US\$ 26,371,300 US\$ 34,856,000 Texts without PBI (with no extra-budgetary US\$ 41,618,500 appropriations) Texts with PBI (requiring extra-budgetary appropriations) US\$ 69,926,299 US\$ 97,892,984 US\$ 76,159,800


Evolution of Council Special Sessions since 2006




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Donors of the Voluntary Trust Fund to support the participation of LDCs and SIDS in the Council 2024

Donors to the LDCs/SIDS Trust Fund




*as of 25 January 2024



Top themes in 2024: focus of thematic resolutions





Civil and political rights

Cyberbullying

Disinformation

Independence
of the judiciary

Opinion and expression

Participation in political
and public affairs

Peaceful protests

Religion and belief

Torture

Accessiblity

Democratic and equitable international order

Development Genocide

Foreing debt

Internet Firearms Mercenaries

Climate change / pollution

/ biodiversity

Peace Governance Terrorism

International Solidarity Racism

Unilateral Coercive Measures

International cooperation

/ technical assistance


Note: The size of each bubble and word/phrase within the bubble relates to the number of resolutions adopted with that focus/theme in 2024.

Data source: Council resolutions available on the OHCHR extranet and via the URG Resolutions Portal.

- In 2024, the human rights issues related to climate change, pollution and/or biodiversity stood out as a particular concern, reflecting the global concern related to the triple planetary crisis and human rights. Three resolutions were passed in 2024 (two during HRC56 and one during HRC57). One resolution focused on the relationship between climate change and human rights, another on the impacts of plastic pollution, and the last on biodiversity and human rights. This trend of increased Council focus on the triple planetary threat suggests that States may need to consider a more holistic approach to these environmental issues and human rights that, instead of being compartmentalised, recognises that relevant human rights principles are the same regardless of the environmental threat involved.
- Regarding groups in focus, women's and girls' rights were once again a focus point of Council resolutions. Three resolutions were passed in 2024, including two new resolutions: elimination of domestic violence and initiative technology-facilitated gender-based violence.




State participation in Interactive Dialogues of the Special Procedures in 2024



Data source: OHCHR extranet. Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.


Evolution of amendments to Council resolutions






Data source: OHCHR extranet.

Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.



Data source: Council texts (resolutions, decisions, or presidential statements) 2006-2024, available on the OHCHR extranet and via the URG Resolutions Portal.

GLOBAL COVERAGE OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM IN 2024



Data source: Council texts (resolutions, decisions, or presidential statements) 2006-2024, available on the OHCHR extranet and via the URG Resolutions Portal.

30 |



MEMBERSHIP OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

IN 2024 United States of America [←][→WG— 2024 Members Incoming members 2024 Reelected members Outgoing members Bureau member -President Bureau member -Vice-president Members of The Consultative Group Members of The Working Group on situations

Data source: OHCHR website.

COOPERATION WITH THE UN, ITS REPRESENTATIVES, AND MECHANISMS IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Secretary-General's report

On 27 September 20242, the Assistant cooperate or having cooperated with Secretary-General for Human Rights, Ms. Ilze Brands Kehris, presented the and mechanisms in the field of human fifteenth annual report pursuant to Council rights. The Council also condemned acts resolution 12/2 on: 'Cooperation with of intimidation and reprisal committed the United Nations, its representatives by Governments and non-State actors and mechanisms in the field of human against such individuals and groups and rights'. The report contains observations invited the Secretary-General to report and recommendations for addressing and preventing intimidation and reprisals, as well as information on allegations of intimidation and reprisals received during the reporting period of 1 May 2023 to 30 April 2024. The report also includes follow-up information on cases included in previous reports.

expressed its concern over the reports of intimidation and reprisals against individuals and groups wishing to

the United Nations, its representatives annually on alleged reprisals, including recommendations to address the issue.

