GLION HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE 2020

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE: MAKING DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY WORK FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

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Glion VII

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

The seventh Glion Human Rights Dialogue (Glion VII), organised by the Governments of Switzerland and Liechtenstein, and the Universal Rights Group (URG), in partnership with the Permanent Missions of Fiji, Iceland, Mexico, the Seychelles, and Thailand, was held on 3-4 December 2020 and focused on the topic: 'Human rights in the digital age: Making digital technology work for human rights.' For the first time the retreat adopted a digital format (due to the COVID-19 pandemic). Although the decision to organise the retreat on Zoom was taken for health reasons, the format had several advantages, including facilitating the participation of a wider group of stakeholders, from Australia to Silicon Valley. The Glion VII digital retreat itself was preceded by four preparatory policy dialogues held during the months of February, October and November (three in Geneva and one in New York).

The rapid evolution and spread of new technologies have major implications for the enjoyment of human rights. Indeed, numerous contemporary human rights challenges are inextricably linked with the growing power of digital technology, from the spread of online hate speech to attacks on the integrity of democratic elections.

The Human Rights Council (Council) and the wider UN human rights system have regularly considered the human rights implications of new technologies.[1] For example, in March 2021 the Council adopted a resolution on the right to privacy which considered, *inter alia*, the impacts of new technologies such as artificial intelligence[2] on this right, while in 2019 it adopted a broader text on 'New and emerging digital technologies and human rights.'[3] The latter (resolution 41/11) pursued three main objectives: (1) to look at the positive as well as the negative implications of technologies for human rights; (2) to adopt a holistic approach by looking at a broad range of new technologies; and (3) to promote a multi-stakeholder approach involving 'governments, the private sector, international organisations, civil society, the technical and academic communities.'

Digital technologies and human rights have also been identified as a priority issue by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, and her Office.[4] As she noted during her opening statement at Glion VII: 'Digital technology is changing our world and our lives [at] unparalleled speed and scale. To ensure this change is for the better – and for all – the digital age must be rooted [in] human rights.'[5]

Likewise, UN Secretary-General António Guterres has argued that new technologies, and particularly digital technologies, are already having a major impact on human rights, peace and security, and sustainable development, around the world. He has called for such technologies to be 'put at the service' of humanity and the planet, rather than 'abused to commit crimes, incite hate, [spread] fake information, oppress and exploit people, and invade privacy.'[6] To respond to this challenge, he noted that 'the UN is a tailor-made platform for governments, business[es], civil society and others to come together to formulate new protocols and norms, to define red lines, and to build agile and flexible regulatory frameworks.' Therefore, in 2020, the Secretary-General launched a 'Roadmap for digital cooperation, covering internet connectivity, human rights, and trust and security in the age of digital interdependence.'[7] The Roadmap is designed to follow-up on the report of the 'High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation,' established in 2018.[8] In parallel, and also as a follow-up to the panel's recommendations, in late 2019, the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) launched its 'B-Tech project' to generate human rights guidance for businesses working in the technology space.[9]

Council mechanisms and instruments are also increasingly focused on the human rights implications of new technologies. In 2019, for example, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression released a report on the threats digital technology poses to democracy and free and fair elections,[10] while several other Special Procedures have explored how digital technologies can be mobilised to catalyse and reinforce the promotion and protection of human rights.

Clearly, therefore, there is an important role for the UN in general, and the human rights pillar in particular, to play in clarifying universal human rights norms as they pertain to new and digital technologies. At the same time, ensuring that these technologies respect, and work to enhance the enjoyment of, human rights around the world, requires cooperation between all relevant stakeholders, and in particular the building of partnerships between governments, civil society and technology companies.

Against this backdrop, Glion VII provided a platform for UN member States, the President of the Human Rights Council, senior UN officials (including the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Secretary-General's Envoy on Technology), Special Procedures mandate holders, NGOs, human rights defenders, academics, technology and social media companies, and others, to consider these questions, challenges and opportunities.

As with all Glion Human Rights Dialogues, the informal and inclusive discussions at Glion VII, held under the **Chatham House rule,** aimed to generate new thinking and new ideas, to boost mutual understanding and bridge differences. Finally, by focusing on areas where a 'rights-based approach' can bring important benefits, the retreat aimed to complement existing initiatives in this area. In this context, it adopted a practical approach premised on helping States use human rights obligations, commitments and principles to improve national policies and practices, and on encouraging companies to integrate human rights considerations throughout the 'life cycle' of digital technologies.

POLICY DIALOGUES AHEAD OF GLION VII

Ahead of Glion VII, during February, October and November 2020, URG co-convened a series of informal policy dialogues, also held under the Chatham House rule, with supportive State delegations in Geneva and New York. These dialogues were designed to allow early consideration and exchange of views on certain key questions related to the future of human rights in an increasingly digitalised world. Key conclusions, ideas and proposals generated during the preparatory dialogues were then fed into the Glion VII retreat.

The four policy dialogues (three in Geneva, one in New York) addressed the following topics:

- 'Freedom of expression and access to information in the digital age.' *Hosted by the Permanent Mission of Mexico, 11 February, Geneva.*

- 'Putting digital technology at the service of equality and non-discrimination, including in the area of economic, social and cultural rights.' *Hosted by the Permanent Missions of Iceland and Rwanda, 20 October, New York*.

- 'Putting digital technology at the service of equality and non-discrimination, including in the area of economic, social and cultural rights.' *Hosted by the Permanent Mission of Thailand, 30 October, Geneva.*

- 'Making digital technology work for civil and political rights, democracy and elections.' *Co-hosted by the Permanent Missions of the Republic of Fiji and the Republic of the Seychelles, 3 November, Geneva.*

REPORT OF THE SEVENTH GLION HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE

This report on Glion VII is divided into three parts.

Part one looks at **making digital technology work for freedom of expression and access to information.**

Part two provides reflections on **making digital technology work for equality and non-discrimination, including in the area of economic, social and cultural rights.**

Finally, part three considers various issues relating to **making digital technology work for civil and political rights, democracy and elections.**

Each part of the report includes a brief situation analysis, followed by a summary of the main issues discussed and ideas put forward during Glion VII.

The report is an informal document summarising (in a non-attributable manner)[11] some of the key ideas developed during the Glion retreat and based on the four preparatory policy dialogues. The document does not represent the position of Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Fiji, Iceland, Mexico, the Seychelles, Thailand, nor of any of the participants, but is rather a non-exhaustive collection of ideas generated during those meetings.



MAKING DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY WORK FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION













WHERE ARE WE TODAY?

One of the most profound benefits of the digital age, especially the growing reach and power of the Internet, has been to provide a global, open and (in principle) inclusive platform for the sharing of information, ideas and opinions. However, with opportunities come challenges, including for the promotion and protection of human rights.

The Council and its mechanisms have regularly considered these opportunities and challenges, and have consistently drawn attention to the value of the international human rights framework as a guiding force for the expansion of, and access to, the Internet.

In particular, Council resolutions have addressed a number of specific areas of human rights concern.

With respect to the right to privacy, for example, States have expressed concern that the 'rapid pace of technological development enables individuals all over the world to use information and communication technology,' yet 'at the same time enhances the capacity of Governments, business enterprises and individuals to undertake surveillance, interception, hacking and data collection, which may violate or abuse human rights.'[12] This view was echoed by the High Commissioner during her opening statement at Glion VII, in which she spoke of a global 'privacy crisis,' and sought to highlight the 'unimaginable' scale at which 'companies and States are storing information [...] often without proper safeguards.' This in-turn raises further concerns around 'data-driven discrimination [...] and pervasive surveillance.' Against this backdrop, States have been urged to adopt appropriate laws and policies on personal data and privacy protection online, 'in order to prevent, mitigate and remedy the arbitrary or unlawful collection, retention, processing, use or disclosure of personal data on the Internet that could violate human rights.'[13]

Another area of repeated concern for the Council has been the spread of so-called 'hate speech.' In this regard, the body has stressed 'the importance of combating advocacy of hatred on the Internet, which constitutes incitement to discrimination or violence, including by promoting tolerance, education and dialogue.'[14]

A more recent area of focus has been deliberate disinformation or 'fake news.' The Council has expressed concern 'about the spread of disinformation and propaganda on the Internet, which can be designed and implemented so as to mislead, to violate human rights and privacy and to incite violence, hatred, discrimination or hostility.'[15] Such concerns have become particularly acute during the COVID-19 pandemic, as online disinformation has put people's rights to health and life at significant risk. In that regard, in May 2020 the Council underscored the importance of rights-holders having 'access to timely and accurate information online and offline.'[16]

Whereas issues such as online security, privacy, hate speech and fake news, are of real and growing concern, the Council has also noted the risk that governments might deliberately use such phenomena as an excuse to undermine or actively supress human rights. For example, it has sought to draw attention to 'undue restrictions of freedom of opinion and expression online, including where States have manipulated or suppressed online expression,' with the aim of 'intentionally preventing or disrupting access to or dissemination of information online.'[17] At Glion VII, the High Commissioner made clear that as we 'address the growing power of digital companies,' the international community must be careful not to 'facilitate overreach or abuse by States.'

ISSUES FOR REFLECTION AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE

Data collection and State surveillance

• An important benefit of digital technology is in the area of **data collection and analysis.** By enabling modelling and prediction, technologies such as artificial intelligence and algorithmic decision-making can help **improve public service provision,** with positive implications for, *inter alia,* the right to health and the right to an adequate standard of living.

• Such technologies can also help protect human rights in the digital sphere. For example, social media companies use algorithms to sift through the millions of posts generated each day to identify, tag and remove **'hate speech'** or **malicious disinformation.** In another example, it was noted that smart phones and social media, allied with 'big data' collection and analysis, can be a powerful tool to **monitor and report human rights violations,** including in situations of armed conflict – with important benefits for justice and accountability.

• On the other hand, it was noted that 'big data' and artificial intelligence can be – and often are - used to facilitate **State surveillance** and undermine key freedoms, including freedoms of movement, expression, association and assembly, and the right to privacy. Linked with this point, the use of facial recognition and other biometric technologies, as well as the automatic gathering of metadata, can lead to violations of human rights when and where they are used without the consent of individuals concerned.

• Given the above, a number of participants called for the use of artificial intelligence, whether by State actors or private entities, to be properly regulated. One went further and proposed that a **moratorium** be established on the **export of surveillance technologies** - until a strict, transparent, uniform and rights-based export regime can be put in place.

'Hate speech' online

• At Glion VII, deep concern was expressed about the growing threat to human rights and dignity posed by online expression that **incites hatred or violence** (i.e., 'hate speech'). The speed of information flow in the digital age, and the scale of the harm that hateful content can cause, together mean that addressing 'hate speech' online must be a priority concern for States, the UN and technology companies.

• A number of participants spoke of how hateful expression online especially **targets certain groups,** including based on their religion or belief, their race, ethnic or national background, their gender, or their sexual orientation. They emphasised the point that 'hate speech' spread via social media can have devastating consequence for human rights, including the right to life.

• One speaker, while recognising this threat, urged colleagues to remember that efforts to curb 'hate speech' must be carefully calibrated so as not to **harm legitimate free expression.** There is a continuum from offensive yet permissible speech through to expression that aims to incite hatred and violence – which should indeed be prohibited. Another noted that a key challenge for UN member States is that what is permissible may shift along that continuum depending on **local conditions** (societal norms, cultural and religious backgrounds, etc.). In response, it was suggested that such arguments risk spilling over into advocacy of so-called **'cultural relativism'** – when in fact human rights are universal. Another speaker referred in this context to 'broadly defined national hate speech [or disinformation – see below] laws that may have a **chilling effect** on free speech.'

• There was wide agreement that States must always ensure respect for, and the protection of, **legitimate free speech** as they seek policy solutions to the very real challenges posed by 'hate speech' in the digital age. A number of participants drew attention to the **Rabat Plan of Action** as a key set of guidelines for identifying and responding to incitement to hatred and violence.