The 2024 report notes: 'forms of reprisal and retaliation for ongoing or past cooperation and intimidation designed to discourage future participation or cooperation with a wide range of United With resolution 12/2, the Council Nations entities at Headquarters and in the field continued throughout the reporting period'. Incidents or trends were addressed within the United

Nations system by the Secretariat, including the Office of the United during the period." Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and United Nations The field offices and peace operations, Council, the Human Rights Council holders, human rights treaty bodies and other mechanisms, such as the Expert Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture. The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) and the Governing Body of

also addressed incidents of reprisal

Secretary-General's report underscored that the absence or and intergovernmental organs, such decrease of reprisals in reports does as the General Assembly, the Security not necessarily indicate improvement, as fear of further reprisals deters and its special procedure mandate incident reporting and UN cooperation. Additionally, shrinking civic space, rights restrictions, repressive laws, and Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous surveillance discourage engagement Peoples, the Permanent Forum on with the UN which makes reporting and Indigenous Issues and the United Nations addressing intimidation or reprisals more challenging. Further, UN entities continued to observe similar global trends, with new concerns emerging. Many victims documented by OHCHR declined public the International Labour Office and its reporting due to serious risks, impacting Committee on Freedom of Association 32 individuals across six Member States.







Four States are excluded due to victims' fears of identification. Additionally, selfcensorship and anonymous cooperation or reprisals against those cooperating persist due to fear of reprisals, complicating documentation. Half of the trials, and prison sentences—particularly Member States had anonymous cases, though requests for anonymity rose, with 120 victims consenting to report rights violations, including enforced confidentially, making up 75% of new cases. Surveillance remains a concern in torture, and killings, highlighting a a one-third of the Member States.

The report also highlighted that of the Specifically the report mentioned that that deterred or hindered UN cooperation, restrictive measures. Meanwhile, civil

their UN engagement. Further, 80% of Member States reported intimidation with the UN, including legal charges, affecting human rights defenders. Cases of intimidation often involve severe human disappearances, arbitrary detention, persistent pattern of reprisals.

Member States 45% continued to those at heightened risk of reprisals introduce laws related to civil society, include human rights defenders, counter-terrorism, and national security activists, journalists, victims of human rights violations, witnesses, their families, with some nations introducing further lawyers, and trade unionists. Women and Indigenous Peoples face increased risk society organisations continued to face when engaging with the UN. Additionally, dissolutions and deregistrations, limiting gender-specific reprisals against women,


Security Council and peace operations, against women peacebuilders heightened Issues. Additionally, at least 20 young people have reported intimidation, for youth.

The Secretary-General's report further highlights that The Agenda for Protection enables UN entities to address protection challenges within their mandates, particularly in safeguarding human rights defenders and civil society actors facing threats or reprisals for engaging with the

especially those cooperating with the UN. The UN is dedicated to fostering safe, inclusive participation by civil remain a concern, particularly as attacks society, reviewing preventative practices, and enhancing response measures to as their participation increased in peace incidents of intimidation. This includes processes. Indigenous representatives systems to document, track, and also face intimidation in UN forums such report reprisals, in coordination with as the Permanent Forum on Indigenous OHCHR. Member States hold primary responsibility for preventing reprisals, ensuring accountability, and sharing best emphasising on the need for the UN to practices. The international community ensure safe and inclusive participation is urged to protect and support safe, meaningful engagement with the UN, particularly for women human rights defenders and peacebuilders.



38 | | 39





Additionally, as with each annual report on reprisals, the report summarises and provides information on reported allegations of intimidation and reprisals in different UN member States. In 2024 the Secretary-General presents information on cases in the following countries:

Afghanistan | Indonesia

Algeria Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Andorra Iraq

Bahrain Israel

Bangladesh Libya

Belarus Nicaragua

Burundi Philippines

Cameroon Russian Federation

Central African Republic Saudi Arabia

China Sri Lanka

Colombia Turkmenistan

Democratic Republic of the Congo United Arab Emirates

Egypt Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

France Viet Nam

Guatemala Yemen

India State of Palestine

Finally, and again in line with previous annual reports the document summarises responses it has received from States to the allegations made in previous reports. In 2024, the Secretary-General reports having received responses from the following countries:

Algeria | Democratic Republic of Congo

Andorra France

Bahrain Guatemala

Bangladesh India


Belarus Indonesia

Burundi Philippines

Cameroon Saudi Arabia

China United Arab Emirates

Colombia Viet Nam



African Group (AG)

Overview of members



Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Principal sponsorship

During 2024, African members of the Council led (as main sponsors/part of a core group) on a number of important resolutions, covering both thematic and country-specific issues.