• There was also broad agreement that the wider international human rights system provides an ideal framework to guide States and social media companies as they grapple with new and emerging challenges such as the spread of 'hate speech' and disinformation online. For example, one participant argued that, in order to be consistent with international human rights standards, any national laws designed to address 'fake news' or 'hate speech' online, must respect the **principles of lawfulness, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality.**

• Along the same lines, another participant drew attention to the importance of distinguishing between policies governing 'take downs,' 'flags' or 'tags,' and State policies creating 'blanket bans of social media platforms' or instigating Internet 'shutdowns.' There was wide agreement at Glion VII that such **'shutdowns'** violate the principles of lawfulness, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality, and represent a growing threat to human rights around the world. 'It has never been easier,' according to one speaker, 'to express views,' and yet, unfortunately, 'it has also never been easier for governments to shut down views they don't agree with.'

Disinformation or 'fake news' online

• Many of the same questions and challenges pertinent to the issue of 'hate speech' are also relevant to the equally important contemporary challenge of **malicious disinformation** or 'fake news.' It was noted that the growing power and reach of the Internet means that such disinformation can spread rapidly, undermining human rights (e.g., the right to health during a global pandemic) and endangering democracy.

• A number of speakers sought to draw attention to the rapidly increasing threat to human rights posed by a specific type of harmful disinformation, namely **'deep fake videos.'** The impacts of such videos for human rights and dignity are, it was argued, currently underestimated. This is especially the case for already-marginalised population groups. For example, women are the primary victims of 96% of deep fake videos, with many of these being of a pornographic nature.

• As with Glion VII discussions around emerging policies and laws to address hate speech, there was again deep concern expressed (on the part of some States and civil society representatives) about the potential consequences of new 'fake news' laws for **legitimate free speech.** For example, one participant argued that laws that seek to manage disinformation could easily become a pretext for silencing other points of view. In that regard, the participant said, 'we need to make sure that the cure is not worse than the disease.'

• Others countered that it should be possible to address malicious disinformation while **respecting freedom of expression** and that it is vital that States find ways to do so, given the grave risks that online 'fake news' pose to human rights. 'Concern for freedom of expression should not lead to government inaction.'

• One example was shared of a State that is trying to manage the negative consequences of disinformation (e.g., in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic) while protecting freedom of expression. The State concerned has adopted a new law that requires social media companies to rapidly **'tag' posts containing malicious disinformation** with accurate information.

• Finally, it was noted that the spread of 'hate speech' and 'fake news' online is often understood as primarily a risk to the rights of minorities or to religious and racial tolerance. In fact, they are also increasingly a **threat to democracy, the rule of law,** and to **public health**. For example, disinformation about elections or election outcomes can undermine public trust in democratic institutions and exacerbate social tensions, while 'fake news' about medical

treatments or vaccines can directly threaten people's rights to health and to life.

Multi-stakeholder and multi-dimensional approach

• Glion VII benefited from significant involvement on the part of social media and other digital technology companies. This allowed them to describe and explain the different steps being taken by the private sector, sometimes in cooperation with governments, to better respect human rights.

• Examples shared and discussed included **Twitter's steps to flag posts** seeking to spread malicious disinformation (e.g., with clarifications that claims of election fraud are disputed by relevant national authorities), and **Facebook's growing use of algorithms and 'spotters'** to identify and 'take down' posts that seek to incite hatred or violence. On the latter point, there was considerable discussion about **Facebook's new Oversight Board,** made up of independent human rights experts and mandated to review Facebook's content moderation decisions.

• There was broad agreement, during the retreat, about the importance of governments and digital technology companies working together. Others agreed on the importance of a **'multi-stakeholder approach,'** but said this must go beyond States and technology companies, and also include UN bodies and experts, civil society, academia, journalists, and social media influencers.

• There is a need for **'public-private partnership,'** underlined one participant, as both governments and digital technology companies share an interest in controlling the spread of 'hate speech' and harmful 'fake news' online, while at the same time protecting free speech. States are used to regulating such issues themselves. However, in the digital age, with billions of social media posts moving instantaneously across borders, it is not realistic for public authorities to manage such data flows. This can only be done by the social media platforms themselves – 'and even then, it is challenging.' At the same time, private companies should not be given free rein. States are the primary duty-bearers for human rights, and should therefore establish clear, consistent and transparent frameworks of rules for technology companies to operate within. One speaker suggested that **'co-regulation'** should be the preferred approach in terms of 'identifying acceptable or harmful content, and deciding what to do about the latter,' while 'self-regulation is the most effective way to implement agreed rules.'

• This led to a discussion about who or what should be responsible for **oversight.** While there was considerable interest in, for example, Facebook's Oversight Board, some questioned whether it is wise to invest so much power over human rights in a corporate structure (even if the Board is somewhat detached from the company). 'Should we really be outsourcing human rights protection to the private sector?', asked one participant. Instead, it was suggested, all social media companies could come together and work with governments, the UN and civil society to build a single **'social media council'** responsible for overseeing content moderation decisions, or perhaps 'a series of national councils.'

• There was an acknowledgment that 'vocabulary differences' or **'mutual illiteracy,'** as well a general **'lack of trust,'** between the human rights and technology communities is an important potential barrier to building a 'multi-stakeholder approach.' The solution to this, it was suggested, is to work together transparently and in good faith, and to share information and experiences on evolving policies and lessons learnt.

• In addition to the focus on 'multi-stakeholder approaches,' there was also considerable discussion regarding the importance of **'multi-dimensional approaches'** – approaches premised on building trust in the system. In the context of private sector policies, this means ensuring transparency in decision-making, in programming (i.e., for algorithms), and in the elaboration of 'community standards,' creating a reliable and well-trained system of 'spotters' and fact-checkers, and ensuring oversight. For States, it means, *inter alia,* making sure necessary and appropriate regulatory 'guardrails' are in place, promoting a pluralist free independent media, and increasing digital literacy.

The role of the Human Rights Council and its mechanisms

• There was a broadly held view at Glion VII that the Council and its mechanisms are well placed to play a leading role in **clarifying international norms** in relation to digital technology. That role, it was proposed, should include 'providing guidance on how international human rights law applies online,' as well as a common space for the development of 'multi-stakeholder' approaches.

• For its part, the Council could play a more active role in **holding States accountable** for the misuse of technology to supress freedoms (e.g., through 'Internet shutdowns') and violate rights (e.g., where government officials incite hatred or violence).