In 2024, members of the African Group (AG) led, *interalia*, on the following issues:

Cameroon: Promoting accessibility for the full enjoyment of all human rights by all.

Côte d'Ivoire: Youth and human rights; and Human rights and a culture of peace.

The Gambia: Human rights and a culture of peace; Mandate of Independent Expert on the enjoyment of human rights by persons with albinism; Social reintegration of persons released from detention and persons subjected to non-custodial measures; Openended intergovernmental working group on an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the rights to early childhood education, free preprimary education and free secondary education.

Malawi: Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka; Human rights and a culture of peace; and Remote participation modalities for hybrid meetings of the Human Rights Council.

Morocco: World Programme for Human Rights Education; human rights and transitional justice; youth and human rights; Youth and human rights; Enhancement of technical cooperation and capacity-building in the field of human rights; Technology-facilitated gender-based violence; and Mandate of

Special Rapporteur on the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment.

Somalia: Assistance to Somalia in the field of human rights.

South Africa: Education as a tool to prevent racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; The role of good governance in the promotion and protection of human rights; and Combating discrimination, violence and harmful practices against intersex persons.

Sudan: Human rights and a culture of peace

Notwithstanding such individual leadership, it is important to note that African States often work through their regional group. In 2024, the **African Group** led on, *inter alia*, the following thematic resolutions: From rhetoric to reality: a global call for concrete action against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; Menstrual hygiene management, human rights and gender equality; Mandate of the International Independent Expert Mechanism to Advance Racial Justice and Equality in Law Enforcement; and Mandate of Independent Expert on the enjoyment of human rights by persons with albinism.

The African Group also led on Council initiatives aimed at the delivery of technical assistance and capacity-building in the field of human rights in certain States, including Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Mali, Libya, and South Sudan.


Contribution to Council debates, panel discussions, and dialogues in 2024




- Regional group statements
- Sub-regional group statements
- Political group statements
- Cross-regional group statements
- Other joint statements

Note: This bar chart shows the number of joint statements each State has joined during Council general debates, panel discussions, and interactive dialogues with the Special Procedures. The empty chair symbol indicates whether, overall, the country, as a Council member, participated (individual statements) in more than 10% of panel discussions, general debates, and interactive dialogues. For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Voting analysis



Cooperation with human rights mechanisms



Ratification and reporting are recorded for the nine 'core human rights conventions,' meaning: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW); and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)

Note: for more comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Asia-Pacific Group (APG)

Overview of members



Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote,

Principal sponsorship

During 2024, Asia-Pacific Group (APG) members of the Council led (as main sponsors/part of a core group) on a number of important resolutions, covering both thematic and country-specific issues.

In 2024, APG members led, *inter alia*, on the following issues:

Bangladesh: Human rights and climate change; Human rights and a culture of peace.

China: Marking the thirtieth anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action; and Promoting accessibility for the full enjoyment of all human rights by all.

Indonesia: Equal participation in political and public affairs; Enhancement of technical cooperation and capacity-building in the field of human rights; Strengthening documentation within the Human Rights Council: webcasts; and Right to work.

Japan: Role of States in countering the negative impact of disinformation on the enjoyment and realization of human rights

Kazakhstan: Social reintegration of persons released from detention and persons subjected to non-custodial measures; Elimination of domestic violence; Open-ended intergovernmental working group on an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the rights to early childhood education, free pre-primary education and free secondary education; Safety of the child in the digital environment; Technology-facilitated gender-based violence; and Human rights and a culture of peace.

Kyrgyzstan: Elimination of domestic violence; Openended intergovernmental working group on an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the rights to early childhood education, free preprimary education and free secondary education; Informing the Human Rights Council on the human rights adviser programme; and Technology-facilitated gender-based violence.

Malaysia: Safety of the child in the digital environment.

Maldives: Independence and impartiality of the judiciary, jurors and assessors, and the independence of lawyers; Mandate of Special Rapporteur on the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment; and Remote participation modalities for hybrid meetings of the Human Rights Council.

Qatar: Enhancement of technical cooperation and capacity-building in the field of human rights; and Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic.

United Arab Emirates: Safety of the child in the digital environment.

Viet Nam: Human rights and climate change.


Notwithstanding such individual leadership, it is important to note that some APG States regularly work through political groups, especially the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Arab Group.

During 2024, the **Arab Group** led on Council initiatives aimed at the delivery of technical assistance and capacity-building in Yemen.

In 2024 the **OIC** lead on the following resolutions: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan; Human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the ob-


ligation to ensure accountability and justice; Right of the Palestinian people to self-determination; Human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan; and Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar.

Contribution to Council debates, panel discussions, and dialogues in 2024



Note: This bar chart shows the number of joint statements each State has joined during Council general debates, panel discussions, and interactive dialogues with the Special Procedures.


Voting analysis



THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL IN 2024

Cooperation with human rights mechanisms

(3rd cycle)




^{*} Ratification and Reporting is recorded for nine 'core UN human rights conventions' which include: the ICCPR, the ICESCR, CAT, the CPED, the CEDAW, the CRC, the CERD, CMW, and the CRPD.

Note: for more comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Eastern European Group (EEG)

Overview of members



Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Principal sponsorship

During 2024, Eastern European Group (EEG) members of the Council led (as main sponsors/part of a core group) on a number of important resolutions, covering both thematic and country-specific issues.

At a thematic level, in 2024, EEG States led, *inter alia*, on the following issues:

Albania: Technology-facilitated gender-based violence; and Advancing human rights in South Sudan.

Bulgaria: Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation; Mandate of Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change; and Open-ended intergovernmental working group on an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the rights to early childhood education, free preprimary education and free secondary education.


Georgia: Cooperation with Georgia.

Lithuania: Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation; Mandate of Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change; and Role of States in countering the negative impact of disinformation on the enjoyment and realization of human rights.

Montenegro: Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka; and Social reintegration of persons released from detention and persons subjected to non-custodial measures.


Romania: Social reintegration of persons released from detention and persons subjected to non-custodial measures; Local government and human rights; Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation; Youth and human rights; Open-ended intergovernmental working group on an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the rights to early childhood education, free pre-primary education and free secondary education; and Right to work.

Contribution to Council debates, panel discussions, and dialogues in 2024




Note: This bar chart shows the number of joint statements each State has joined during Council general debates, panel discussions, and interactive dialogues with the Special Procedures.

Voting analysis



THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL IN 2024

Cooperation with human rights mechanisms




* Ratification and Reporting is recorded for nine 'core UN human rights conventions' which include: the ICCPR, the ICESCR, CAT, the CPED, the CEDAW, the CRC, the CERD, CMW, and the CRPD.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL IN 2024

Note: for more comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC)

Overview of members



Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Principal sponsorship

During 2024, Latin America and the Caribbean Group (GRULAC) members of the Council led (as main sponsors/ part of a core group) on a number of important resolutions, covering both thematic and country-specific issues.

In 2024, GRULAC members of the Council led, *inter alia*, on the following issues:

Argentina: Countering cyberbullying; and Situation of human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

Brazil: World Programme for Human Rights Education: the plan of action for the fifth phase; Education as a tool to prevent racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; Promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet; Enhancement of technical cooperation and capacity-building in the field of human rights; Freedom of opinion and expression; Human rights in the context of HIV and AIDS; Mandate of Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy; and Adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to non-discrimination in this context.

Chile: The role of good governance in the promotion and protection of human rights; Local government and human rights; Situation of human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; Elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and girls; and Combating discrimination, violence and harmful practices against intersex persons; Human rights and a culture of peace.