• The human rights mechanisms, too, have an important role to play. For example, a. number of participants drew attention to the **Human Rights Committee's General Comment number 34,** which calls on governments to avoid placing undue restrictions 'on the operation of websites, blogs or any other internet-based, electronic or other such information dissemination system.' According to the Committee, permissible restrictions do not include generic bans on the operation of certain sites and systems, especially where the motive for such bans is to prevent criticism 'of the government or the political social system espoused by the government.'[18]

MAKING DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY WORK FOR EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION, INCLUDING IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS













WHERE ARE WE TODAY?

With resolution 41/11, the Human Rights Council has recognised that digital technologies can have positive as well as negative implications for economic, social and cultural rights.[19]

In a similar vein, the High Commissioner for Human Rights has spoken of the 'enormous' benefits of digital technology 'for human rights and development,' but has also warned that this technology may be used – either accidently or deliberately – to undermine or violate economic and social rights. 'The digital revolution is a major global human rights issue,' she has said, 'its unquestionable benefits do not cancel out its unmistakable risks.' Therefore, 'we must ensure that the digital revolution is serving the people, and not the other way around.' [20]

At Glion VII, the High Commissioner recalled these points, and pointed out that the COVID-19 pandemic has cruelly exposed an 'inequality, discrimination and exclusion crisis,' a crisis that was already present but often ignored before the virus hit, and which is equally relevant to both the offline and online worlds.

The digital divide

In June 2020, UN Secretary-General António Guterres presented a 'Roadmap for digital cooperation' - a set of recommended actions to help ensure all people are connected, respected and protected in the digital age.

Meaningful participation in the digital age requires a high-speed broadband connection to the Internet. However, in reality, there are important barriers to global and equitable connectivity, especially in the world's poorest countries. First, installing traditional broadband connections is costly, and countries often face difficulties in financing the fibre-optic cables required. Second, market dynamics are often unfavourable. Finally, a lack of digital skills and digital literacy can also limit the adoption of digital tools.

This 'digital divide' reflects and amplifies existing social, cultural and economic inequalities. The gender gap in global Internet use is a stark example – in two out of three countries, more men than women use the Internet.[21] Similar challenges affect migrants, refugees, internally displaced persons, older persons, young people, children, persons with disabilities, rural populations, and indigenous peoples.

The COVID-19 pandemic has once again underscored the urgency in bridging these divides. Digital tools are a lifeline for millions of people. Without prompt action, there is a risk that current barriers to digital inclusion will be layered on top of existing obstacles to development.

Putting technology at the service of economic and social rights, and the SDGs

As noted above, digital technology has both positive and negative implications for the enjoyment of human rights. The mobilisation of such technology has, for example, been at the forefront of States' efforts to mitigate the health impacts of COVID-19, and protect people's rights to health and to life. However, the ethical and legal boundaries of deploying digital tools for disease surveillance and control purposes are unclear, and a rapidly evolving debate has emerged around the risks involved in mobilising digital tools for public health.

Similarly, COVID-19 has had a devastating impact on children's and young people's right to education. As schools and universities have been closed, digital technology has been crucial for the continuation of teaching and student assessments. Yet in many cases, schools and universities have struggled to adapt to this new reality. Students from poorer backgrounds, who may not have access to a personal computer or a reliable Internet connection, are often excluded from online learning, with important negative consequences for their rights and future prospects.

The 'digitalisation' of social security

Although the COVID-19 pandemic served to place the relationship between economic and social rights and digital technologies in a more public light, the growing power of technology to either support or undermine human rights has been evident for some time. An important and illustrative example of this is the 'digitalisation' of social security systems. At the heart of this example is a single question: can artificial intelligence systems be trusted to respect, promote and protect human rights without discrimination?

In October 2019, the Guardian newspaper published an opinion piece by Ed Pilkington entitled 'Digital dystopia: how algorithms punish the poor.'[22] The article explained how access to social security benefits is being digitised and automated. 'Vast sums are being spent by governments across the industrialised and developing worlds on automating poverty and in the process, turning the needs of vulnerable citizens into numbers,' he wrote. The American political scientist Virginia Eubanks has described this as the creation of a 'digital poorhouse.'[23] Moreover, in these cases, digital technology solutions – affecting social security services and benefits - are often being rolled out with minimal public consultation or parliamentary debate.

These serious threats and challenges to economic and social rights, as well as to the principles of equality and non-discrimination that underpin human rights law, are belatedly being considered at the UN. At the end of 2019, Philip Alston, the then UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty, presented his final report to the General Assembly. In it, he warned that the world is 'stumbling zombie-like into a digital welfare dystopia.'[24]

ISSUES FOR REFLECTION AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE

Putting digital technology at the service of social, economic and cultural rights

• There was broad agreement at Glion VII that digital technologies are having an ever-increasing impact on the enjoyment of economic and social rights around the world – for better or for worse. The Council and its mechanisms, participants noted, have a central role to play in ensuring that States effectively mitigate the negative consequences of such technologies and instead ensure they are placed **'at the service of human rights.'**

• Participants raised a number of areas where digital technologies are already being used to serve economic and social rights, and where they might be further mobilised in the future.

• For example, one participant pointed out that digital technologies, in particular machine learning and artificial intelligence systems, have the potential to improve **health** policies by increasing access, improving data analysis for resource allocation**,** avoiding waste (i.e., of drugs), and strengthening financial management. Another speaker agreed and pointed to the prominent role of **contact tracing apps** in State responses to COVID-19.

• A number of national case studies from Africa were presented, showing how UNDP has worked with national governments to facilitate the delivery of essential services, including health services, and to advance sustainable development. In Togo, for example, UNDP and the government have jointly developed **mobile payment systems** to ease access to healthcare and services for informal and migrant workers.

• Another example discussed was the provision of **social services**. In principle, digital technologies can make access to and delivery of such services more efficient and less prone to corruption. An example given was Malawi, where UNDP has worked with the government to set up a digitalised system for the **disbursement of social benefits.** As part of a long-term COVID-19 social recovery strategy, 16 million households were assisted with $1.2 billion. In a related programme, also in Malawi, UNDP worked with the government to build a **national identification system** using digital technology (four million Malawians have been registered so far). Among numerous benefits, the system has had a profound positive impact on women's rights, including their right to vote, their right to equal access to family bank accounts and property claims, and their right to justice (e.g., in the context of allegations of domestic violence).

• However, as mentioned above, removing humans from the provision of social services and replacing them with machines and algorithms also carries significant risk. **Programming errors or biases** can have devastating impacts on economic and social rights, especially of the most vulnerable in society. Moreover, those most in need of social services, such as the poor, homeless or older persons, may be least able to access services online.

• In relation to this point, it was noted that the specific needs of **persons with disabilities** should be actively considered in the design and implementation of digital technology solutions in the area of social services.

• There was considerable interest in the issue of **biases** that may be unwittingly built into algorithms by, for example, predominantly white, male programmers, as well as the consequences of this for human rights. Such biases have led to racial discrimination in **predictive policing programmes,** for example, as well as in employment screening. Two participants also drew attention to examples of gender bias in predictive algorithms in the **education** sector. These have led to women and girls being treated unfairly in university admissions processes, and to students from poorer communities receiving lower grades.

• A number of participants argued that these examples highlight the importance of the human rights community and the technology sector working closely together throughout the **'life cycle' of the development of new technologies.** New algorithms should be designed, trained, tested and deployed based on human rights principles.

• The opportunities and risks associated with digital technology for the promotion and protection of the **right to education** were

repeatedly raised in the discussions. On the positive side, as long as children have access to the Internet and to a device (e.g., personal computer, tablet, smartphone), they can in principle access education, even if they live in remote areas. As one speaker noted, 'technology means that the enjoyment of the right to education is no longer dependent on a student's proximity to qualified local educators.'

• This general rule also applies to **vocational training.** Rural areas of Africa were mentioned as an example of where aspiring (or already-qualified) doctors can be taught by specialists 'half-way around the world.'

• Notwithstanding these opportunities, there also exist a number of parallel challenges. First, although all children have an equal right to a quality education, not all children have equal **access to the digital world** and thus to online learning tools. It was noted that the shift away from on-site learning during the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly increased inequalities among children and young people. Second, such inequalities are further exacerbated by private education. Children who attend private schools tend to come from more well-off backgrounds and can therefore usually afford faster Internet access and their own personal computer. Moreover, private schools can invest more in online learning than their public sector counterparts. (See below for more on the issue of privatisation).

• Another participant spoke of the role of digital technologies in mitigating the impacts of **climate change** on the enjoyment of human rights, especially in climate-vulnerable States. In various LDCs and SIDS, for example, digital technologies have helped improve access to safe drinking water and increase agricultural production.

Digital service provision and privatisation

• Notwithstanding the opportunities to promote social rights in the digital world, some speakers expressed concern that the **digitalisation of public services** is often accompanied by privatisation.

• Some doubted that the private sector, especially 'unaccountable multinationals,' could ever be made to apply human rights principles to their work. **Private companies,** they said, are not bound by international human rights law – 'their focus is on making a profit rather than respecting human rights.' This raises the important yet neglected question, according to one participant, of 'whether privatisation is at all compatible with the enjoyment of economic and social rights.' Building on this, another speaker expressed deep concern about the current 'headlong rush' towards **privatisation and digitalisation,** 'when the consequences for human rights are unclear and when it will be difficult for States to reverse these policies in the medium- or long-term.'

• If a government chooses to pursue a privatisation strategy, another speaker said, it must at least be accompanied by **strong regulations** to ensure that services are provided in a way that is consistent with human rights.

• Others disagreed, arguing that businesses can – and do – integrate human rights concerns into the delivery of public services, as foreseen in the **UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights**. On the contrary, 'excessively stringent regulation,' they said, 'can stymy competition and undermine the private sector's ability to develop solutions that benefit human rights.'

• There was wide agreement that human rights standards need to be integrated into the **design, deployment and use of digital technologies** that affect basic services, but that this is not currently happening in practice. One participant asserted that the vast majority of companies providing core public services such as healthcare, education, water and sanitation, and adequate housing, are either unaware of international human rights instruments or consider them as irrelevant to their work.

• Doubts were also expressed about the degree to which the **UN human rights system** is asserting itself in this 'neglected space' and, relatedly, the extent to which it is able to answer questions around the privatisation of key public services and their impact on human rights, especially in the digital age.

• A number of speakers drew attention to the 'important challenge of **mutual-illiteracy.**' 'Just as tech executives do not understand or speak the language of human rights, so it is true that human rights diplomats and experts rarely understand or speak the language of technology and business.' It was suggested that the answer to this problem lies in bringing the human rights community and the business/tech community together more regularly – for example, by **creating platforms** in or around the Human Rights Council.

• A final point was about **privacy and data protection** in the context of economic and social rights. 'Enormous amounts of personal data,' warned one participant, 'much of it sensitive (e.g., information about health or children), 'is being placed in the hands of unaccountable businesses.' Others expressed particular concern about the storage of biometric data by private companies, as well as about the misuse or even sale of data collected for one purpose for another (e.g., for political campaigns).

'Digital discrimination' between and within States

• There was considerable discussion about the **digital divide** and its wide-ranging negative impacts on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. Participants highlighted the gross inequalities that persist in access to digital technologies worldwide, mainly due to **affordability and infrastructure barriers,** discriminatory social norms, and different levels of digital skills. They also drew attention to the **gender, racial, age and poverty dimensions** of the divide.

• In terms of solutions, participants underlined the importance of adopting a **human rights-based approach to technology policy**, which should include a focus on equality and non-discrimination, as well as improved **digital inclusion metrics** to better monitor and develop targeted policies to ensure that no one is left behind.

• Regarding **inequalities in access to digital technologies,** one speaker pointed to the fact that only a third of people in Africa have access to the Internet, a number which drops to less than a quarter for women and girls. The speaker argued that it is crucial for the international community to put pressure on States to provide equitable access to the Internet for their populations, with a particular focus on marginalised groups.

• While others agreed with these points, they warned that building physical infrastructure alone will not be enough to bridge the digital divide – rather, it must be combined with **proactive, rights-based government policies** (as mentioned above). That should include 'efforts to boost computer and internet literacy for all,' and especially for marginalised groups.