Costa Rica: Social reintegration of persons released from detention and persons subjected to non-custodial measures; World Programme for Human Rights Education: the plan of action for the fifth phase; Biodiver-

sity and human rights; The promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests; Plastic pollution implications on the full enjoyment of human rights; and Mandate of Special Rapporteur on the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment.

Cuba: The right to food; Mandate of Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights; Effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights; Promotion of a democratic and equitable international order; Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination; Human rights and international solidarity; and The Social Forum.

Dominican Republic: Human rights and a culture of peace; Remote participation modalities for hybrid meetings of the Human Rights Council; and Open-ended intergovernmental working group on an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the rights to early childhood education, free pre-primary education and free secondary education.

Honduras: Promoting accessibility for the full enjoyment of all human rights by all; and Enhancement of technical cooperation and capacity-building in the field of human rights.


Paraguay: Mandate of Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change; Situation of human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; and Informing the Human Rights Council on the human rights adviser programme.

Contribution to Council debates, panel discussions, and dialogues in 2024




Note: This bar chart shows the number of joint statements each State has joined during Council general debates, panel discussions, and interactive dialogues with the Special Procedures.

Voting analysis



THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL IN 2024

Cooperation with human rights mechanisms



* Ratification and Reporting is recorded for nine 'core UN human rights conventions' which include: the ICCPR, the ICESCR, CAT, the CPED, the CEDAW, the CRC, the CERD, CMW, and the CRPD.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL IN 2024

Note: for more comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Western European and Others Group (WEOG)

Overview of members



Note: For comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Principal sponsorship

During 2024, the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) members of the Council led (as main sponsors/part of a core group) on a number of important resolutions, covering both thematic and country-specific issues.

In 2024, WEOG members of the Council led, *inter alia*, on the following issues:

Belgium: Mandate of Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change; and Technology-facilitated gender-based violence; and Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation.

Finland: Mandate of Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change; Adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to non-discrimination in this context; Combating discrimination, violence and harmful practices against intersex persons; and Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation.

France: Marking the thirtieth anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action; Youth and human rights; Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation; Youth and human rights; Mandate of Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change; Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic; and Technical assistance and capacity-building to improve the situation of human rights in Haiti, in connection with a request from the authorities of Haiti for coordinated and targeted international action.

Germany: Responding to the human rights and humanitarian crisis caused by the ongoing armed conflict in the Sudan; Countering cyberbullying; The human

rights to safe drinking water and sanitation; Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation; Mandate of Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change; Mandate of Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy; Adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to non-discrimination in this context; Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran; and Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Luxembourg: Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation; Mandate of Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change; and Open-ended intergovernmental working group on an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the rights to early childhood education, free pre-primary education and free secondary education.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the): Equal participation in political and public affairs; Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation; Mandate of Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change; Freedom of opinion and expression; and Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic.

United States of America: Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka; Responding to the human rights and humanitarian crisis caused by the ongoing armed conflict in the Sudan; Promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet; Advancing human rights in South Sudan; Role of States in countering the negative impact of disinformation on the enjoyment and realization of human rights; and Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Notwithstanding such individual leadership, it is important to note that some WEOG Council members regularly work through the **European Union (EU)**. In 2024, at the thematic level, the EU led the following resolutions: freedom of religion or belief; and Rights of the child: realizing the rights of the child and inclusive social protection.

At a country-specific level, the EU led on the following resolutions: situation of human rights in Afghanistan; situation of human rights in Burundi; situation of human rights in Eritrea; situation of human rights in Myanmar; situation of human rights in Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and situation of human rights in Belarus.

Contribution to Council debates, panel discussions, and dialogues in 2024




Note: This bar chart shows the number of joint statements each State has joined during Council general debates, panel discussions, and interactive dialogues with the Special Procedures.

Voting analysis



THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL IN 2024

Cooperation with human rights mechanisms



* Ratification and Reporting is recorded for nine 'core UN human rights conventions' which include: the ICCPR, the ICESCR, CAT, the CPED, the CEDAW, the CRC, the CERD, CMW, and the CRPD.

Note: for more comprehensive information on data sources, timeframes, and methodology, please see endnote.