• It should also include efforts to ensure that the Internet 'is treated as a public good' and remains open and accessible to all. In India, for example, the government has adopted laws 'to ensure **net neutrality with a free and open internet.'**

• It was argued that if developed countries truly believe that digital technology can be used for the promotion, protection and implementation of human rights, they should **invest in helping poorer countries build digital infrastructure and strengthen digital literacy.** On this point, it was reported that UN agencies, including UNDP, are increasingly responding to this view by integrating digital access projects into their country programming.












MAKING DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY WORK FOR CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS











WHERE ARE WE TODAY?

The rapid evolution and spread of digital technology are having a major impact on the enjoyment of civil and political rights around the world, and on the ways in which democracies function. Some of those impacts are positive. For example, digital technology allows citizens to more easily participate in civic processes and to demand transparency and accountability from their political representatives, in a manner unimaginable only a decade ago.

However, with opportunities come threats and challenges. For example, while social media makes it easier to connect electorates with politicians, it can, at the same time, be used to easily spread misinformation, disinformation, conspiracy theories and hate. Some of these threats and challenges have received considerable media and expert attention over recent years, while others, especially the negative impacts of digital technology on peoples' right to choose their elected representatives in free and fair polls, and their right to receive accurate and honest information to help them make that choice, have received less attention. Until this situation is rectified, rather than easing the disconnect between electorates and politicians, and ultimately building confidence in a functioning democracy, there is a real risk that digital technology will increasingly be used to foment doubt and mistrust in democratic institutions and processes.

Unfortunately, at present, digital technology is too often used to narrow or restrict, rather than widen, the enjoyment of civil and political rights, and to perpetuate existing inequalities. While, in principle, digital technology is a great equaliser, turning every desktop into a printing press or broadcasting station, recent experience suggests that, far from serving to empower citizens and deepen democracy, for the moment it is the wealthiest and most politically well-connected parts of society who have most effectively seized upon the opportunities provided by digital technology to consolidate – not share - power and influence.

Elections

Although democracy is about much more than the right to vote, free and fair elections are of central importance. Yet the international community has paid remarkably little attention to the question of how to embrace the digital age and its benefits while maintaining and strengthening the integrity and legitimacy of elections.

This is surely a missed opportunity. At a time of increasing distrust between citizens and their governments, technology can play a critical role in creating more transparent and inclusive electoral processes. Countries around the world, including many emerging democracies, are increasingly embracing technology to strengthen their electoral processes, improving efficiency and transparency, and affording the outcomes greater legitimacy in the eyes of voters.

There is also a risk in inaction. Recent years have seen an upsurge in attempts, by candidates, pressure groups, foreign governments and others, to leverage digital technology to manipulate voters or otherwise undermine the integrity of democratic polls. There is increasing evidence that such attempts are often successful, including in long-established and stable democracies.

Now is the time, therefore, for the international human rights community, including the Human Rights Council, to engage with these issues and questions - to ensure that digital technology serves to strengthen the inclusivity and integrity of elections, and thus to promote – rather than undermine - civil and political rights.

Big data and voter manipulation

A number of different national polls over the past five years, in different parts of the world, have shown that technology can be used to mislead and manipulate voters in ways, and to a degree, that would have been unimaginable only a decade ago. These cases have typically involved the theft of personal data and the use of that data to target individual voters, typically via social media campaigns with messages (often containing disinformation) tailored to play on their particular fears or prejudices.

Digital technology companies have begun to take this threat to democracy seriously. For example, Twitter has begun flagging disinformation promoted by political candidates. However, many politicians and election experts argue that these efforts do not go far enough. Governments must also act to safeguard the integrity of elections in the digital age, defend democracy, and protect civil and political rights. Unfortunately, most national election laws and the bodies that police them (e.g., elections commissions), were drafted/established before the advent of the digital age. As a result, they are oftentimes powerless in the face of new forms of digital campaigning.

ISSUES FOR REFLECTION AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE

Digital democracy and the use of new and emerging technologies for elections

• The use of technology in elections takes a number of forms, from candidate and voter registration (including through biometrics) to campaigning, casting votes (ballot scanners, internet voting, voting machines), and making vote counts expeditiously available to the public, civil society and the press.

• Participants agreed that the use of new and emerging technologies for democracy and elections is increasing around the world and offers **important opportunities** for holding more **inclusive, transparent and credible polls,** including in new or emerging democracies.

• For example, the case of a presidential election in Asia (in 2018) was shared. Here, against a backdrop of repeated efforts on the part of the incumbent to steal the election, technology played a key role in ensuring that voting took place fairly and transparently, that votes were quickly and accurately tallied, and that the vote counts were disseminated to the public in real time. All this served to reduce opportunities for voter fraud and meant the result was ultimately respected.

• The case of Japan was also raised. Here, in 2002, the government introduced new electronic voting systems. This was found to have a number of **important human rights benefits,** including making it easier to identify and verify eligible voters, increasing the participation of persons with disabilities, and avoiding long queues at polling stations.

• Building on the above example, in particular the point about democratic **accessibility for persons with disabilities,** another speaker explained that the same principle also holds true for other marginalised groups such as poorer voters (who may not be able to take time off work to wait at polling stations) or those living in isolated rural communities.

• Notwithstanding these success stories, the Glion VII retreat also heard from other countries (e.g., Switzerland and Norway) that have experimented with digital democracy but have since reverted to traditional voting procedures. It was suggested that building public trust in technology solutions, even in advanced economies, remains a challenge.

• Others raised the important benefits of digital democracy during the **COVID-19 pandemic.** It was noted that, against a challenging backdrop, a number of important elections have been able to go ahead thanks to digital technology, including by facilitating online or hybrid rallies, digital campaigning and absentee voting. Another speaker nonetheless cautioned that we have also seen, during the current pandemic, the **contemporary limits of digital democracy.** For example, despite the obvious health risks, a majority of voters in recent elections have still preferred to cast their ballots in paper form, and in person.

• Notwithstanding, participants also recognised, as they did for each of the subthemes addressed at Glion VII, that digital technology also poses significant **risks and challenges** to free and fair elections, and to the integrity and resilience of democratic institutions.

• For example, in some countries, misinformation and **disinformation** about digital voting machines and the broader integrity of polls have spread rapidly on social media, raising doubts in the minds of voters, even where the election was demonstrably free and fair (e.g., in the US).

• Another participant raised the issue of the **online harassment of female candidates** and politicians, which has led, in some cases (e.g., the UK) to elected female representatives withdrawing from politics, and in others (e.g., the US), to threats to their physical safety.

• A further challenge raised during Glion VII related to **digital campaigning.** It was noted that politicians in all parts of the world are increasingly turning to digital solutions (e.g., e-mails, social media campaigns, video messages). While this shift has, in principle, certain advantages, especially in creating a more level playing field for candidates ('traditional TV spots are very expensive,' noted one participant), and in bringing them into closer proximity (in a digital rather than physical sense) with voters (e.g., voters can now regularly interact with politicians via Twitter), it has also created myriad new challenges – especially in a situation where most national election laws were designed for the analogue rather than the digital age. For example, there have been a number of cases, over recent years, of voters' personal data being mined without their consent from platforms like Facebook, sold to politicians, and then used to run highly sophisticated micro-targeted social media campaigns designed to play on voters' fears (e.g., being the victim of crime) or prejudices (e.g., against migrants). It was noted that, in these examples, national elections commissions and data protection commissions have been shown to be **largely powerless** in the face of such tactics and, to-date, that there has been little accountability for those involved.

• Other challenges associated with the shift to online campaigning, raised during the Glion VII retreat, included: **campaign finance loopholes** that mean political campaigns are overspending on political advertisements on Twitter and Facebook; the fact that video messages or online advertising do not allow the same level of **public scrutiny** of politicians as is provided by, for example, TV or press interviews; and the creation of **echo chambers** online, where politically like-minded groups interact only amongst themselves, undermining the pluralist basis of democracy and widening societal divisions.

• On the **legal loophole** point, one participant urged governments to update their campaign finance and broader election laws, to make them 'fit for purpose in the digital age.' Online advertising should be included in overall spending limits, and rigorously policed, including where politicians use 'off-shoot' campaigns that are not directly tied to the main campaign. Another speaker added that updates to electoral laws should also cover data privacy, the content (e.g., to prevent misinformation and disinformation) and origin of political social media posts, the responsibilities of social media companies, and protections for the intended targets (i.e., voters).

• On the **echo chambers** point, one participant described this as 'particularly worrisome where such like-minded forums are used

to share malicious disinformation.' The rise of online conspiracy theories, such as QAnon, offers but one, admittedly extreme, example of this new phenomenon.

Trust in democracy and elections

• A key question in the context of the relationship between digital technology and democracy or elections is one of **public trust.** For example, misinformation and disinformation about voting machines or election results can spread rapidly on social media. Even in the absence of such misinformation or disinformation, electors may lack confidence in digital voting machines. 'For many people, there is still something reassuring about seeing their vote drop into a transparent ballot box.' An added complication for democratic governments is that 'it is difficult to build public trust in digital voting systems without explaining, in detail, how they work – yet such information might be the intellectual property of the company involved.'

• In another example, it was noted that legal 'grey areas' about the use of personal data - sometimes illegally obtained - to power **'micro-targeted' online political campaigns,** and the lack of accountability for those involved, has significant negative consequences for public faith in the outcomes of important elections and referenda (e.g., the 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK).

• One participant suggested that there are **'five pillars for building trust in elections and democracy'** in the digital age: (1) building trust in those responsible for running elections, such as election commissions, and, by extension, in the technology they have chosen to use; (2) those responsible for running elections, under the law, must retain overall control of the electoral process, even if they choose to outsource aspects of the election, such as vote counting, to private contractors; (3) the system for procuring outside support must be transparent and non-politicised; (4) even where machines are used, the vote count should still be impartially observed and open to verification/audit by hand; (5) where there are allegations of voter fraud, these must be investigated, and there must be recourse to an independent judiciary for final arbitration.

• A number of examples were shared of efforts to strengthen public trust in digital democracy. For example, Microsoft has developed an open-source technology called 'Election Guard.' This allows voters to scan their ballot and visually check and confirm that it has been counted, while also safeguarding confidentiality.

Regulation or self-regulation?

• As was the case for the other two subthemes at Glion VII, there was considerable discussion as to the relative merits of **regulatory versus self-regulatory** (business led) approaches to mitigating the risks that digital technology can pose to democracy and civil and political rights.

• Some participants opined that over the past eighteen months, social media giants, including **Facebook and Twitter,** have 'upped their game' and have taken a range of bold steps to prevent their platforms from being used to, for example, spread misinformation and disinformation about the integrity of elections. Twitter's decision to tag false statements by former US President Donald Trump alleging election fraud, was held out as one example. Moreover, 'reforms initiated by tech companies in response to their perceived failings in the 2016 US presidential election, have also had knock-on benefits beyond the US, in places like Myanmar.'

• Another person agreed, arguing that recent steps represent a 'massive shift' in the positions and practices of digital technology companies. For example, Facebook has strengthened its community guidelines, while Twitter has 'begun public consultations on their terms of service related to disinformation, hate speech and manipulated content.' Twitter has taken **consultative approach** because, 'users do not want [social media companies] to take top-down decisions on what information they can and cannot share and view.' Rather, according to the speaker, 'they want to be provided with more information to enable informed decisions.' This last point helps explain Twitter's preferred policy of tagging fake news posts about COVID-19 or the 2020 US elections with factual counter-information, rather than simply removing the original posts.

• Others, while recognising a greater willingness on the part of social media companies to rein in content that harms civil and political rights, while respecting legitimate free speech, nonetheless questioned the effectiveness of some of the steps taken. For example, it was noted that Facebook's last-minute decision to ban political advertising during the 2020 US presidential election did not work. Others raised moral questions about ceding so much power 'to police free speech to unaccountable business enterprises.'

• Notwithstanding people's positions on the merits of self-regulation, there was wide agreement that States are responsible for setting the broad rules – 'the **guardrails** set up to ensure that social media companies operate in a way that promotes and respects human rights.' There was also a widely held view that, for the moment, governments are not fulfilling this responsibility, either individually or collectively, including at the UN.

• Overall, participants agreed that the only way to fully safeguard civil and political rights, and address threats to democracy, in the digital age, is through 'public-private partnership.' The **'Christchurch Call to Action,'** designed to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online, was cited as a good example of such partnership.