Methodology Notes

yourHRC.org uses independent and objective data as the basis of its summaries and analyses. The origin of that data is primarily official UN documents and information produced by other international organisations. To ensure transparency, information on the sources of all data used, together with the methodology applied and the timeframe, is presented below.

Section L

The Council's focus and output: Resolution and mechanisms

Source: OHCHR website. OHCHR extranet.

Timeframe: 2006-2024.

Data as of: 31 October 2024

Special Sessions

Source: OHCHR website.
Timeframe: 2006-2024.
Data as of: 31 October 2024

The focus of Council texts by agenda item (2008-2024)

Source: Individual resolutions, decisions, and presidential statements. OHCHR extranet.

Timeframe: 2008-2024

Data as of: 31 October 2024

Financial Implications of Council resolutions (2012-2024)

Source: Individual PBIs. OHCHR extranet.

Timeframe: 2012-2024 Data as of: 31 October 2024

Top themes in 2024: focus of thematic resolutions

Source: Individual resolutions, decisions, and presidential statements.

OHCHR extranet

Timeframe: 2024

Data as of: 31 October 2024

Geographic focus of the Council texts, special sessions, and panels (2006-2024)

Source: Council texts: Individual resolutions, decisions, and presidential statements. OHCHR extranet; Special Sessions: OHCHR website; Panels: OHCHR website.

Timeframe: 2006 - 2024 Data as of: 31 October 2024

Global coverage of the UN human rights system in 2024

Source: OHCHR website. UN Human Rights Appeal 2024.

Timeframe: 2024

Data as of: 31 October 2024

State participation on Interactive Dialogues of Special Procedures in 2024

Source: HRC Extranet

Data as of: 31 October 2024

Note: The level of participation in Interactive Dialogues with Special Procedures was calculated based on the individual statements listed on the OHCHR Extranet during the 2024 sessions (i.e. during the Council's sessions 31-33). Joint statements on behalf of a group of States that were not individually listed were not counted. Nevertheless, of course, States do also participate in this broader manner.

Section II.

Overview of membership, members of the Bureau, of the Consultative Group, and the Working Group on Situations

Source: OHCHR website - Human Rights Council.

Data as of: 31 October 2024.

Voluntary contribution to OHCHR (2023 and 2024)

Source: OHCHR website.

Most recent information published by the OHCHR, data as of 31 October 2024.

NHRI Accreditation Status

Source: Chart of the Status of National Institutions, accredited by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI); https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/nhri/StatusAccreditationChartNHRIs.pdf

Most recent information published by the OHCHR, data as of 31 October 2024.

Previous membership terms

Source: OHCHR website.

Data as of: 31 October 2024.

Contribution to Council debates, panels, and dialogues

Source: HRC Extranet.

Data as of: 31 October 2024.

Note: The participation of the members of the Council in group statements was calculated based on all joint statements listed on the HRC Extranet from March 2024 until September 2024 (i.e., during HRC sessions 55-57). Figures include statements not delivered due to lack of time

Cooperation with human rights mechanisms

Special Procedures

Standing invitation

Source: OHCHR website.

Data as of: 31 October 2024.

Visits Completed & longest outstanding visit

Source: OHCHR website.

Data as of: 31 October 2024.

Note: The number of visits undertaken includes only visits that have actually taken place, as listed on the OHCHR website (i.e. visits reported as completed or with report forthcoming). The dates for the most overdue visit are calculated according to the initial request date of the corresponding visit (regardless of subsequent reminders) or with the earliest request date published, when the initial request date is not available. Visits with incomplete information (i.e., dates and status), invitations, and visits postponed/cancelled have been excluded from the analysis. Visits by Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, or visits to regional institutions/organisations are not included in this analysis.

Communications response rate

Source: OHCHR – Communication report and search database. Data as of: 31 October 2024.

Treaty Bodies

Status of Ratification and Reporting

Source: OHCHR website.

Data as of: 31 October 2024.

Note: Ratification and Reporting is recorded for eight 'core UN human rights conventions,' which include: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

Treaty Body reporting dates relate to the State's current reporting cycle, as listed on the OHCHR website.

Explanation of Options:

- SUBMITTED ON TIME: The State Party Report submitted the report before or on the due date;
- ON SCHEDULE: The current cycle due date is in the future;
- **SUBMITTED LATE:** The State Party Report has been submitted for the current cycle but was submitted late, i.e. after the due date;
- **OVERDUE (OUTSTANDING):** The current cycle report has not yet been submitted, and it is overdue;
- NOT PARTY: The State has not ratified the corresponding Treaty;
- N/A: No deadline has been set, or data is not available.

The 'most overdue' report time is for the outstanding report with the earliest due date.

Reporting and ratification scores were calculated with the information published on the OHCHR website on the 31st October 2024.

Communications procedures accepted

Source: OHCHR website.

Data as of: 31 October 2024.

Note: This figure relates to the acceptance of individual complaints procedures under each of the abovementioned core conventions.

OP-CA

Source: OHCHR website.

Data as of: 31 October 2024.

Note: An 'NPM' is a 'National Preventative Mechanism'.

Universal Periodic Review

Level of delegation

Source: The Head of a State's delegation (for its last UPR) was determined using the report submitted by the corresponding State during its last UPR. Where the rank of the representative was not clear, the URG followed up with the relevant missions as far as possible.

Data as of: 31 October 2024.

Mid-term reporting

Source: OHCHR website.http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRImplementation.aspx

Data as of: 31 October 2024.

Note: The 'mid-term reporting' score relates to whether the State has submitted a mid-term report for the first and/or the second cycles of UPR.

Participation in other reviews

Source: UPR Info - 'Statistics of UPR Recommendations.'

Data as of: 31 October 2024.

Note: Participation in other reviews relates to the number of other States' reviews (out of 193) during which the corresponding State made (1 or more) recommendations.

Note: For updated information on all current and former Council members, visit yourHRC.org.

Photo credits:

Palais des Nations, Geneva. The flags of the 193 member states are back after the renovation of the "Allée des Drapeaux" at the Palais des Nations. 7 February 2014. UN Photo / Jean-Marc Ferré. Photo ID: 579261: UN Geneva. 41st Session of the Human Rights Council. A Voting during 41st Session of the Human Rights Council. 12 July 2020. UN Photo/ Jean Marc Ferré.

UN Geneva. 41st Session of the Human Rights Council. A general view of participants during 41st Session of the Human Rights Council. 1er July. 2020. UN Photo/ Jean Marc Ferré

UN Geneva. 42nds session of the Human Rights Council. Interpreters in Spanish language during 42nds session of the Human Rights Council. 9 September 2020. UN Photo/ Jean Marc Ferré

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About yourHRC.org

The yourHRC.org project has four parts:

1

A universally accessible and free-to-use web portal - yourHRC.org - providing information on the performance of all States that have stood for and won election to the Council. An interactive world map provides information on the Council's membership in any given year, and the number of membership terms held by each country. Country-specific pages then provide up-to-date information on: the voting record of the State; its principal sponsorship on important Council initiatives; its level of participation in Council debates, interactive dialogues, and panels; its engagement and cooperation with the Council's mechanisms (UPR and Special Procedures) and with the Treaty Bodies; and the degree to which it fulfilled the voluntary pledges and commitments made before its previous membership term.



An annual 'yourHRC.org election guide,' providing at-a-glance information (including comparative information) on candidatures for upcoming Council elections.



An annual 'yourHRC.org end-of-year report' (to be published each December), providing information (including comparative information) on levels of member State engagement and cooperation over that year.



A periodic 'yourHRC.org candidate alert' sent to stakeholders informing them of candidature announcements for future Council elections, and providing information on that State's performance during previous membership terms (where applicable).

The present document is the third annual 'yourHRC.org end-ofyear report,' offering an assessment of the Council's work, output, achievements and shortfalls in 2024, and analysing the contributions of member States to the work of the Council and the enjoyment of human rights around the world.

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your HRC.org A window onto cooperation, dialogue, leadership and policymaking at the UN Human Rights Council