The role of the UN human rights system

• There was wide agreement that the UN must necessarily play a key role in **clarifying human rights norms** as they pertain to digital democracy, and in providing **a space for States to coordinate their actions,** including in consultation with technology companies and

civil society. This last point was seen as particularly important in view of the cross-border/global nature of the challenges involved.

• Regarding **norm-setting,** a number of speakers made the broad point that 'the same rights must apply online as apply offline.' Beyond that general assertion, many called on the Human Rights Council and its mechanisms to play a more proactive role, in consultation with digital technology companies and civil society, in clarifying human rights norms as they relate to key challenges in the digital age, such as digital democracy, fake news and hate speech. It was suggested that this could be best done through **soft law instruments** such as UN guidelines, resolutions or general comments.

• For example, one speaker said it would be useful for governments to work together at UN-level to identify the criteria that companies should be permitted to use when facilitating micro-targeted political advertising campaigns. In the view of the speaker, permissible criteria for algorithms might include, for example, 'age and gender,' but not 'shopping history, past social media posts, or browsing history.' The speaker argued that 'the right to privacy should be a guiding principle in establishing permissible criteria.

• Not everyone agreed, however, on the value of further norm-setting work at the UN. What is important, they said, is for States to respect the fact that 'the same rights apply online as apply offline,' and for States, in cooperation with technology companies, to focus on the **national implementation of universal norms.** It was noted, for example, that the ICCPR, relevant UN resolutions and reports, and soft law instruments such as the Rabat Plan of Action, taken together, provide detailed guidance to States and social media companies on protecting freedom of expression while addressing hate speech - 'what is important now is for governments and companies like Facebook to apply those rules.'

• Turning to the role of the **UN as a platform for cooperation** between governments, technology companies and civil society, one speaker urged democratic States, for example, to consult with each other, as well as with the private sector, on common challenges posed by digital technology to election laws and election infrastructure. This should include serious consideration as to whether current laws need updating and whether relevant bodies like elections commissions have all the powers and resources they need.

• Building on the last point, participants also urged governments to work together to agree common rules 'to protect against particularly egregious violations of civil and political rights' caused, for example, by **'cyber-attacks** against political campaigns, State **surveillance** and **Internet shutdowns.'** One speaker noted with concern that 'Internet shutdowns seem to have become standard practice for those leaders determined to control and steal elections in Africa and Asia.' Such tactics are designed 'to help incumbents supress political opposition, silence dissent, and control predominant narratives about election outcomes.' They also help keep the international community in the dark about what is happening inside the country. 'The **Human Rights Council** should be much more focused on these **emerging human rights violations,'** it was argued, 'either through new resolutions on democracy and elections, or via paragraphs on cyber-attacks and Internet shutdowns in country-specific resolutions.'

• Building on and linked to this point, there was a considered debate at Glion VII around the issue of **foreign interference in democracy and elections,** especially where more autocratic regimes seek to use digital technology and human rights, such as freedom of expression, to undermine the resilience of democratic institutions and/or popular trust in other countries. There was wide agreement that this is an enormously important emerging human rights issue, with significant implications for the health of democracy around the world. And yet, thus far, the Human Rights Council has 'not yet faced up to the questions involved, let alone found any answers.'

• Bringing issues around digital technology, democracy and elections more squarely into the Council's orbit, including by creating regularised platforms for the exchange of experiences and approaches, would also allow States to learn from each other and build on existing **good practices.** For example, other countries might learn from Japan's efforts to build digital technology policy around the 'human-centred artificial intelligence principle.' Under this principle, the conception, design and roll-out of new technologies should occur in a manner that promotes – and does not harm – human rights. A tech representative added that 'for us, every year is an election year – and it would be good to have a regularised space at the UN where we can share lessons learnt and discuss common solutions.'

• A **regularised platform for States, technology companies and civil society** to engage and coordinate policy would also be useful, it was suggested, as a forum for jointly considering 'important but difficult human rights questions, such as whether online gatherings should benefit from freedom of assembly human rights protections in the same way that in-person rallies do - a question that has become especially important during the COVID-19 pandemic.' A participant explained that this issue has already been addressed by the UN Human Rights Committee.

• In addition to the role of the Council, a number of participants spoke of the important mandate and responsibilities of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Indeed, it was noted that **OHCHR** has been particularly active over recent years in the digital technology and human rights space. For example, it has an ongoing project on accountability, which includes analysis of non-judicial grievance mechanisms such as Facebook's new Oversight Board.

CONCLUSION

Discussions at Glion VII demonstrated a growing awareness, among States, technology companies, UN experts and civil society, of both the scope and the scale of the challenges that digital technology pose to human rights in the 21st century, as well as a growing recognition that now is the time for the Human Rights Council, its mechanisms and the wider UN system to act. There was, moreover, a clear belief that the global and complex nature of those challenges mean that all stakeholders must work together, through dialogue, cooperation and collaboration, if they are to be effectively addressed. At the same time, there was a strong determination, among participants at Glion VII, that the role of the international community should not only be to mitigate the human rights risks associated with new technologies, but rather to 'put digital technology at the service of human rights' – economic, social, cultural, civil and political.

END NOTES

1. For an overview of the Councils engagement with this topic see The URG, 'Do digital technologies hurt or support human rights?', 3 September 2019, available from: https://www.universal-rights.org/blog/do-digital-technologies-hurt-or-support-human-rights/

2. United Nations, Human Rights Council, (23 March 2021), Resolution 46/16, 'Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy', A/HRC/RES/46/16, available from: https://undocs.org/A/HRC/RES/46/16

3. United Nations, Human Rights Council, (17 July 2019), Resolution 41/11, 'New and emerging digital technologies and human rights', A/HRC/RES/41/11, available from: https://undocs.org/A/HRC/RES/41/11

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'The mosaic pictures on pages 7, 8, 12, 17, and 18 were made using screenshots taken during the Glion Human Rights Dialogue and the preparatory policy dialogues. Participants featured in these mosaic pictures did not per se participate in a discussion on the topic of the section, where their picture is used.'

working together to protect universal human rights

URG

Universal Rights Group
Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E,
1202 Geneva
Switzerland

T +41 22 755 14 56

info@universal-rights.org
www.universal-rights.org